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Abstract 
 
Print media reports on the SABC suggest that the public service broadcaster (PSB) is 
undergoing a crisis in terms of fulfilling its PSB responsibilities. Hence, this study 
examines whether the SABC is a genuine PSB. In examining the SABC as a PSB, 
theories of media and democracy and critical political economy of the media are used. 
However, this study also engages with the corollary theories of the public sphere, the 
public interest, PSB, and development journalism. The study uses the PSB 
characteristics of independence, accountability, distinctiveness and finance as themes 
to ascertain whether the SABC is a genuine PSB.  The methodology of this study 
consists of institutional analysis, document analysis (which is split into a policy 
analysis and an examination of print media reports on the SABC) and semi-structured 
interviews. The study finds that firstly, the SABC’s independence, both politically and 
economically, is eroded. Secondly, although the SABC is accountable to the state and 
ICASA, the institution is not adequately accountable to the public it claims to serve. 
Thirdly, due to the SABC’s reliance on commercial sources of funding, the institution 
is increasingly shifting towards commercialisation. Fourthly, due to the SABC’s 
increasing shift towards commercialisation, the institution’s high-quality content 
provision is being compromised. Hence, the SABC’s distinctiveness in comparison to 
other broadcasters is eroding. The SABC’s violation of the central tenets of PSB is 
indicative of a governance crisis within the institution, but most importantly, it 
indicates that the SABC is not a genuine PSB. A core reason for the SABC’s inability 
to fulfil the central tenets of PSB and the governance crisis that has befell the 
institution, are flaws in legislation. The legislation that governs the SABC does not 
adequately ensure the institution’s independence from the government or its 
accountability to the public. Consequently, legislation governing the SABC inhibits 
the institution from fulfilling its PSB responsibilities.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
South Africa finds itself in a unique position. After several decades of apartheid, the 
need to reconstruct national identity and a new all-encompassing South African 
culture has become crucial post-1994. Consequently, broadcasting in South Africa, 
and in particular public service broadcasting (PSB), is equally important, as 
broadcasting “is a key medium of the public sphere and hence crucial to the transition 
to democracy and the ongoing process of democratisation” (Horwitz, 2001: 175). 
However, even though South Africa has to deal with the aged task of nation building, 
in terms of broadcasting, it simultaneously has to deal with the current changes in the 
global broadcasting environment. This two-pronged challenge places PSB in South 
Africa in an onerous position. Hence, how the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC) fulfils its PSB obligations within this unique situation is of key 
importance to issues of democracy in South Africa.  
 
This chapter provides a breakdown of the study that will be conducted. First, the 
history of the SABC will be briefly discussed. Second, the aims for this study are 
articulated. Third, a rationale is provided for the study. Fourth, the research questions 
and hypothesis for this study are laid down. Fifth, the various areas that make up the 
theoretical framework are discussed. Sixth, the methods that will be used for this 
study are discussed. Lastly, a review of the existing literature within the PSB arena is 
provided.  
 
1.2. Brief history of the SABC 
 
PSB was established in South Africa by Lord John Reith (Director General of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation – BBC). Reith was invited by Prime Minister J.B.M 
Hertzhog in 1936 to establish a broadcasting regime in South Africa (Teer-Tomaselli 
and de Villiers, 1998). Although the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 
was established in 1936, its operations consisted solely of radio broadcasting 
(Draisma, 1999). Television broadcasting was adopted by the SABC much later, only 
in 1976. One of the reasons for such a delay to the commencement of television was 
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that, it was met with heavy resistance, like all new technology.1 It can be seen that, 
from the moment of commencement, the SABC had strong ties to the BBC model of 
broadcasting (Orgeret, 2006; Teer-Tomaselli, 2004; Teer-Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 
2001; Currie and Markovitz, 1997). The Reithian model of broadcasting suited the 
ideologies of the apartheid government, as black South Africans were not recognised 
as being part of the South African radio audience (Teer-Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 
1995). Hence, from its inception the SABC ultimately functioned as an appendage of 
the apartheid government, facilitating and promoting the apartheid government’s 
policies and ideologies, which promoted both “Afrikaans language and culture” 
(Horwitz, 2001: 121; Orgeret, 2006; Currie and Markovitz, 1997). Another reason for 
the SABC’s pro-government stance was that, the SABC Board was appointed by the 
apartheid government.  
 
The implications of a state-controlled SABC were far reaching, especially since the 
SABC monopolised both television and radio. Firstly, the SABC’s television channels 
were segregated. TV1 catered exclusively for whites in Afrikaans and English, TV2 
catered for blacks in the Nguni languages, and TV3 catered for blacks in the Sotho 
languages. Secondly, programming was racist. Thirdly, South African culture and 
national identity was distorted into a white national identity and culture. 
Consequently, non-whites were marginalised and suppressed in terms of 
representation by the SABC, which ultimately culminated in distorted perceptions of 
the world (Currie and Markovitz, 1997).  
 
South Africa’s appalling PSB situation eventually led to attempts to transform the 
SABC in the 1990s. With democracy taking the reigns in South Africa from 1994, 
notions of building national reconciliation meant that the role of the SABC had to 
change to one that was more representative of the entire nation, a role that would 
serve the public interest of the entire nation (Currie and Markovitz, 1997; Tomaselli, 
1998). The transformation process was also about “correcting social and gender 
imbalances and about change from a non-democratic state to an open, democratic one 
                                                 
1 A more comprehensive account for the delay of television to South Africa is provided by 
Bernard Cros entitled Why South Africa’s Television is only Twenty Years Old: Debating 
Civilisation, 1958-1969, and can be accessed from: 
http://www2.univreunion.fr/~ageof/text/74c21e88-271.html. Retrieved on 29 July 2007. 
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where all South Africans would be given the same rights as equal citizens” (Orgeret, 
2006: 1). The role of the SABC was pivotal, as the institution was presented with the 
task of promoting and facilitating the government’s transformation process. The 
SABC had the ability to promote national reconciliation and nation building, but more 
importantly, the SABC had the ability to provide equality to all through equal 
representation. Hence, from the very beginning of its inception as a PSB in 1936, the 
SABC has been intrinsic to the development of democracy in South Africa.  
 
The SABC’s transformation began foremost by organisational changes, which 
occurred “parallel to the commercialisation process that had been brought to other 
parastatals such as the South African Posts and Telecommunications and the South 
African Transport Services” (Horwitz, 2001: 122). To commence the SABC’s 
organisational transformation, the government created the Viljoen Task Group in 
1990, to enquire into the “future of broadcasting in South Africa” (Horwitz, 2001: 
127). However, the Task Group was criticised as it consisted solely of white men. 
Hence, in opposition to the Viljoen Task Group, the Jabulani! Freedom of the 
Airwaves Conference took place in 1991 in the Netherlands (Horwitz, 2001; Teer-
Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 2001; Currie and Markovitz, 1997). At the Conference, the 
existence of a PSB autonomous of state control and market influences was 
championed. Hence, the Jabulani! Conference was crucial to discussions of the 
SABC’s transformation, as it generated a number of progressive recommendations, 
such as: 
 
… three levels of broadcasting: public service, commercial, and community. The 
public service broadcaster must cater to all tastes and be independent of the 
government of the day… Advertising must be cut back and the “Christian National” 
bias of the SABC must be removed. All indigenous South African languages must 
have access to broadcasting, and education must become a genuine orientation of 
South African broadcasting (Horwitz, 2001: 133).  
 
Another key conference in the transformation of broadcasting in South Africa was the 
Free, Fair and Open Conference of 1992, which was organised by the Campaign for 
Open Media and the Centre for Development Studies (Horwitz, 2001). The Free, Fair 
and Open Conference proposed that broadcasting transformation be negotiated at the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in 1993, so as to remove any 
unilateral decision-making by the government on broadcasting (Horwitz, 2001). Out 
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of the CODESA phase, the importance of independent broadcasting was recognised, 
and subsequently the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act and the IBA 
were established in 1993 (Teer-Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 2001).  
 
The IBA was presented with the task of conducting a Triple Enquiry into firstly, the 
viability of PSB; secondly, cross media ownership; and thirdly, South African content 
(Barnett, 1999; Horwitz, 2001; Teer-Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 2001). The outcomes 
of the Enquiry were to reduce the SABC to two terrestrial channels, impose “strong 
cross-media limitations”, impose “substantial local content obligations for all 
broadcasters”; have a mix of funding; and make sure the SABC focused on its public 
service obligations (Horwitz, 2001: 161). 
 
However, the problem with the IBA’s recommendations was that it did not have the 
authority to put its recommendations into practice. Hence, the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Communications changed the IBA’s recommendations, insisting that 
the SABC have three channels, reduce the government’s responsibility in funding the 
SABC (Horwitz, 2001). The Portfolio Committee also generated “reduced and 
ambiguous public service obligations” (Horwitz, 2001: 169). Consequently, the 
changes made by the Portfolio Committee created the danger of the SABC falling into 
the talons of commercial influences. In 2000, the IBA merged with the South African 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA), to form the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). ICASA thus regulates the 
SABC, ensuring that it complies with its public service mandate and obligations. 
 
1.3. Aims  
 
This study aims to critically analyse the SABC as a PSB in South Africa. This 
analysis will be carried out in order to ascertain whether the SABC is living up to its 
public service mandate, or whether the SABC is moving away from its public service 
responsibilities, as imposed by the Broadcasting Act of 2002, towards 
commercialism. If the SABC is moving away from its public service mandate, this 
study aims to uncover the causes for this shift. In essence, the aim of this study is to 
determine whether the SABC is a genuine PSB. 
 
 
 5
 
1.4. Rationale 
 
PSB has become a topical and controversial issue both globally and locally, which 
makes researching this topic quite enticing. Firstly, PSB the world over is undergoing 
tumultuous transformations. In fact, there has been a vast amount of literature 
pointing to the fact that PSB is under threat and is thus, on the decline (McChesney, 
1999; Blumler, 1992; Held et.al, 1999; Horwitz, 2001; Dahlgreen, 1999; Fourie, 
2003; Mpofu, 1996; Hansen et.al, 1998; Tomaselli, 1994). Consequently, it would be 
engaging to examine the SABC, to explore whether the SABC as a PSB is 
deteriorating or whether the institution is progressing as a PSB amidst the changing 
broadcasting environment.  
 
In addition, PSB in South Africa consists of its own separate nuances, which are 
predominantly attributed to the country’s apartheid past. During apartheid the SABC 
not only promoted and facilitated the agenda of the government of the day, it has also 
been known to promote a market driven agenda (Currie and Markoviz, 1997).  This 
had detrimental effects on perceptions of PSB in the country. However, post-
apartheid, vital steps have been taken to change conceptions of PSB in the country. 
These changes are embodied in the various policies and regulations pertaining to PSB 
in South Africa.   
 
With regard to the South African Broadcasting Act of 2002, the SABC is obligated to 
provide a broadcasting service that speaks of equality and that is representative of all 
South Africans (Broadcasting Act, 2002). Furthermore, the SABC must comply with 
its license conditions as imposed by ICASA. Hence, the SABC must provide a 
broadcasting service, which consists of full-spectrum programming that is 
representative of all South Africans; programming that is fair, balanced, and honest 
(ICASA license conditions, 2005). In addition, the core editorial values that underpin 
the SABC, according to the SABC Editorial Charter, are equality, editorial 
independence, nation building, diversity, human dignity, accountability, and 
transparency. However, the extent to which the SABC strives to adhere to and fulfil 
these editorial values and the regulations stipulated in the Broadcasting Act is of key 
interest and of crucial importance to issues of democracy in South Africa. 
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With the SABC’s history in mind and the new role given to it in democratic times, it 
is crucial to look closely at the SABC to make sure that the past does not repeat itself 
in terms of being controlled by government and market influences. Evaluating 
whether the SABC is adequately fulfilling its public service responsibilities is thus, 
crucial to the public interest and democratic practices in South Africa.  
 
Lastly, PSB has become a controversial issue in South Africa, as suggested by print 
media reports that the SABC has been stumbling from controversy to controversy.2 
Consequently, these controversies have created perceptions in the South African 
media that the SABC is undergoing a crisis as a PSB. Such controversies consist of, 
the appointment of Dali Mpofu (a former advocate and member of the ruling ANC) as 
the CEO of the SABC, the blacklisting saga (where political analysts and 
commentators were banned from SABC broadcasts), and the Gobodo report on the 
commissioning of external television productions. These are just a few of the 
controversies that the SABC has managed to generate. However, they cause the 
SABC’s transparency, accountability, financial position, editorial independence, and 
role as a PSB to be questioned. Furthermore, these controversies also cause the 
SABC’s internal structure to be questioned. In light of such media reports, it seems 
crucial that the SABC’s service as a PSB be closely examined in order to isolate any 
problems that the SABC might be experiencing and suggest solutions to these 
potential problems.  
 
This study is therefore motivated by three aspects simultaneously; the changing 
international PSB environment, the SABC’s post-apartheid obligations embodied in 
the policies and regulations pertaining to broadcasting, and the recent controversies 
pertaining to the SABC in the South African media. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Examples of such controversies that have appeared in the print media can be seen with the following 
headlines: “ICASA to investigate SABC blacklisting. In Business Day. 6 March 2007, 2; 
“Dumbed-down SABC still its ANC master’s voice”. In Business Day. 19 April 2007, 13;  
“It’s time for a new board at the SABC”. In Mail and Guardian. 8 March 2007, 29; 
“Time to purge the SABC”. In Sunday Times. 22 July 2007, 20; and   
“Mpofu’s tenure looks shaky as SABC bleeds”. In Sunday Independent. 8 July 2007, 9. 
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1.5. Research questions and hypothesis 
 
This study will attempt to answer the following questions: firstly, in what ways and to 
what extent is the SABC a genuine public service broadcaster? Secondly, does the 
policy and regulatory framework for broadcasting enable or constrain the SABC from 
fulfilling its public service obligations and responsibilities? This question will also 
explore whether ICASA enforces PSB policy and holds the SABC accountable for its 
activities or inactivity. This question is crucial to this study, as, if there is a problem 
with policy, this problem will immediately affect the SABC’s ability to fulfil its 
public service obligations.  
 
My assumptions to the questions posed above are firstly, the SABC is not fulfilling its 
public service role adequately. Rather, it is moving towards commercialism. This 
assumption is made from the apparent financial crisis that the SABC seems to be 
undergoing. Secondly, my assumption is that the policy and regulatory framework 
does not create an enabling environment for public service broadcasting to flourish in 
South Africa.  
 
1.6. Theoretical framework 
 
In answering the questions posed by this study, a theoretical argument was articulated 
using theories of media and democracy and critical political economy of the media. 
Within this discussion, the media’s relationship to democracy, which includes the 
ideal institutional roles of the media; the public sphere; and the public interest and 
citizenship, was discussed. The concept of public service broadcasting and the key 
characteristics of public service broadcasting were also discussed. The specific PSB 
characteristics that were examined in this study were independence, accountability, 
distinctiveness, and funding. Furthermore, this study engaged in a discussion on 
commercialisation and market failure. Finally, the concept and implications of 
development journalism were discussed. 
 
1.7. Methodology 
 
This study followed a qualitative research tradition, where primary data was utilised 
and analysed. Primary data took the form of firstly, newspaper articles. However, 
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these articles were only used to inform the study, as it provides insight into public 
opinion. Secondly, a policy-oriented analysis was conducted. Within the policy-
oriented analysis the following documents were examined and analysed: the 
Broadcasting Act of 2002, the SABC’s Editorial Charter, the licenses for each of the 
three SABC television channels, the SABC’s annual report for the financial year 
2006-2007, the IBA Act of 1995 and the ICASA Act of 2006. In addition, an 
institutional analysis was conducted, which examined the internal structure of the 
SABC, in order to determine whether the SABC as an institution was enabling or 
hindering the fulfilment of its public service obligations. Furthermore, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with selected key informants from the SABC, ICASA, 
FXI, MISA, NABSA, and with former SABC staff members. 
 
1.8. Research within the field: A review of existing literature 
 
The majority of comprehensive studies that have been done on the SABC are 
historical. These studies deal with the SABC during apartheid or during the transition 
period from apartheid to democracy (from a state to a public service broadcaster). For 
instance, the 1996 edited book by Mpofu, Manhando and Tomaselli, Public Service 
Broadcasting: Policy Directions Towards 2000. The book consists of specific studies 
on public service broadcasting in South Africa by various authors. Although the book 
deals with the examination of the various programme genres and issues that constitute 
PSB or that are related to PSB, the book is a dated study. However, it still provides a 
rare and somewhat thorough and comprehensive examination of the SABC, which 
provides useful background information to this study.  
 
Other studies include Ruth Teer-Tomaselli’s 1998 article, The Public Broadcaster 
and Democracy in Transition: The 1996 Spry Memorial Lecture and Currie and 
Markovitz’s 1997 article, The People Shall Broadcast: The Struggle for a Post-
apartheid National Television Culture in South Africa. Teer-Tomaselli has 
particularly written much about the SABC, most of which are historical examinations 
(Tomaselli, 1987; Tomaselli, 1989; Tomaselli, 1994; Teer-Tomaselli, 1995; Teer-
Tomaselli, 1996; Teer-Tomaselli, 1998; Teer-Tomaselli, 2004). Nevertheless, her 
position on the Board of the SABC has allowed her to provide important insights into 
the SABC. Although Horwitz’s (2001) book, Communication and Democratic Reform 
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in South Africa is more contemporary, the book also has a historical focus, thus the 
book does not address the current state of the SABC, which is what this study aims to 
examine. 
 
Recent literature on the SABC includes Orgeret’s 2006 thesis Moments of 
Nationhood: The SABC News in English – The first decade of democracy. The thesis 
only covers the period from April 1994-July 2004, which is fundamentally the period 
of former President Nelson Mandela’s reign over the country. The period covered by 
Orgeret (2006) leaves a three-year gap, which this study will attempt to fill. Orgeret’s 
study is historically based and its contemporary focus examines the SABC’s news and 
news production. Orgeret’s study is located within cultural studies, and thus has a 
specific focus on content. In contrast, my study focuses on policy and institutional 
issues, and is located within critical political economy of the media and normative 
theories of media and democracy. Another contemporary study is Tleane and Duncan 
(2003), Public Broadcasting in the era of cost recovery. The book fundamentally 
deals with the degree of accountability of SABC radio. Nevertheless, the book does 
provide insights into accountability that can be applied to television as well.  
 
With the above in mind, it can be seen that there is a lack of comprehensive current 
studies on the SABC. This study, which will examine the SABC’s independence and 
accountability, the SABC’s funding model, and policy and regulation pertaining to the 
SABC, will provide an important contribution to existing literature on the SABC. This 
study will examine many of the aspects that make the SABC a PSB, unlike much of 
the existing literature, which focuses on one specific aspect of the SABC as a PSB or 
are historically based. 
 
1.9. Dissertation structure 
 
This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction to the study. 
Chapter 2 consists of a combined literature review and theoretical framework. The 
reason for this combination is that, the literature and theories that are engaged with in 
this study are so tightly interwoven that separating the two would have resulted in 
repetition. Chapter 3 engages in a discussion on the methods that are used in this 
study. Chapter 4 lays down the findings of the study. Chapter 5 engages in an analysis 
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of the findings laid down in chapter four. Finally, chapter 6 forms the conclusion to 
the study and also provides recommendations to improve PSB in South Africa.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review and theoretical framework 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The media have long since been identified as being vital in the promotion of 
democracy, thus PSB is tied closely to the facilitation of democracy in a country. The 
media is deemed to be so crucial as it is recognised as a powerful socialisation agent.3 
Hence, the media influences what society knows and how they know it, that is to say, 
it gives society ideas and images of things that they do not know. The media’s 
socialisation function, together with the fact that the media has a mass audience 
makes the promotion of democracy a crucial role of the media.  
 
Consequently, the media’s relationship and role in a democracy needs to be sussed 
out, which is done in this study, through a discussion of the media’s relationship to 
democracy and the ideal institutional roles of the media. Due to the role that 
democracy plays in discussions of PSB, one of the theories that will be used is the 
theory of media and democracy. However, the theory of critical political economy of 
the media is also central to issues of democracy and thus PSB, and will also be used. 
In this chapter, discussions of the public sphere, the public interest, PSB, market 
influences, and developmental journalism will also be closely engaged in.  
 
It is important to note that, the ideal institutional roles of the media, the public sphere, 
the public interest, and the key characteristics of PSB are intricately interwoven. 
Hence, some aspects, which may apply to all or some of these discussions, may only 
be discussed in one of these sections to avoid repetition. Many of the issues pertaining 
to these interwoven aspects are discussed in detail in the discussion of the ideal 
institutional roles of the media.  
 
In terms of the theoretical framework for this study, firstly, theories of media and 
democracy will be used, as it provides insights into the ideal institutional roles of the 
media (Ansah, 1988; Occiti, 1999; Nyamnjoh, 2005; Ronning, 1994; Ngugi, 1995; 
Curran, 1997; Berger, 2000). Secondly, theories of critical political economy of the 
                                                 
3 Socialisation refers to “processes by which individuals learn and internalise values, norms and 
beliefs” (Ritzer, 2000: 98). 
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media will be used as they also provide insights into the ideal institutional roles of the 
media (Murdock and Golding, 1997; Gandy, 1997; McChesney, 1998). Hence, the 
theories of media and democracy and critical political economy of the media provide 
an important framework for analysing the issue of PSB.  
 
In particular, theories of media and democracy provide an important insight into what 
constitutes the public interest, and as a result PSB (Occiti, 1999; McQuail, 2002; 
Keane, 1993; Lichtenberg, 2002; Curran, 1997; Seaton, 1997; Curran and Seaton, 
1997). Exploring the issue of democracy is important in trying to understand the 
rights of citizens and thus, the public interest (Occiti, 1999; Ronning, 1994; 
Lichtenberg, 2002; Seaton, 1997; Curran and Seaton, 1997). It also allows one to 
ascertain what constitutes media freedom and the state’s relationship to the media and 
vice versa (Legum, 1971; Ansah, 1988; Nyamnjoh, 2005; Ronning, 1994; Nwanko, 
2000, Curran, 1997; Seaton, 1997; Curran and Seaton, 1997). Media freedom and the 
relationship between the state and a PSB are critical aspects as they affect the 
autonomy of PSB, and thus its ability to fulfil its public service mandate and 
responsibilities.  
 
There are two dimensions to critical political economy of the media. Critical political 
economy of the media, due to its close examination of institutions, provides a way of 
understanding, as well as analysing, the SABC’s operations (Boyd-Barrett, 2002; 
Gandy, 1997; Garnham, 1997). Critical political economy of the media’s close 
examination of institutions also allows for the examination of regulatory institutions, 
in this case, ICASA’s policies and regulations that are set out for the SABC (Boyd-
Barrett, 2002; Golding and Murdock, 2000). Critical political economy of the media 
is also concerned with the historical, social and political context of the media, and 
thus plays an important part in examining PSB in South Africa due to the effects that 
apartheid had on the SABC (Boyd-Barrett, 2002; Garnham, 1990; Golding and 
Murdock, 2000). What is more, critical political economy of the media is critical of 
the influence of market forces on the media and is thus crucial to the examination of 
PSB (Boyd-Barrett, Murdock and Golding, 1997; Gandy, 1997; Williams, 2003; 
Garnham, 1990). The theory also takes into account globalisation and the influence it 
has on the media and is thus applicable to current situations in PSB in a global and 
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local context (Boyd-Barrett, 2002; Mattelart and Mattelart, 1998; Garnham, 1997; 
McChesney, 1998). 
 
2.2. The media’s relationship to democracy 
 
Democracy is “‘a particular set of governance relationships or ways of achieving 
governance objectives’ emphasising ‘accountability through open competition for 
authority’, ‘responsiveness and policy pluralism through participation’, and ‘respect 
for human rights’” (Kareithi, 2005: 7). Horwitz (2001) adds that, democracy has clear 
normative dimensions such as equality, majority rule, the protection of minority 
rights, adherence to the rule of law, and freedom of expression. Consequently, 
according to Occiti, “ideally, democracy and media coexist and support each other 
through a process of negotiation hopefully aimed at developing a consensus about the 
public interest” (1999: 6). Occiti’s explanation illustrates that, media and democracy 
cannot be separated, as they have a symbiotic relationship. Consequently, a media, 
which is restricted, will result in the stunted growth of democracy within that 
particular country. As a result, it is important to critically examine institutions that are 
designated the task of promoting democratic processes, such as the SABC. The 
fundamental way in which the media can facilitate democracy is through the 
fulfilment of its ideal institutional roles. The ideal institutional roles of the media stem 
from democracy and embody the ideal way in which the media is supposed to 
function.  
 
The ideal institutional roles of the media stem from democracy theory and embody 
the ideal way in which the media is supposed to function. The ideal institutional roles 
of the media are commonly embodied in, and form the fundamental basis of the 
public sphere, the public interest, citizenship, and the key characteristics of PSB. 
Hence, the ideal institutional roles of the media are important to this study and thus 
need to be sussed out. It essentially links the public sphere, public interest, 
citizenship, and PSB to democratic processes. Consequently, this study engages in an 
in-depth account of the ideal institutional roles of the media.  
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2.2.1. The ideal institutional roles of the media 
 
Theories of the media and democracy highlight and emphasise the ideal roles of the 
media and link these roles to the promotion of democratic processes. These ideal roles 
of the media operate within normative theory. Rozumilowicz (2002) highlights the 
importance of a free and independent media system. This type of media system is 
linked to freedom of expression, which is a human right. According to Scanlon, “to 
analyze the freedom of expression […] we need to identify the values it seeks to 
protect” (1990: 335). A free and independent media system is necessary in order to 
carry out the ideal institutional roles of the media and to facilitate democratic 
processes in a country. Key to ensuring a free and independent system is to ensure 
that no single entity dominates media control, be it the government, the market, or any 
social force (Rozumilowicz, 2002). Habermas argues congruently with 
Rozumilowicz, in his discussion of the public sphere. Consequently, it is extremely 
important to evaluate whether PSB’s and in specific, the SABC, are fulfilling these 
ideal institutional roles, as this impacts on democratic processes in South Africa. 
There are six ideal institutional roles of the media, namely being a watchdog, 
providing information, analysis, an open forum for debate and discussion, 
entertainment, and a cultural role.  
 
2.2.1.1. Watchdog role 
 
The media’s role as a watchdog allows the media to protect the public interest and 
democracy by acting as a surveillance mechanism that mediates balances and checks 
between the government and the public, as well as between private businesses and the 
market (Allan, 1999; Masmoudi, 1992; Curran, 2002; Baker, 2002). In this way, the 
media acts as a means of gauging political activities, where by acting as a surveillance 
mechanism, the media “allows citizens to pay attention to different national activities 
and, by expressing their opinion, contribute to the progress of the nation, it thus acts 
as the fourth estate”4 (Masmoudi, 1992: 34). In this way, the government is again 
made aware of the faults in its political activities and can then make provisions to 
correct these faults. Curran argues that, “The principal democratic role of the media 
[…] is to act as a check on the state. The media should monitor the full range of state 
                                                 
4 Fourth estate refers to the “fourth branch of government” (Lichtenberg, 2002: 174). 
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activity, and fearlessly expose abuses of official authority” (2000: 121). However, the 
media needs to be a watchdog of not only the government and its activities, but needs 
to also act as a watchdog of private businesses (Baker, 2002). 
 
Such abuses are for instance, using official authority to secure the outcomes that the 
official in question may want. In doing so, the official may be in violation of human 
and civic rights; laws might be broken; people may be harassed, intimidated, 
physically harmed or pressured; officials may use their power and authority to make 
sure certain laws get passed or that certain laws get dropped, which works in their 
self-interest.  
 
The MacBride Report highlights that “no government should be the sole judge of 
what people need to know and even less of what they have to say” (Masmoudi, 1992: 
37). Media freedom is seen to be the centre of this relationship between the role of the 
media and democracy, as a free media is able to perform a watchdog role. This 
watchdog role allows the media to make sure those politicians or any other powerful 
figures in society are exposed when they abuse their power and are held accountable 
for their actions. Therefore, the media through its watchdog role, guards against the 
corruption of those who hold power in society. On the African continent, this 
corruption is entrenched by one-party political systems or when the military begins to 
exert power in a particular country (Ansah, 1991).  
 
The fulfilment of the media’s watchdog role is achieved through investigative 
journalism. According to Forbes, investigative journalism:  
 
… is not just about divulging allegations for the first time (the scoop), but rather the 
methodical proving of those allegations in the public interest. This often involves the 
piecing together of complex developments and revealing hidden truths (2005: 6). 
 
Investigative journalism then is concerned with in-depth reporting of issues that are 
hidden from public knowledge and awareness. Investigative journalism is a crucial 
aspect for furthering democratic processes, as such reporting exposes government 
development initiatives when they go wrong, provides the public with reasons for 
these initiatives being defective, and thus makes the government accountable to the 
public, as the public is able to put pressure on the government to incite progressive 
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changes. Due to this public pressure, Forbes highlights that investigative journalism is 
also called “journalism of ‘outrage’” (2005: 5). Thus, the media’s watchdog role 
through investigative journalism is extremely important in democratising countries, as 
it works in the public interest, makes the government accountable to its people, and 
brings about progressive changes. 
 
2.2.1.2. Information role 
 
The media is seen to play a pivotal role in informing citizens on the events and 
processes of the day, on what is happening in society and on daily insights, so that 
they are able to make informed decisions on “public political choices”, for instance 
who is the best candidate to vote for during elections and so on (Murdock, 1992). In 
line with this, elections should be reported on as a process from the moment the 
election period begins to the day it ends. Kellner argues that: 
 
Democracy requires an informed electorate that can participate in political affairs. 
Genuine democracy consists of the sovereignty of the people and thus government 
by, for and of the people. In order for a free people to govern themselves, they must 
be adequately informed and able to participate in public debate, elections and political 
activity (1992: 44).  
 
Hence, one of the ways in which the media in Africa can fulfil its information role is 
by providing a balanced, fair and objective account of election processes, for instance, 
the implementation of policies and regulations (Murdock, 1992; World Radio and 
Television Council, 2000).  
 
Other processes can for instance, take the form of the implementation of policies and 
regulations. The media should also provide general information on the political 
environment such as the government’s activities, so that citizens are aware of how the 
government functions on a day-to-day basis. Similarly, opposition parties can also 
access this information to gauge whether the government is operating to the benefit of 
all. For Murdock (1992) this forms one of the rights that a person is entitled to as a 
citizen of any country. With a public that is adequately informed, people are able to 
actively engage in government policies and programmes by expressing their opinions, 
inviting solutions to problems and aid in the settlement of disputes (Baker, 2002). 
Consequently, the process of democracy becomes legitimised (Allan, 1999; Chiumbu, 
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1997; Nyirenda, 1993). Here, the media is also an educator, working to enlighten 
citizens (Baker, 2002). Due to their active participation, the process of democracy 
becomes legitimised, as citizens are able to participate in the political process 
 
Furthermore, the media should also inform citizens of their human rights as per the 
Constitution, this assists in the empowerment of the people. Therefore, the media 
assists in protecting citizens against human rights abuses (Chiumbu, 1997). 
Associated with the media’s information role, is the provision of analysis 
 
2.2.1.3. The provision of analysis 
 
In providing analysis, the media discusses the implications of the issues and events 
happening in a country, and solutions to problems that may arise (Allan, 1999). For 
instance, the analysis of election processes are needed in order to ascertain whether or 
not a particular election was conducted freely and fairly or whether there was 
corruption involved. The analysis of election processes can be used to ascertain 
whether a particular election is legitimate or not. In this way, the media’s provision of 
analysis facilitates democratic processes.  
 
Another instance, where the media’s provision of analysis is crucial is in the 
circumstance where new laws are drawn up and passed into a country’s constitution. 
The media has a responsibility and duty to analyse the new law(s) in order to establish 
whether it is legitimate and to ensure that it is not flawed or contains any clause that 
may be detrimental to the public; in doing so the media is serving the public interest 
(Tettey, 2001).  
 
2.2.1.4. Open forum for debate and discussion 
 
The media’s provision of analysis must be accompanied by open debate and 
discussion, where if for instance, a particular law was deemed illegitimate through 
analysis and conflict arises around decision-making to change this law, these 
conflicting views can be discussed and debated to facilitate some form of resolution 
(Allan, 1999). By providing open debate and discussion, the media is also providing 
the platform for a public sphere, which will be discussed in detail later in this study. 
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Two principles are highlighted by Lichtenberg, which also help to facilitate freedom 
of expression these are: 
 
the noninterference or no censorship principle: One should not be prevented from 
thinking, speaking, reading, writing, or listening as one sees fit. The other I call the 
multiplicity of voices principle: The purposes of freedom of speech are realized when 
expression and diversity of expression flourish (2002: 176). 
 
The multiplicity of voices, which Lichtenberg (2002) mentions is vital to democratic 
purposes, where many people express their views. Through this, the issue of 
discussion or debate can be examined from all angles, facilitating the best solution or 
decision to the discussion or debate. If all voices are not heard, people may come to 
the wrong conclusions to important issues and this may result in inequality, 
marginalisation and domination. In a democracy a voice needs to be given to those 
that previously did not have a voice, for instance people living in rural areas 
(Manning, 2001).  
 
Ansah quotes Gorbachev in order to establish the importance of debate and discussion 
in democratic processes:  
 
I would like to dwell particularly on the political freedoms that enable a person to 
express his opinion on any matter. The implementation of these freedoms is a real 
guarantee that any problem of public interest will be discussed from every angle, and 
all the pros and cons will be weighed, and that this will help to find optimal solutions 
with due consideration for all the diverse opinions and actual possibilities. In short, 
comrades, what we are talking about is a new role of public opinion in the country 
(1988: 7). 
 
Critical political economy of the media focuses on, “the nature of political debates 
over communication policy and [works to] establish alternative media, as well as to 
participate in them” (McChesney, 1998: 8). In doing so, critical political economy of 
the media, through its analysis and critique seeks to facilitate democratic change. 
 
Debate and discussion directly relates to freedom of expression (Chiumbu, 1997). 
Lichtenberg (2002) points to the need for the multiplicity of voices, which is vital to 
democratic purposes, where many people express their views. Through this, the issue 
of discussion or debate can be examined from all angles, facilitating the best solution 
or decision to the discussion or debate (Curran, 2002). If all voices are not heard, 
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people may come to the wrong conclusions to important issues and this may result in 
inequality, marginalisation and domination (Lichtenberg, 2002). 
 
However, there is much controversy surrounding the ability of the media to represent 
all voices. This controversy stems from the argument that in a complex society, such 
as South Africa, the many opinions that society holds cannot be exhausted. In fact, 
Keane contends that, “The public service claim to representativeness is a defence of 
virtual representation of a fictional whole, a resort to programming which simulates 
the actual opinions and tastes of some of those to whom it is directed” (1991: 122). 
PSB’s rarely, if ever, succeed in equal and total representation of the entire 
population. Keane’s (1991) argument correlates to Mamdani’s (1996) argument in 
this study’s later discussion of citizenship. 
 
2.2.1.5. Entertainment and cultural roles 
 
Although the entertainment and cultural roles of the media may not explicitly have 
anything to do with democracy, they can also interlink with the information, analysis, 
and debate and discussion roles that the media have. The media’s provision of 
entertainment allows for, to a certain extent, social regulation, where understandings 
of acceptable and unacceptable social behaviour are formed (Curran, 2002). 
Entertainment can provide “cognitive maps of reality”, which facilitates social 
insights, such insights have political implications (Curran, 2002: 238). In addition, 
entertainment communicates social values and identities, which assist in the formation 
of political opinion and allegiances. What is more, entertainment provides a platform 
for important discussions to take place on issues such as race, gender, sexuality and so 
on. Furthermore, entertainment provides a platform for minority groups to dissent 
against the dominant structures and ideologies in society. Although entertainment 
does benefit the public to a certain extent, excessive entertainment provision leads to 
“mass passivity and elite control” (Curran, 2002: 238). Hence, entertainment 
provision should not displace the other information and education genres. 
 
Culturally, the media plays a role in validating culture. Consequently, the media have 
a role and responsibility to provide news in terms of the culture within that specific 
country. In this way, the media works to inform and educate those within and outside 
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of that specific country, on the ways in which to conduct themselves socially 
(Manning, 2001).  
 
It is important to note that, the ideal roles of the media and subsequently, the media’s 
relationship to democracy coincide with the notion of the public sphere. In essence, 
the media’s fulfilment of its ideal institutional roles facilitates the functioning of the 
public sphere, which operates on the same premise. Specifically though, the media’s 
role of providing an open forum for debate and discussion provides the platform for a 
public sphere. Many of the arguments laid down when discussing the ideal roles of 
the media are reiterated in discussions of the public sphere. 
 
2.3. The public sphere 
 
The concept of the public sphere originates from the concept of publicity (publicness), 
devised by Immanuel Kant (Splichal, 2006). Publicity according to Kant was a 
“‘transcendental concept of public right’ based on citizens’ fundamental dignity and 
moral sovereignty; as a moral principle and legal norm; and as an ‘instrument’ to 
achieve both individuals’ independent reasoning and legal order in the social realm” 
(Splichal, 2006: 696). Publicity then, is crucial to notions of citizenship and 
democracy. 
 
The notion of the public sphere has been pioneered by Jürgen Habermas and has been 
extremely influential in contributing to a more democratic media system. The public 
sphere, according to Habermas, is “a realm of our social life in which something 
approaching public opinion can be formed” (1964: 116). A place that is accessible to 
all citizens. Hence, the public sphere is essentially a place where “critical-rational 
discussion” can take place (Habermas, 1992: 423). McChesney adds that a public 
sphere is, “a place where citizens interact that is controlled by neither business or the 
state” (1998: 9). Consequently, the public sphere is a place free from vested interests 
(Corner, 1999). This aspect of the public sphere also comprises one of the 
characteristics of PSB, which will be discussed later in this study.  
 
Habermas conceptualised the public sphere in the context of the bourgeois civil 
society, during the rise of capitalism. Habermas provides an account of the transition 
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of the public sphere from the feudal era, which cultivated a representative public 
sphere, to the modern era, which cultivated an unrepresentative bourgeois public 
sphere.  During the feudal era, the public and the private were integrated. The advent 
of capitalism separated the public and the private in the bourgeois era. The modern 
public sphere then, places the interests of the state and the interests of the bourgeois in 
conflict (Habermas, 1964). Habermas argues that ‘The bourgeois public sphere could 
be understood as the sphere of private individuals assembled into a public body which 
almost immediately laid claim to the officially regulated “intellectual newspapers” for 
use against the public authority itself’ (1964: 117). Consequently, in defending their 
interests against the state, the bourgeois’s institutionalised a number of rational-
critical practices in which the public could also challenge the state (Duvenage, 2005).  
 
The first rational-critical practice that was institutionalised was an intimate sphere, in 
which patriarchal values were entrenched within the family. Secondly, a literary 
public sphere was institutionalised, which “created a form of rational-critical 
discourse about objects of common concern that could be carried over directly into 
political discussion” (Duvenage, 2005: 3). Within this literary public sphere, the 
public was able to criticise everything. Thirdly, as a result of the literary public 
sphere, the political public sphere emerged. Nevertheless, the bourgeois public sphere 
was eventually “undermined by historical and economic developments in the 
nineteenth century” (Duvenage, 2005: 4). Habermas also writes of the decline of the 
public sphere, where conflicts that where restricted to the private sphere are 
encroaching into the realm of the public sphere, resulting in the ‘“refeudalization” of 
the public sphere’ (Habermas, 1964: 118).  
 
Habermas positioned democracy, the media, and the public at the centre of his notion 
of the public sphere. Within the public sphere, public interest groups can raise 
awareness on issues of importance, independent of the selfish interests of the 
government and business. Hence, the public is able to put pressure on the government 
and any other powerful groups to promote progressive changes in society. The media 
is at the heart of this public sphere, as it can provide a platform for stimulating and 
facilitating debate within this sphere (Curran, 2000).  
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It must be noted that Habermas’s early conceptualisation of the public sphere has 
been widely criticised. Firstly, Habermas has been criticised for his focus on the 
contradictions in liberal capitalism, instead of a focus on historical developments 
(Duvenage, 2005). Habermas was largely pessimistic about modern media being 
“instruments of misinformation and of elite power” (Corner, 1999: 21; Duvenage, 
2005; Kellner, 2003). In addition, it has been indicated through historical 
investigation that Habermas’s eighteenth-century bourgeois public sphere did not 
exist (Curran, 1991; Shudson, 1992; Sparks, 2000). What is more, Habermas does not 
recognise the marginalisation of women in the bourgeois public sphere (Duvenage, 
2005; Thompson, 1995; Calhoun, 1992; Ryan, 1992). Hence, Habermas idealised the 
bourgeois public sphere when he wrote of the bourgeois public sphere being a forum 
for rational discussion and debate, as it excluded some groups from participating in 
the public sphere (Kellner, 2003). Furthermore, Habermas was highly criticised for 
theorising about a single public sphere, a liberal or democratic public sphere. In doing 
so, oppositional and any other public spheres that may have existed where ignored. 
Kellner points out that “it is more productive to theorize a multiplicity of public 
spheres, sometimes overlapping but also conflicting” (2003: 7). Consequently, 
Habermas, in a revised version of his original work on the public sphere, 
acknowledges the coexistence of competing public spheres, but where a dominant 
public sphere exists (Habermas, 1992).  
 
The notion of the public sphere correlates with participatory democracy. Critical 
political economy of the media favours a participatory democracy system, where 
democracy fundamentally consists of an informed citizenry that participates in 
political processes (McChesney, 1998; Stromback, 2005). Hoynes and Croteau argue 
that a participating citizenry is also involved in “the process of debate, compromise, 
and decision making that affects their communities” (2001: 208). Participatory 
democracy is based on the premise that all citizens have the right to a media that 
represents their needs. These needs are determined by the citizens that the media are 
representing and by no other body. Media content should be independent of 
government and business control. The media should exist primarily to serve audience 
needs and not commercial or government needs (McQuail, 1987). An informed and 
participating citizenry is made possible through the provision of analysis by “a 
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healthy and vibrant media system” (McChesney, 1998: 8). Such a system is one 
where the media facilitates:  
 
… a genuine commonwealth of forms of life, tastes and opinions to empower citizens 
who are governed not by despotic states nor by market forces, that is the necessity of 
developing a self-organising civil society which is not synonymous with the market 
… (Ronning, 1994: 14).  
 
Consequently, a vibrant and healthy media system is one that is independent of 
market or government influences and represents the needs of the people. Furthermore, 
the media should also inform citizens of their human rights as per the Constitution, 
which assists in the empowerment of the people. Therefore, the media assists in 
protecting citizens against human rights abuses (Chiumbu, 1997). It can be seen by 
the discussion of participatory democracy that it correlates with the ideal institutional 
roles of the media and with the key characteristics of PSB.  
 
Sparks (2000) further argues that there are two types of public spheres, the local 
(state) and the global. However, there are no global public spheres in existence yet. 
Although Sparks (2000) argues that there is no global public sphere, there are others 
who contend that a global public sphere does exist. McLuhan (1967) contends that the 
Internet has fostered a global village. A common understanding of the global village 
is supplied by Ang, “the progressive homogenization – through successful 
communication – of the world as a whole” (1996: 367). Another description of the 
‘global village’ is that it “is a thoroughly paradoxical place, unified yet multiple, 
totalized yet deeply unstable, closed and open-ended at the same time” (Ang, 1996: 
367). Similarly, globalisation proponents argue for a global public sphere brought into 
existence by the forces of globalisation. For instance, news-groups and chat sites 
provide a platform through which individuals are able to discuss important issues 
(Whittaker, 2001). Furthermore, Hauben (1996) contends that the Internet facilitates a 
marketplace of ideas, where individuals from various countries are brought into 
contact with one another, as well as with their experiences and views. Consequently, 
these people are exposed to multiple views and are able to form their own opinions.  
 
Nevertheless, there is still strong opposition against the existence of a ‘global village’, 
which can most clearly be seen with the digital divide. The digital divide refers to “the 
differential degree to which rich and poor countries benefit from new information and 
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communications technologies such as the Internet” (James, 2005: 114; Thussu, 2000; 
Ferguson, 2004; Mansell, 2001; Castells, 2001). Hence, if everyone in the world does 
not have access to the Internet in a language that they can understand a ‘global 
village’ cannot be said to exist.  
 
Conversely, local public spheres do exist in the form of open public discussion. 
However, most of the local public spheres that do exist are limited and imperfect. 
Although no global public sphere exists, there are global aspects that are eroding local 
public spheres, for instance, capitalism and globalisation. These global phenomena 
thus, place PSB under threat, as PSB functions predominantly within the local public 
sphere (Sparks, 2000). Consequently, the way in which PSBs work to protect the 
public interest is of great concern when examining PSB. 
 
Additional problems with the concept of the public sphere are that, it is difficult to 
prove empirically and difficult to define. Nevertheless, the public sphere contributes 
vitally to normative theories of the media (Splichal, 2006). Another important 
problem with the notion of the public sphere is that in reality, existing media do not 
embody its ideals. Furthermore, due to commercialisation, audiences have become 
extremely fragmented “in terms of unequal access to material resources, and in terms 
of the different cultural tastes, interests and competencies which distinguish social 
groups” (Barnett, 1999: 649; Hoynes and Croteau, 2001; Corner, 1999; Cross, 2001; 
Curran, 2002b; Siune and Hultén, 1998; Dahlgreen, 1999). Consequently, the public 
sphere has diminished, which in turn has a detrimental effect on democracy (Curran, 
2002b; McChesney, 2000). It is important to recognise that the public sphere and PSB 
are interlinked on this issue, as the factors that are responsible for the decline of the 
public sphere are largely the same factors that are responsible for the decline of PSB. 
Hence, in South Africa a true public sphere can only occur once there is equal access 
to television. Nevertheless, the public sphere and its ideals are an aspirational notion 
to which PSBs as well as regulators can endeavour to fully embody (Sparks, 2000). 
Related closely to the public sphere is the concept of the public interest. 
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2.4. The public interest and citizenship  
 
There is no explicit definition of the public interest; however the concept has certain 
principles attached to it. Consequently, the public interest as a concept has remained 
ambiguous, which is its key flaw (Napoli, 2001; Dennis, 2002). However, Dennis 
provides the foundation for defining the public interest as: 
 
a. The free flow of information 
b. Information about public affairs 
c. The publication of newsworthy information 
d. Communications diversity 
e. Government regulation of certain communications activities in the public interest  
f. Matters of public interest or matters in the public interest are usually immune from  
 libel and privacy recovery (2002: 166). 
 
Some of the points presented above, fall into one of the key characteristics of PSB, 
quality programming, and into the media’s information role.  
 
Napoli (2001), highlights that the notion of the public interest consists of three levels 
namely, the conceptual level, operational level, and application level. Accordingly, 
any discussion of the public interest needs to indicate which level is being referred to. 
The conceptual level is concerned with what constitutes the public interest that an 
institution will need to advance. The operational level is concerned with assigning 
values and principles to the serving of the public interest. The application level 
involves generating policy actions and regulatory standards to ensure the public 
interest is facilitated (Napoli, 2001). 
 
Nevertheless, a contentious issue regarding the notion of the public interest is whether 
the media should function in the public interest or in the national interest. Kupe 
(2005) points out that what is in the national interest is not necessarily in the public 
interest, but what is in the public interest is incontrovertibly in the national interest. 
Consequently, the public interest is much broader than the national interest, where the 
public interest “speaks to and reflects the values that no single organization or 
individual or entity can claim sole ownership of” (Kupe, 2005a: 1). Furthermore, 
Tleane and Duncan (2003) contend that the national interest, disguised as the public 
interest, is often nothing more than the state interest. Speaking at the Goedgedacht 
Forum in 2002, Joel Netshitenzhe argued that the public interest and the national 
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interest “can and should, in fact, be complementary” (Mak'Ochieng, 2006: 2; Tleane 
and Duncan, 2003). In the quest for complementarity between the two important but 
contending concepts, consensus can be found within the South African Constitution, 
which forms the foundation for both the concepts (Mak'Ochieng, 2006; Tleane and 
Duncan, 2003). Hence, PSBs should serve both the public and national interests. 
 
Similarly, Teer-Tomaselli argues that the public interest is not always the same as 
political interest; instead, “it is the chance for ordinary people to receive unbiased 
information, and be able to give voice to their own concerns, not simply the concerns 
of the politicians” (2004: 204). Furthermore, Dennis (2002) points out that even 
public interest and media interest do not always correspond. The media supplying the 
public with what it wants is not necessarily in the public interest. Instead, the media 
should acquaint “the public with the broad range of possibilities and then allowing it 
to make a free choice within that extensive panoply” (Dennis, 2002: 167). Hence, the 
public interest and media interest can only correspond when there is minuscule 
interference and the utmost freedom existing in both simultaneously.  
 
Although, what the public interest is and is not has been discussed, much of what can 
be said to be in the public interest, as well as the factors that hinder the public interest, 
fall within the concept of citizenship. Hence, the rights of citizenship in a democracy 
and the public interest are tightly interconnected. 
 
2.4.1. Citizenship 
 
T. H. Marshall (1963) who pioneered the concept of citizenship argues that 
citizenship is linked to certain rights. Citizenship can be divided into three parts, 
namely, civil, political and social. The civil component of citizenship consists of the 
right to “individual freedom…freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own 
property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice” (Marshall, 1963: 
71). The political component consists of “the right to participate in the exercise of 
political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an 
elector of the members of such a body” (Marshall, 1963: 72). Finally, the social 
component consists of the right to “share to the full in the social heritage and to live 
the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” 
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(Marshall, 1963: 72). Murdock (1992) proposes a fourth sphere of citizenship rights, 
namely, cultural rights. Cultural rights entail “the right to participate in existing 
patterns of social and cultural life and the right to challenge these configurations and 
develop alternative identities and forms of expression” (Murdock, 1992: 20). It is 
important to note, that much of what Marshall proposes citizenship to be, falls within 
discussions of the ideal institutional roles of the media. 
 
Another aspect of Marshall’s thesis, was the emphasis on equal opportunity, where 
every person has the right to “display and develop differences, or inequalities; the 
equal right to be recognized as unequal” (Marshall, 1963: 109). Consequently, 
Marshall’s thesis of citizenship correlates directly with notions of democracy and the 
public interest. Although these rights are supposed to be universal, a major problem 
with these rights is that urban elites have more citizenship rights than those living in 
rural areas that are poor (Mamdani, 1996). For instance, access to television in South 
Africa is mainly an urban phenomenon (Barnett, 1999). Mamdani contends that 
colonialism caused the state to become bifurcated, consisting of two forms of power, 
urban power and rural power. According to Mamdani, “Urban power spoke the 
language of civil society and civil rights, rural power of community and culture. Civil 
power claimed to protect rights, customary power pledged to enforce tradition” (1996: 
18). However, in addressing this inequality, PSB can play a critical role, as it is best 
placed to deliver on the rights advocated by Marshall (1963). Consequently, it is 
crucial to evaluate the state of PSB in South Africa, especially from a historical 
viewpoint, where apartheid created inequalities.  
 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that Mamdani has been widely criticised. Mamdani 
looks for the commonalities between colonial and post-colonial Africa, however he 
either does not clearly articulate the differences or does not recognise them (Tignor, 
1997). For Mamdani, the consequences of colonialism for both tropical Africa and 
South Africa are the same, which is incorrect as South Africa’s development since 
colonialism has been different to that of tropical Africa (Austen, 1999). Mamdani’s 
urban-rural argument, applies more to the South African case than to tropical Africa, 
as South Africa has had a strong migrant labour background (Austen, 1999). Young 
(1999), argues similarly when he reveals that Mamdani articulates the similarities 
between social theory and political life, but does not go further than this and articulate 
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the differences. Even the similarities that Mamdani discusses are not articulated 
persuasively enough. In addition, Mamdani underplays the significance of religious 
and racial inequality in South Africa’s apartheid era (Young, 1999). Furthermore, 
Mamdani’s discussion of the bifurcated state does not account for the specific nuances 
of individual societies, instead, Mamdani generalises significantly (George, 2000; 
Copans, 1998). 
 
Nolan (2006) argues that, the conditions for citizenship and those factors that 
determine inclusion or exclusion of citizenship are always in existence. The denial of 
citizenship can be distinguished along two barriers, firstly, along socio-economic 
barriers such as race, gender, employment and income; and secondly, along barriers to 
the access of imagery and information. When barriers are set up along these lines, 
people are excluded from social and cultural processes, as well as democratic life 
(Golding, 1997). Murdock suggests that deliberations about citizenship should first 
explore “the kinds of programmes that would provide pleasure and promote the core 
capacities of citizenship, and then work backwards to the organizational, financial and 
political conditions that would be required to support and develop them’’ (1999: 16). 
 
Even though the capitalist system creates inequalities and imposes subordination, 
critical political economy of the media identifies that there is a way in which the 
subordinated can resist capitalist domination. Such resistance can be achieved through 
public intervention. Critical political economy tries to identify what constitutes public 
intervention and links this to citizenship rights. One way in which citizenship can be 
implemented is through a public sphere that is open to all groups in society. Critical 
political economy of the media identifies that the media could play a pivotal role in 
promoting this public sphere. In this way, democratic processes are also promoted in 
society (Golding and Murdock, 2000: 76).   
 
The notion of citizenship can be summarised by asking, “To what degree and in what 
ways are people denied access to necessary information and imagery to allow full and 
equal participation in the social order?” (Golding, 1997: 682). It is crucial to note, that 
citizenship rights are not adequate by itself; there must be policies in place, which 
allow people to exercise these rights. Such policies should consist of a combination of 
welfare policies (such as health care) and symbolic resources (a vibrant media system) 
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(Murdock, 1992). Closely linked to the public interest and the public sphere, is the 
concept of PSB, which ideally embodies the theses of both the public interest and the 
public sphere (McChesney, 2000; Murdoch, 1992; Tracey, 1998; Søndergaard, 1999; 
Syvertsen, 1999; Nolan, 2006).  
 
2.5. Public service broadcasting  
 
The theoretical premise on which PSB in South Africa is based is on John Reith’s 
conceptualisation, and is thus tied to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
model5 (Banda, 2006a; Tomaselli, 1994; Cross, 2001; McChesney, 2000; Rayner 
et.al, 2004; Coppens and Saeys, 2006). The notion of PSB exists in highly contested 
terrain. The reason for this is that the needs, interests, desires, challengers, and 
opportunities that the public displays are different in different countries. 
Consequently, different countries tend to have differing models of PSB (Syvertsen, 
2001; Teer-Tomaselli, 2004; Mooney, 2004; Collins et.al, 2001). For instance, as 
Banda points out, in South Africa PSB is about “national unity and reconciliation” 
(2006a: 1). Hence, there exists no single definition of PSB (McChesney, 1999; Teer-
Tomaselli, 2004; Collins et.al, 2001; Banda, 2006a; Mpofu, 1996; Søndergaard, 1999; 
Hansen et.al, 1998, Syvertsen, 1999; Ramadi, 2006).  In view of the fact, that the 
concepts of public interest and PSB are interlinked, PSBs lack of definition may be 
attributed to the public interest’s lack of definition. Consequently, PSB is suffering 
from a legitimation crisis, as the role of a PSB remains ambiguous (Keane, 1991). 
However, the dilemma of providing elucidation to the role of PSBs is that if PSBs are 
prescribed with a specific definition and role, this specification will not cater for the 
nuances of individual countries. In addition, such an act would increase the potential 
for the concept to be too narrowly defined. Hence, although the concept of PSB is 
vague, this vagueness allows different countries to adapt the broad principles of PSB 
to suit that country’s specific PSB needs, it also allows for the transformation and 
growth of the concept. 
 
Nevertheless, Teer-Tomaselli (1998) contends that there are two fundamental reasons 
for the need for PSB. Firstly, PSB plays a crucial role in protecting national identity 
                                                 
5 John Reith was the first Managing Director of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Reith 
wrote a book in 1924 entitled, Broadcast over Britain, in which he laid down the first PSB principles 
(Findahl, 1999). 
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and culture. Secondly, PSB plays a crucial role in providing important need-to-know 
content to the public, such as “information, education, and entertainment to those 
sectors of society which are economically non-profitable” (Teer-Tomaselli, 1998: 6). 
In fact, Keane advocates that,  
 
The public service model has legitimized the presence of ordinary citizens in 
programmes dealing with controversial issues and problems; it has helped to make 
idiomatic, conversational styles respectable; and, significantly, it has publicized the 
pleasures of ordinariness, creating entertainment out of citizens playing games, 
talking about their experiences or taking delight in events as disparate as football and 
tennis matches, religious ceremonies and dancing to the current top ten (1991: 118).  
 
Hence, PSB is important to examine, as it plays such an important role in democracy 
and in society in general. PSBs need to do “more than just facilitate individual liberty 
and provide expressions of difference, but it must also facilitate expressions of unity 
and provide opportunities for the development of chains of equivalence” (Nolan, 
2006: 226). Furthermore, McChesney (2000) argues that the success or failure of a 
PSB is dependent on the degree of democracy in a country and the degree to which 
informed public debate underpins the PSB system. 
 
2.5.1. Continental shifts  
 
State broadcasters are the order of the day on the African continent (Article 19, 2003; 
Ramadi, 2006; Banda, 2006b). Governments on the continent have realised the power 
and influence of broadcasting and have thus, retained control of broadcasting for 
“hegemonic purposes” (Mbaine, 2003: 143). Mbaine contends that “What goes for 
public service broadcasting in most of Africa is really state or government 
broadcasting, with a tinge of public service broadcasting” (2003: 160). Consequently, 
the aspiration in the media landscape on the African continent is a shift towards the 
transformation from state broadcasters to public service broadcasters. South Africa is 
revered to be the only country on the continent to have transformed its state 
broadcaster into a public broadcaster. In fact, the SABC is revered as a genuine PSB 
with an independent Board (Kantumoya, 2006; Banda, 2006b).  
 
The transformation of state broadcasters to public broadcasters has been coerced by 
certain campaigns and policy guidelines. For instance, the Media Institute of Southern 
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Africa (MISA) has a three-tier broadcasting campaign. The campaign aims to 
promote,  
 
… editorial independence, diversity and regulation of legislation and the promotion 
of ICT as a tool for national development and a medium of sharing information and to 
advocate for the transformation of state broadcasters into genuine public service 
broadcasters (www.misa.org.za).  
 
Policy guidelines consist of the African Charter on Broadcasting. However, 
broadcasting guidelines also exist, such as those embodied in the Windhoek 
Declaration on Promoting an Independent and Pluralistic African Press. These 
campaigns, legislation and guidelines have surfaced due to a need for protocols to 
drive African countries to adopt a PSB mandate (www.misa.org.za). Despite the 
efforts being made to transform state broadcasters, state broadcasting remains strong 
on the continent. Kupe (2005b) argues that the more participation in the 
transformation of state broadcasters into public broadcasters is required. There needs 
to be increased participation from “… social and cultural organisations representing 
broader social and cultural interests, which are not politically partisan, are part of the 
effort on a sustained basis” (Kupe, 2005b: 83). Nevertheless, global trends are also 
influencing the broadcasting environment on the African continent. Liberalisation and 
deregulation are facilitating the move away from state broadcasting towards 
independent and commercial broadcasting (Kantumoya, 2006).  
 
2.5.2. Global shifts 
 
Despite the importance of PSB, a global shift in conceptions of PSB has emerged 
from the new conditions that globalisation has created.6 That is to say liberalisation 
and deregulation. This shift can particularly be seen in Europe. These conditions have 
been summarised by Blumler as: 
 
                                                 
6 Globalisation refers to the spread of capitalism on a trans-national level through the trade in goods 
and services, flow of capital and the trade in currencies, the major players being the world’s largest 
private corporations. It is characterised by neo-liberal economic policies, which advocate trade 
liberalism and works to the benefit of businesses that are able to maximise their profits through the 
process of globalisation (McChesney, 1998).  
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… the termination of the monopoly sway of public service broadcasting bodies; an 
invasion of transnational forces at corporate, production and distribution levels; a 
shift from spectrum scarcity to multi-channel abundance; the unleashing of 
unprecedented competition for revenue and viewing shares; uncertainties about how 
the programming patterns on offer will be affected; associated uncertainties about 
likely shifts of audience preferences and tastes in response (1992: 1). 
 
Consequently, globally PSB is under threat, where technological innovations have 
facilitated the advancement of globalisation and market forces (Held et.al, 1999; 
Dahlgreen, 1999; McChesney, 2000; Tracey, 1998; Hackett, 2000; Fourie, 2003; 
Hansen et.al, 1998. Held et.al (1999), bear testimony to the fact that technological 
advancement is driving globalisation when they argue that “The revolutions in 
communications and information technology…have increased massively the stretch 
and intensity of all manner of socio-political networks within and across the borders 
of states” (1999: 445).  
 
The multi-channel environment that globalisation has produced also challenges the 
regulatory environment of broadcasting industries, as spectrum scarcity is no longer 
an issue (Horwitz, 2001; McChesney, 2000; Keane, 1991; Fourie, 2003). 
Technological advancement, together with the strengthening of market forces, has 
resulted in a highly commercialised global broadcasting industry. More specifically, 
globalisation has amplified the processes of liberalisation and deregulation, which 
includes the process of commercialisation.  
 
The augmented influence of commercialisation means that competition within the 
media industry has greatly increased (Horwitz, 2001; Collins et.al, 2001). Increased 
competition means that the SABC is now in a position where it has to compete with 
other broadcasters, as well as other forms of media to secure advertising revenue. 
Market influences have enormous power, thus PSBs tend towards not upsetting 
market influences, where criticism of these influences are self-censored (McChesney, 
1999). In fact, advertisers can be more powerful than news media owners and 
editorial staff. Large businesses have a crucial impact on the economy, thus 
politicians tend to listen to them (McChesney, 1998). Hence, globalisation, 
liberalisation, deregulation and commercialisation have made the market such a 
powerful force; that finding a balance between the market and PSB has become 
inevitable (Blumler, 1992).  
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Due to their commercial orientation, PSBs have come to undermine democracy and 
the public interest that they are supposed to serve. Consequently, broadcasting content 
has become homogenised, which contradicts the very existence of PSB (Horwitz, 
2001; Siune and Hulten, 1998). The trend in Europe to counter the homogenising 
effects of globalisation on broadcasting is through regional broadcasting (Horwitz, 
2001). In South Africa however, the prospect of regional broadcasting brings back 
issues of segregation that was characteristic of broadcasting during the apartheid era, 
which compromises its viability. Fourie (2003) argues that the dilemma facing PSB is 
two fold. Firstly, PSB’s have to fulfil their public service obligations; and secondly, 
PSB’s need to keep up with technology and ward of competition in the broadcasting 
arena or face financial and audience decline. Hence, a key problem with notions of 
PSB, is finding a way for PSB and the market to co-exist. 
 
McChesney (2000) contends that the commercial inclination of PSBs is more political 
than technological, as there is nothing inherent in technology that indicates that it 
must be used commercially. Hence, non-profit competition is possible. Neo-liberals 
contend that the media is best regulated by the free-market, as this system is the most 
efficient and democratic regulatory system. However, the free-market does not allow 
for non-profit competition. Hence, the neo-liberal climate is the root cause of the 
decline of PSB (McChesney, 2000).  
 
Collins et.al (2001) argues that within this multi-channel broadcasting environment, 
PSB can potentially be strengthened, as PSBs are associated with the qualities of 
authoritativeness and trustworthiness. Consequently, PSBs will come to be 
increasingly valuable to audiences, as they will rely on PSB’s to ‘select, package, and 
“authenticate” the flow of products that they consume’ (Collins et.al, 2001: 10). 
 
With the new conditions in the broadcasting environment comes new policy 
challenges. Broadcasting policy now needs to incorporate the new conditions caused 
by globalisation and in turn liberalisation, deregulation and commercialisation in 
order to best facilitate the ability of PSB’s to fulfil their public service roles (Horwitz, 
2001; Craik et.al, 1996). Hence, significant attention needs to be paid to the analysis 
of government policies and regulations pertaining to broadcasting. 
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Here government policies and regulations are crucial, as these policies and regulations 
can either guarantee or undermine media freedom and independence. Nyamnjoh 
shares this view when he argues that “The media can only play an effective role, in 
this regard, if the law and its application are democratic” (2005: 20). Subsequently, 
the examination of the regulations that steer the SABC is crucial to media freedom, 
independence and as a result, the public interest. 
 
Critical political economy seeks to analyse the relationship between the state and the 
media within policy-making processes, and how this relationship affects cultural 
production. Critical political economy of the media thus finds that policies and 
regulations, because they promote capitalist interests, are only made for one sector of 
society (the elite in society), while marginalising the majority in society. 
 
However, due to commercial pressures, PSB is needed more now then ever before 
(McChesney, 1999; Tleane and Duncan, 2003; Fourie, 2003; Cross, 2001; World 
Radio and Television Council, 2000; McChesney, 2000). In saving PSB from the 
talons of the market “we need to study, debate, and reconceptualize what we mean by 
public service broadcasting” (McChesney, 1999: 9). 
 
Although no single definition exists for what public service broadcasting is, there is a 
common mandate to which a public service broadcaster should adhere. PSB can be 
defined according to the ideal roles of the media, as well as by its key principles or 
characteristics. Hence, the way in which PSB is defined is similar to the way in which 
the public interest is defined.  
 
2.5.3. Key characteristics of public service broadcasting  
 
Mpofu et.al (1996) point out that there are eight basic principles of PSB. These 
principles are geographic universality, universality of appeal, universality of payment, 
distance from vested interests, promoting national identity and community, catering 
for minority interests, quality programming, and independence (Mpofu et.al, 1996; 
Ramadi, 2006; Tracey, 1998; Mooney, 2004; Teer-Tomaselli, 2004, Hansen et.al, 
1998). Albeit, it must be noted that overlapping with these eight principles are 
accountability, diversity, and distinctiveness. Further overlapping occurs with 
 
 35
 
Blumler’s (1992) seven vulnerable values. These values are programme quality, 
diversity, cultural identity, independence of programme sources from commercial 
influences, the integrity of civic communication, welfare of children and juveniles, 
and maintenance of standards. Blumler (1992) refers to these values as vulnerable, as 
he contends that market pressures are threatening these specific television values.  
 
However, for the purposes of this study only independence, accountability, 
distinctiveness, and financing will be examined and discussed in order to keep the 
study manageable. The institutional framework of a PSB is crucial to whether a PSB 
can fulfil its public service obligations. Tomaselli (1994) highlights that PSBs tend to 
narrowly place control of the institution within the hands of a privileged elite. 
Consequently, it can be argued that, if a PSB institution is unrepresentative in its 
appointments, this unrepresentativeness will extend into its public service 
responsibilities. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the principles of PSB 
embody an ideal and there are contentions to whether these ideals have been 
completely achieved in reality (Cross, 2001). 
 
Independence and accountability were chosen to be examined, as these two 
characteristics are among the most important characteristics that define PSB. If a PSB 
is not truly independent, it cannot correctly serve the public’s needs, the same applies 
to the principle of accountability. If the foundation of independence and 
accountability are not present in a PSB, the ability of a PSB to fulfil its public service 
role will immediately be severely hindered. Hence, the independence and 
accountability of a PSB directly affect its functioning.  
 
Distinctiveness was chosen to be examined, as the programming that a PSB displays 
to its public forms the core composition of a PSB. The programming of a PSB makes 
a PSB what it is. Hence, a PSB that is distinct is intrinsic, as it allows the 
characteristics of universality of appeal, promotion of national identity and 
community, as well as catering for minority interests to be achieved.  
 
The three characteristics that have been chosen to be examined in this study thus 
provide direct insights into the health and authenticity of a PSB. However, a fourth 
characteristic needs to be added to this study’s examination, that is to say, the 
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financing of a PSB. Financing must be added, as the funding model of the SABC will 
be engaged with in the examination of distinctiveness. Furthermore, financing is 
crucial to the fulfilment of a PSB’s obligations, as it will determine whether the PSB 
is being dominated by market forces and is able to fulfil its PSB ressponsibilities.  
 
2.5.3.1. Independence 
 
PSBs must be independent, which entails that they be neither state nor commercially 
controlled (Collins et.al, 2001; Ramadi, 2006; Mooney, 2004; Hoynes and Croteau, 
2001; Tomaselli, 1994; Teer-Tomaselli, 2004; Cross, 2001; World Radio and 
Television Council, 2000; Tleane and Duncan, 2003; Siune and Hulten, 1998). In fact, 
with regard to non-commercial control, a central premise of PSB was that it was too 
valuable to be controlled by market forces (McChesney, 2000). Hence, the 
independence of a PSB needs to be guaranteed, as the fulfilment of the public interest 
can only be achieved if PSB can operate devoid of the ulterior motives that state and 
commercial entities project in order to further their own interests (Tleane and Duncan, 
2003). Consequently, there must never be only a single contributor to a particular 
programme (Hoynes and Croteau, 2001). In fact, PSB originates from a mistrust of 
the ability of state and commercial entities to be able to fulfil the public’s interests 
(World Radio and Television Council, 2000).  
 
There are three requirements for a PSB to be independent from political influence. 
Firstly, politicians must not “interfere in the day-to-day running” of the PSB 
(Tomaselli, 1994). Secondly, PSBs must be able to resist political pressure and must 
maintain control of the provision of news and current affairs. Thirdly, there must be 
public conviction that the PSB is indeed independent (Tomaselli, 1994). Fourie 
(2003) adds that in order for PSBs to be independent from political influences, the 
relationship between the PSB and the government must be made as transparent as 
possible. Hence, “a clear and legally bounding distinction should be made between 
the board, the day-to-day management of the organisation, the supervisory bodies and 
the government” (Fourie, 2003: 165). The roles and functions of the different staff 
levels and departments of a PSB must be clearly defined (Fourie, 2003). 
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The World Radio and Television Council (2000) argue that in order to ensure a PSB’s 
independence, its administrative structure must be autonomous. In this way, the public 
is able to have confidence in the PSB. Collins et.al (2001) contend that independence 
can only be achieved if a PSB is efficient. In this study, independence will be studied 
with an examination of the SABC’s editorial policies, newspaper articles, an 
institutional analysis, and through informant interviews. One way in which a PSB can 
ensure its independence is through accountability. 
 
2.5.3.2. Accountability 
 
According to Tleane and Duncan, accountability can be defined as “fulfilling the 
requirement or expectation to give an explanation of one’s actions, or being 
responsible to someone or something” (2003: 23). Hence, a PSB should make its 
relationship with the government transparent to the public. However, a PSB also 
needs to be accountable to the public that it serves (Ramadi, 2006; Mooney, 2004; 
Hoynes and Croteau, 2001; Tleane and Duncan, 2003; McChesney, 2000; Siune and 
Hulten, 1998). Public support of a PSB is the ultimate test of a PSB’s independence 
(Curran, 2002).  
 
Accountability to the public can be achieved directly or indirectly. Directly, PSB’s 
should provide documents that inform the public of its activities, commitments and so 
on (Mooney, 2004). However, other accountability measures exist such as advisory 
councils and public meetings. In addition, criteria documents (editorial and 
programming policies and codes of practice or conduct) are drawn up to guide PSB’s. 
These documents are also used as the foundation for self-assessments, which should 
be made available to the public (Tleane and Duncan, 2003).  
 
Indirectly, accountability can also be achieved through a broadcasting regulatory 
body, which can monitor non-compliance and take appropriate action when non-
compliance is found (World Radio and Television Council, 2000; Mooney, 2004; 
Hoynes and Croteau, 2001). For instance, The Independent Communications 
Authority of South Africa (ICASA) evaluates and keeps the SABC in check. This 
regulatory body will also be able to evaluate whether the PSB is fulfilling its public 
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service responsibilities. Furthermore, to ensure accountability, a PSB’s board 
members should be widely publicised (Hoynes and Croteau, 2001).  
 
Coppens and Saeys (2006) highlight four categorisations of performance criteria that 
are used to ensure that a PSB is accountable. Firstly, there are government-imposed or 
self-imposed criteria. Self-imposed criteria are common and consist of the 
responsibilities that the PSB prescribes for itself. An example of self-imposed criteria 
would be the SABC Editorial Charter. Secondly, performance criteria can be binding 
or non-binding. While self-imposed criteria are non-binding, government-imposed 
criteria can be either. However, it must be noted that in the long term all criteria 
become binding due to the credibility and financial implications of not fulfilling any 
performance criteria.  
 
The dilemma facing binding criteria is that a PSB’s long-term objectives would end 
up being sidelined, by attempting to primarily fulfil short-term criteria. Thirdly, there 
are economic or traditional criteria. Economic criteria deal with “audience 
appreciation, productivity and financial matters”, while traditional criteria is 
concerned with programming and the social role of PSB’s (Coppens and Saeys, 2006: 
274). Sometimes the distinction between the economic and the traditional are blurred. 
Performance criteria that combine both the economic and the traditional are more 
useful to PSBs. Lastly, there are quantitative or qualitative criteria. Economic criteria 
are usually quantitative and traditional criteria are usually qualitative. Hence, 
combining quantitative and qualitative criteria is much more valuable.  
 
However, Coppens and Saeys (2006) warn that self-assessments alone are inadequate 
as no penalties are dispensed to PSBs for violating the performance criteria. The flaws 
of self-assessments can be accompanied by external assessments for enhanced 
accountability. A multitude of accountability measures means that the PSB will 
provide a better public service (McQuail, 1997). Nevertheless, performance analyses 
are only as good as their validity. These analyses are compromised in their validity, as 
important concepts within performance analysis are contentious (Coppens and Saeys, 
2006). This study, will examine the SABC’s accountability by again examining the 
SABC’s editorial policies, conducting informant interviews, an institutional analysis, 
and through the examination of newspaper articles. 
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2.5.3.3. Distinctiveness 
 
The service and programming that a PSB provides must be different from that of any 
other broadcaster. This distinctiveness is necessary, as the public will then be able to 
distinguish the PSB from other broadcasters (Dahlgreen, 1999; Teer-Tomaselli, 2004; 
Fourie, 2003; Mooney, 2004, Findahl, 1999). The way in which PSBs can achieve 
distinctiveness is to strive to provide high-quality content (Teer-Tomaselli, 2004; 
Mooney, 2004; Heino, 2000, Keane, 1991; Fourie, 2003).  
 
High-quality content provision entails providing “reliable, legitimate news, 
information programming and education” (Teer-Tomaselli, 2004: 203). A PSB must 
not restrict its information provision to just news and public affairs, but must also 
provide programming of “service” or “general interest” (World Radio and Television 
Council, 2000: 14). For instance, information or programme provision should include 
“consumer or legal issues, give practical advice, discuss health issues, publicize 
community services, etc” (World Radio and Television Council, 2000: 14). In doing 
so, a PSB can provide programming that is relevant to all citizens and which increases 
the quality of their lives.  
 
Whereas commercial broadcasting refers to the public as consumers, PSB should treat 
the public as an audience or citizens as opposed to consumers (Teer-Tomaselli, 2004; 
Kupe, 2005a; Kupe, 2006; Dahlgreen, 1999; Raboy, 1996, Findahl, 1999; Syvertsen, 
1999; Mpofu, 2006; Barnett, 1999; Horwitz, 2001). In doing so, a PSB must primarily 
provide for “the needs and aspirations” of all citizens (Teer-Tomaselli, 2004: 204). 
Hence, content provision should “make a significant contribution to creative 
production, favouring original productions, and seek to give value and prominence to 
national, regional and world cultural heritage” (Teer-Tomaselli, 2004: 204). In other 
words, a PSB should provide full spectrum programming consisting of a wide variety 
of programme genres and balanced scheduling (Teer-Tomaselli, 2004; Tomaselli, 
1994; MISA, 2002; Keane, 1991). However, Keane (1991) contends that, the problem 
with discussions of quality is that, the term quality is defined broadly and generally, 
which leads to ambiguities.  
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Quality content provision corresponds to the role of information provision that 
theories of media and democracy and critical political economy of the media propose; 
and fundamentally reflects the same arguments and propositions. This study will 
examine the degree to which the SABC is distinct from its competitors through an 
examination of the SABC’s funding model. 
 
2.5.3.4. Financing 
 
The way in which a PSB finances itself is of the utmost importance, as a PSB’s 
financing methods can facilitate or hinder the ability of a PSB to fulfil its public 
service responsibilities. Funding through license fees is the ideal funding model for 
PSB’s (The World Radio and Television Council, 2000; Mooney, 2004; McChesney, 
2000). In South Africa, the public must pay license fees for the ownership of a 
television. As a result, license fees create a direct relationship between the PSB and its 
public. However, Banda (2006) argues that often license fees alone are not enough to 
sustain PSB’s. In fact, PSB’s funded through license fees alone no longer exist (Siune 
and Hulten, 1998). Consequently, most countries have a mix of funding sources, a 
combination between public and commercial funding. Others have a mix between 
public, commercial and state funding, for instance the SABC (Murdock, 1992).  
 
Commercial and even state sources of funding are acceptable only if they do not 
hinder the PSB’s ability to fulfil its public service mandate and responsibilities 
(World Radio and Television Council, 2000). Four aspects are central to the funding 
of a PSB. Firstly, a PSB must be substantially funded so that it is not overshadowed in 
the broadcasting arena. Secondly, PSB’s must be funded predictably so that funding 
cannot be used to control PSB. Thirdly, PSB funding must be independent from 
commercial and political influences. Fourthly, PSB must be funded according to the 
PSB’s needs to avoid a deficit in funds (The World Radio and Television Council, 
2000).  
 
However, many PSB’s the world over, are moving towards commercial methods of 
funding. The danger of PSB’s moving towards commercial methods of funding is 
that, commercial funding methods jeopardise the public funding rationale of PSB’s. 
Once the rationale for the public funding of PSB’s is gone, PSB’s will eventually 
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transform into commercial broadcasters. Hence, it is of crucial importance to prevent 
PSB’s from gravitating extensively towards commercial methods of funding 
(McChesney, 2000). With regard to resources, since media organisations lack material 
resources, they are vulnerable to market and government influences, as media 
organisations become dependent on the government and the market for funding in 
order to get the resources that they need (Ronning, 1994). Under these circumstances, 
media organisations do not want to offend the economic and political powers for fear 
that they may cease funding them. As a result, the economic and political powers put 
pressure on media organisations to fulfil their specific interests, to which these media 
organisations respond. This type of self-censorship presents the danger of becoming 
so pervasive that PSB’s work counter to democracy and their public service 
obligations as the status quo is not challenged in any way (McChesney, 2000).  
 
This resource crisis can be seen in South Africa, where the SABC is undergoing a 
funding crisis (Tomaselli, 1994; Teer-Tomaselli, 2004). Firstly, Broadcasting 
equipment has to be imported, thus making operating costs extremely expensive. 
Secondly, due the SABC’s financial problems, it is cheaper to import programme 
content than it is for the SABC to produce its own. As a result, the SABC provides 
more foreign content than local content (Tomaselli, 1994; Tleane and Duncan, 2003). 
Thirdly, as a direct result of the SABC’s financial crisis, the broadcaster receives most 
of its revenue from advertising (Teer-Tomaselli, 2004). Teer-Tomaselli (2004) argues 
that this crisis in funding is the SABC’s largest challenge. 
 
Hence, the media as an institution has become a platform for advertisers; it is no 
longer a public platform. The implications of this has seen the media lose its 
credibility and legitimacy as it has come to perpetuate the dominant interests of 
society at the expense of alternative ideas, views and interests. It is cheaper for 
owners to produce content filled with advertising that project dominant interests than 
quality information. Critical political economy in its critique of the media, seeks to 
establish a media system that is non-profit, non-commercial, decentralised and 
democratic (McChesney, 1998: 13-14). 
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2.5.4. Commercialisation and market failure 
 
A central aspect of critical political economy is its identification of capitalism as the 
dominant system, but critical political economy of the media goes beyond this to say 
that capitalism “ is a process of creating inequality on a worldwide scale” (Mattelart 
and Mattelart, 1998: 92). This is because globalisation and capitalism work in favour 
of the interest of businesses and the wealthy in society, thus marginalising all other 
sectors and groups in society. As a result, globalisation and capitalism are 
fundamentally antidemocratic (McChesney, 1998: 2). Due to its insights into and 
critique of capitalism, critical political economy of the media is an influential theory 
in studies of PSB 
 
The trend of liberalisation that has swept the world over can clearly be seen with the 
commercial orientation of PSB’s (Kupe, 2005a; Blumler, 1997, Hoynes, 1999; 
Howley, 2004; Banda, 2006b; Curran, 2002). PSB’s are becoming more 
commercialised in endeavours to secure more funding to support their operations. 
This increasing commercialisation comes in the form of PSB’s clamouring to please 
advertisers in order to secure advertising revenue. As a result, PSB’s are generally 
moving further and further away from their public interest responsibilities (Kupe, 
2005a; Teer-Tomaselli, 1998; Collins et.al, 2001; Blumler, 1997; McChesney, 1999; 
Sondergaard, 1999; Hoynes and Croteau, 2001). Hence, Mooney (2004) contends 
that, PSB is undergoing an identity crisis, where PSB’s are pursuing advertising 
revenue while trying simultaneously to fulfil its public service obligations. 
 
Consequently, the media loses its credibility and legitimacy as it comes to perpetuate 
the dominant interests of society, at the expense of alternative ideas, views and 
interests (Heino, 2000). Since, it is cheaper for owners to produce content filled with 
advertising that projects dominant interests rather than quality information (Teer-
Tomaselli, 1998; Collins et.al, 2001). Consequently, the media has shifted towards a 
situation where business and economic information gets greater attention and 
investment. This has occurred at the expense of quality in general news, where before 
events were seen as symptoms to bigger things, and processes were focused on. Now 
advertising pushes news towards events rather than processes. It also pushes news 
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towards sensationalism and dramatisation, where a certain amount of shock value 
draws attention, as well as advertisers (McChesney, 1998).  
 
What is more, Feltoe (1993) argues that, although the government may not control the 
media, this does not mean that they are independent and free. Media owners, who 
have their own political views, are a powerful controlling mechanism of the media. 
These media owners decide what the editorial line should be and which political party 
the media organisation should align themselves with. Feltoe further argues that, “The 
owners are very likely to favour the interests of private enterprise and to influence 
their editors to support private business and economic structural programmes aimed at 
allowing market forces to operate freely” (1993: 168). As a result, the media are 
restrained in their operations. In fact, the media may operate contradictory to that of 
the government controlled media organisations, in that, although they may be able to 
criticise the government, they may not be able to criticise “private business practices” 
(Feltoe, 1993: 168). In fact, Curran (2002) argues that there are more mechanisms in 
place to ensure that the media, and in particular PSB’s, operate unregimented by the 
state than there are mechanisms to protect the media from commercial pressures. 
 
Neo-liberalism indicates that the commercial aspects of society are far more powerful 
than society’s non-commercial aspects, which is a core reason why PSB is so 
threatened and is on the decline (McChesney, 2000; Meier and Trappel, 1998). 
McChesney (2000) argues that PSB the world over is on the defensive, where PSB’s 
lack the confidence to challenge the commercial system. McChesney (2000) is quite 
pessimistic towards the direction to which PSB is currently heading, arguing that 
there is no solution to the PSB crisis. 
 
Curran (2002) provides four important points in critique of the market. Firstly, the 
cost of market entry is extremely high, which inhibits competition. Secondly, the 
market inhibits the flow of information, where human interest content is favoured. 
Thirdly, public debate is restricted due to the unequal way in which the market 
addresses the wealthy and the poor. Lastly, intelligent and rational debate is 
undermined as the market treats information as a commodity. Consequently, 
information becomes “simplified, personalized, decontextualised, with a stress on 
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action rather than process, visualisation rather than abstraction, stereotypicality rather 
than human complexity” (Curran, 2002: 226). 
 
However, PSB redresses the market, since commercial broadcasters fail to provide 
content that serves the interest of the citizens of a particular country (Teer-Tomaselli, 
2004; Collins et.al, 2001; Ramadi, 2006; Mooney, 2004; Croteau and Hoynes, 2001, 
Sondergaard, 1999; Murdock, 1992). Redressing the market is thus possible, as PSB’s 
can provide “sufficient quantity or quality of programming in education, research, 
children’s programming (other than cartoons), dramas in minority languages and 
other specialised programming” (Teer-Tomaselli, 2004: 202). Commercial 
broadcasters who operate on market logic, which is to make a profit, do not provide 
this type of programming. Commercial broadcasters are elitist, catering for only those 
audience members who have a large disposable income, which attracts advertisers and 
thus increased revenues (Teer-Tomaselli, 2004). Alternatively, PSB endeavours to 
target the entire nation. 
 
2.6. Developmental journalism 
 
Theories of the media and democracy explore the issue of national development or 
nation building. According to Ziegler and Asante (1992), the media in nation building 
assists in promoting government policies, assist in national cohesion and unification, 
and popularise government leaders. Development journalism is used “(i) to motivate 
the audience to actively cooperate in development; and (ii) to defend the interests of 
those concerned” (Banda, 2006a: 5).  
 
In promoting and facilitating national development and nation building, much of the 
media in Africa after independence have taken to development journalism. For 
instance, in South Africa, the SABC follows a development journalism approach, and 
thus emphasises a development perspective (Haffajee, 2006). The notion of 
development journalism has always been difficult to define, however, Kariithi quotes 
Aggarwala (1979) in defining developmental journalism as “’the use of all journalistic 
skills to deport development processes in an interesting fashion’” (Kariithi, 1994: 28). 
Development journalism is used to serve government development goals and is 
alternatively called, development support communication (Watson and Hill, 2000). In 
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addition, development journalism can also be used in an investigative reporting 
context. Within the latter context, the media’s role is to critically examine the 
government’s implementation of its development goals. However, the debate that 
rages between the Western world and Africa is that, development journalism 
essentially inhibits freedom of expression (Watson and Hill, 2000; Kariithi, 1994). 
 
Retief (2000) highlights five characteristics of the development approach. Firstly, the 
media must aid in nation building. Secondly, the media should support and not 
challenge authority. Thirdly, information belongs to the state. Fourthly, freedom of 
expression and civil rights are sidelined to the correction of social problems such as 
poverty and disease. Lastly, countries are given the right to control the flow of 
information within their borders.  
 
In light of the above, the use of development journalism is often associated with 
authoritarianism, which can especially be seen within an African context. The 
problem with development journalism is that, the media becomes partisan to the 
government, and thus does not critique it (Faringer, 1991). Consequently, 
development journalism poses a threat to PSB, and has been widely critiqued (Watson 
and Hill, 2000; Kariithi, 1994; Haffajee, 2006; Kareithi, 2005; Berger, 2000). If 
developmental journalism poses a threat to PSB and the SABC has adopted a 
developmental approach, then it is crucial to examine the SABC’s contribution to 
democracy and the public interest.  
 
Banda argues that, notions of development journalism need to be reconceptualised, as 
the “’demonisation’” of the concept has shifted attention away from debates on how 
development journalism can contribute to democracy and nation building (2006: 1). 
Common elements need to be brought together from a development journalism 
perspective and a public service broadcasting perspective, to ensure the best possible 
route to broadcasting in Africa in general and South Africa in specific (Shah, 1996; 
Banda, 2006a). Consequently, if a developmental approach is not efficient enough, 
then this approach must be altered.  
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2.7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter it has been emphasise that, the media plays a crucial role in democracy. 
This role is articulated by the discussion of the ideal institutional role of the media. 
Related to the issue of media and democracy is the concept of the public sphere. Key 
to discussions of the public sphere has been Habermas’s formulation of the concept. 
However, Habermas’s notion has been widely critiqued, which has led him to revise 
his original work. An important argument made is that the public sphere is currently 
in decline. Related to the public sphere are the concepts of the public interest and 
citizenship. A key flaw in issues of the public interest is its lack of definition. 
Citizenship is discussed according to T.H. Marshall’s formulation of the concept. 
However, it is highlighted that the degree of citizenship that people living in rural and 
urban areas experience, is unequal.  
 
The most important concept discussed in this chapter is the notion of PSB. Although 
the ideal of PSB brings many benefits such as geographic universality, universality of 
appeal, universality of payment, distance from vested interests, the promotion of 
national identity and community, catering for minority interests, quality 
programming, and independence; PSB is under threat on a global level. This crisis can 
predominantly be attributed to market forces. Another factor that threatens PSB is the 
notion of development journalism, which exists counter to notions of PSB. In the next 
chapter, the methodology needed to conduct this study is explored. 
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Chapter 3: Methods 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
There are two broad categories of methodologies that are used when conducting 
media research, qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Within each of these 
paradigms, there are various sub-methodologies. However, the distinguishing 
characteristic between qualitative and quantitative methodologies is as Baxter and 
Babbie articulate, “numerical and non-numerical data” (2004: 55). Qualitative 
methodologies are essentially concerned with the examination of non-numerical data, 
while quantitative methodologies are concerned with the examination of numerical 
data. This study on Public Service Broadcasting in South Africa engages in a 
qualitative research approach, where institutional analysis, document analysis, policy 
analysis, critical reflection, and semi-structured interviews are engaged with. This 
study utilises primary information sources in the form of policy and regulation 
documents, as well as newspaper reports. 
 
3.2. Qualitative analysis 
 
A qualitative approach according to Jensen (1991), involves meaning, internal 
approaches, experience, explanation, process, and locates the object or subject of 
study within a certain context. Therefore, it examines “production as a process which 
is contextualised and extremely integrated with wider social and cultural practices” 
(Jensen, 1991: 4). The media production process is particularly relevant to this study, 
since the SABC’s production process and in turn, its media products are largely 
determined by whether the SABC is able to fulfil its public service mandate and 
responsibilities.  
 
Qualitative analysis takes into account time, history, and context. It allows for the 
examination of unplanned, as well as unanticipated occurrences (Weiss, 1998). The 
issue under examination can be investigated in detail and depth. Qualitative analysis 
accommodates the broader context of the area or issue being examined. As a result, 
this study is able to engage in a more holistic approach, where the specific nuances, 
background, and idiosyncrasies can be explored (Patton, 2002). One of the reasons for 
the achievement of such detail and depth is a result of data collection not being 
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predetermined by specific categories that need to be used in analysis (Patton, 2002; 
Baxter and Barbie, 2004). However, the problem with qualitative analysis is that, 
because it may rely on the interpretation, objectivity, and impressions of the person 
conducting the research, it can be unscientific (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  
 
3.3. Institutional analysis 
 
Before institutional analysis can be discussed, the term institution needs to be sussed 
out. According to Bertrand and Hughes:  
 
The term ‘institution’ applies to both a set of rule-governed practices (abstract 
concepts, such as ‘language’, ‘law’ […], and also the formal organisations which 
administer the practices within social and physical contexts (universities, courts, 
government departments, etc) (2005: 109). 
 
The above definition presents a common understanding of institutions. However, 
institutional analysis and the term institution itself are extremely contentious 
(Hollingsworth, 2003; Campbell, 2004; Peters, 1999).  For instance, some argue that 
institutions are essentially the rules of a society; others argue that institutions are the 
behaviour that results from rules (Hollingsworth, 2003). In addition, the distinction 
between institutions and organisations are not clearly understood. Some contend that 
institutions and organisations are fundamentally the same, while others contend that 
institutions and organisations are entirely disparate entities. Consequently, Peters 
(1999) highlights six institutional theories, Normative Institutionalism, Rational 
Choice Institutionalism, Historical Institutionalism, Empirical Institutionalism, 
International Institutionalism, and Societal Institutionalism. The institutional analysis 
that will be conducted in this study will draw from normative institutionalism, which 
sets out the ideal way in which institutions are supposed to function and behave 
(Peters, 1999). Normative institutionalism proposes that institutions change according 
to the environment in which they are in, “through a process of learning” (Peters, 1999: 
33). Institutions change when their institutional base is threatened or when 
opportunities for growth transpire (Peters, 1999). 
 
Hollingsworth proposes, in descending order, five layers at which institutional 
analysis occurs. Firstly, and most importantly, there are the “basic norms, rules, 
conventions, habits and values of a society” (Hollingsworth, 2003: 131). These norms 
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and rules are what make institutions essential to society, providing the “cognitive 
frameworks for coping with complex environments and for reducing uncertainty” 
(Hollingsworth, 2003: 132; Campbell, 2004). Norms and rules are the most resistant 
to change, which enables institutions to provide society with the stability needed to 
endure change. Consequently, institutions essentially play a crucial role in shaping 
society’s history, which is referred to as path-dependency (Hollingsworth, 2003). 
However, although norms and rules are enduring, they are susceptible to redefinition. 
It is important to note that although norms and rules are essentially what institutions 
are, the examination of norms and rules comprises only one component of 
institutional analysis. 
 
The second layer of institutional analysis consists of institutional governance 
arrangements such as “markets, various types of hierarchies and networks, 
associations, the state, communities and clans” (Hollingsworth, 2003: 132). However, 
institutions do not always have the same governance arrangements. 
 
The relationships between the institutional sectors of a society comprise the third 
layer of institutional analysis; such sectors are for instance, “the society’s system of 
education, its system of research, business system, financial markets, legal system and 
the state” (Hollingsworth, 2003: 132). However, these sectors may differ in different 
countries. The institutional analysis that will be conducted in this study will focus on 
the SABC’s relationship to the state (the government in power) and the legal system 
(ICASA). 
 
The fourth layer consists of how the organisational structures of a specific institution 
exist concurrently. The last layer deals with the outputs and performance of the 
specific institution. The outputs and performance of an institution are transitory 
(Hollingsworth, 2003) 
 
Hence, it can be seen that institutional analysis allows for the examination of how 
media products are produced and placed within a wider context. Institutional analysis 
also allows for the examination of the power relations between the media as an 
institution and other institutions. Hence, the media’s relationship to the government 
and vice versa can be examined. Consequently, institutional analysis allows one to 
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examine the structure and power relations within the SABC, as well as between other 
institutions and the SABC. Institutional analysis is also fundamentally, what critical 
political economy of the media is concerned with.  
 
This study critically examines the internal structure of the SABC. The SABC’s 
relationships to other institutions, specifically its relationship to the government and 
ICASA, are also critically examined. The key objective of conducting an institutional 
analysis was to determine whether the SABC as an institution is enabling or hindering 
the fulfilling of its public service obligations. 
 
3.4. Document analysis 
 
Document analysis is “an integrated and conceptually informed method, procedure, 
and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving and analysing documents for their 
relevance, significance and meaning” (Boyd-Barrett, 2002: 90). Within document 
analysis primary and secondary sources must be distinguished. Primary sources 
consist of “original documents as well as contemporary records, or records in close 
proximity to some event” (Boyd-Barrett, 2002: 90; Altheide, 1996). On the other 
hand, secondary sources consist of primary sources that have already been examined 
and interpreted (Boyd-Barrett, 2002; Becker, 2003; Branston and Stafford, 2003; 
Altheide, 1996).  
 
In terms of primary sources, newspaper articles were collected from the database 
Sabinet7 as it provided insights into the issue areas regarding the SABC as a PSB. The 
Sabinet articles that were collected were thus, electronic documents (Altheide, 1996. 
The newspaper articles were collected from 1 January 2007 to 16 November 2007, 
which according to Sabinet amounts to 507 articles in total. These articles were 
selected using the keywords “SABC”. However, many of the reports were repeated in 
the various newspapers and thus not all the articles were used. It is important to note 
that the use of newspaper articles as primary sources of information did not form a 
large component of this study, and were thus used as auxiliary documents (Altheide, 
1996). Instead, the newspaper articles were used to highlight the important and 
                                                 
7 SABINET Online provides access to a full spectrum of information through its various products. The information 
is contained in various databases, grouped by category, e.g. Science & Technology and Education. A key word is 
typed into the search box and the relevant articles are then provided by the database.  
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sometimes controversial issues regarding the SABC, as well as to provide examples 
for the arguments made in the study. Moreover, the newspaper articles were used to 
get an indication of public sentiments about the direction that the SABC is taking or 
not taking. It must be noted that interviews also constitute primary research (Branston 
and Stafford, 2003). Furthermore, primary sources were utilised in the form of policy 
documents, where a policy-oriented analysis was conducted.  
 
3.5. Policy-oriented analysis 
 
In discussions of policy analysis, a distinction must be made between policy analysis 
and policy-oriented analysis. Policy analysis or policy studies are predominantly 
concerned with the future. Policy analysis seeks to bring about new policies. 
Alternatively, policy-oriented analysis is not concerned with generating new policies, 
but rather critically examines the policies already generated by policy analysis. 
Hence, policy-oriented analysis is concerned with “questioning the values and claims 
of the system, applying independent criteria, suggesting alternatives wit regard to both 
means and ends, exploring the possibility of new forms and structures, and so on” 
(Bertrand and Hughes, 2005). 
 
Hansen et.al indicates that, policy-oriented analysis is important as “policies can often 
have unintended consequences”, these consequences need to be critically examined as 
they may be detrimental to the media (1998: 68). In addition, ambiguities and 
inconsistencies can be exposed through policy-oriented analysis.   
 
In studying PSB, government policy and regulation needs to be examined in order to 
identify the flaws and strengths within the broadcasting regulatory system. In doing 
so, policy-oriented research takes on a critical approach. This critical approach, allows 
for the examination of such things as; what an institution is like, why it is like this and 
how this can be changed (Bertrand and Hughes, 2005). Furthermore, according to 
Hansen et.al, policy analysis is employed to “examine the ways in which policies are 
generated and implemented, as well as the repercussions or implications of these 
policies for the field of communication as a whole” (1998: 87). However, this study 
will not examine how policies are generated. An examination of policies and 
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regulations is essential, as it is through policies and regulations that PSB’s are enabled 
or hindered in fulfilling their public interest responsibilities.  
 
Policy analysis is two fold: firstly, it takes on the form of problem analysis and 
secondly, solution analysis. Problem analysis is used to ascertain what the problem is, 
which in this study is the problem of public service broadcasting in South Africa, and 
the extent of the problem (Weiner and Vining, 1999; Hansen et.al, 1998). 
Accordingly, policy analysis will assist in establishing whether the policies and 
regulations pertaining to the media are promoting the PSB ideal in South Africa. 
Solution analysis is concerned with providing alternatives to the policy problem and 
making recommendations on how these alternatives can be implemented (Weiner and 
Vining, 1999). 
 
The policy documents that were examined in this study were; the Broadcasting Act of 
2002, the SABC’s Editorial Charter, the licenses for each of the three SABC 
television channels, the SABC’s annual report for the financial year 2006-2007, the 
IBA Act of 1995 and the ICASA Act of 2006.  
 
3.7. Interviews 
 
Interviews were also conducted during this study. Interviews were conducted in order 
to get an in-depth understanding of what interviewees think and feel about the SABC 
as a PSB, and how it conducts its operations. The interviews took the form of semi-
structured interviews and were predominantly comprised of open-ended questions, so 
as not to restrict the interviewees in answering the questions. Semi-structured 
interviews are interviews where the interviewer has a list of questions, which he or 
she wants the interviewee to answer, however the interview is not restricted to the 
interview guide. Instead, the interviewer can ask the questions in the order that best 
suits the flow of the conversation and can phrase the questions differently if he or she 
desires (Baxter and Babbie, 2004). Furthermore, the interviewer is facilitated through 
a semi-structured approach, to ask questions that have not been thought of or to delve 
deeper into an issue of interest or concern (Baxter and Babbie, 2004).  
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Informants were drawn from the SABC, ICASA, FXI, MISA, and The National 
Association of Broadcasters of South Africa (NABSA), as well as from staff members 
who have left the SABC. The interviewees from the SABC consisted of Group 
Executive of public, international and regulatory affairs, Phumelele Ntombela-
Nzimande; as well as an interviewee who prefers to remain anonymous, who is 
referred to as interviewee A in the study. The interviewees of former SABC 
employees consisted of Aletta Alberts, former SABC2 General Manager; Sherelle 
Schmulian, former executive manager in the office of the SABC chief executive; 
Pippa Green, the former head of radio news and current affairs; Jimmy Matthews, the 
former head of television news and current affairs; and Nicola Galombik, the SABC’s 
former head of education. The Senior Manager of policy development, Bruce Mkaize; 
and Broadcasting Manager, Thabo Ndlovu were interviewees from ICASA. The 
interviewee from FXI consisted of Executive Director, Jane Duncan. The person 
interviewed from MISA was Raymond Louw, who is institute’s Deputy Chairperson. 
The Executive Director of NABSA, Johann Koster was also interviewed. The 
majority of the interviews conducted were face-to-face interviews. However, due to 
the busy schedules of Pippa Green and Raymond Louw, these interviews were 
conducted telephonically and via e-mail respectively. All face-to-face interviews were 
voice-recorded and then transcribed. 
 
3.8. Data Collection 
 
Information for this study was gathered from books, newspapers, journals, the 
Internet, and informant interviews. The institutional analysis consisted of information 
from all the above sources. The policy documents that have been analysed in this 
study were gathered from ICASA directly and from government websites on the 
Internet, as well as from the SABC’s website, as the documents are easily accessible 
here.  
 
Information for this study was collected on firstly a macro level and secondly on a 
micro level. On a macro-level, information was collected on PSB in general to suss 
out a deeper understanding of the concept of PSB. This macro information gathering 
included, for instance, Ramadi, 2006; Mooney, 2004; McQuail, 2002; Spigel, 2004; 
Teer-Tomaselli, 1998; Tomaselli, 1989; Banda, 2006a; Tomaselli, 1993; Collins et.al, 
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2001; Curran, 1997; Seaton, 1997, and the World Radio and Television Council, 
2000. 
 
On a micro level, information was then gathered on PSB in a South African context, 
with specific reference to the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). Such 
micro information gathering are for instance, Horwitz, 2001; Teer-Tomaselli and 
Tomaselli, 2001; Currie and Markovitz, 1997; Teer-Tomaselli, 2004; Banda, 2006a; 
Kupe, 2006; Tleane and Duncan, 2003. More specifically, Orgeret’s 2006 thesis, 
Moments of Nationhood: The SABC News in English – The first decade of Democracy 
will be particularly useful to this study.  
 
3.9. Limitations to the study 
 
With regard to the interviews that were conducted during this study, a core 
impediment was a reluctant by the majority of interviewees to answer questions posed 
to them liberally. It was found that interviewees did not want to compromise their ties 
within the SABC. In addition, many of the interviewees either did not want to be 
quoted or did not want to be quoted on controversial issues in the study. 
Consequently, a precise understanding of the situation with the SABC was unable to 
be obtained. Moreover, a key interviewee targeted for this study Lulama Chakela, 
who is the Group Executive of PSB at the SABC, could not be interviewed due to a 
busy schedule, thus the insight she would have provided to this study was lost. 
Furthermore, attempts to secure an alternative interviewee from the SABC were 
unsuccessful, as employees within the institution were unenthusiastic about 
participating in the study. In fact, one detected a reluctant to participate due to the 
perceived controversial nature of the study.  
 
3.10. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the methods that were used to conduct this study. The study 
used a strictly qualitative approach, which can be unscientific due to its reliance on 
the researcher’s interpretations. Nevertheless, a qualitative approach allows for a deep 
and detailed study. Within this qualitative approach, an institutional analysis is useful 
in a study on PSB, as it allows one to determine whether the PSB is enabling or 
hindering the fulfilment of its public service responsibilities. A document analysis 
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was used as it deals with primary information sources. In terms of primary 
information, articles on the SABC was collected in order to compliment and inform 
the study. In addition, a policy-oriented analysis, which examined key policy 
documents regarding the SABC was also conducted. The policy analysis was 
necessary in order to identify flaws and strengths within the broadcasting regulatory 
system. Interviews were also conducted with informants from the SABC, ICASA, 
FXI, MISA, NABSA, and former employees of the SABC. These interviews were 
semi-structured to enable flexibility and were voice recorded. The following chapter 
lays down the findings for this study. 
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Chapter 4 – The SABC’s public service delivery 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the findings of the study. It must be noted that this chapter is 
purely narrative; however the findings presented will be analysed in the next chapter. 
Such a structure is used as it assists in providing lucidity to the study. The structure of 
this chapter is themed according to issues relating to the SABC’s independence, 
accountability, funding model and distinctiveness. Within the themes, institutional 
analysis, policy analysis and document analysis are conducted. The institutional 
analysis of the SABC is based on Hollingsworth’s (2002) five layers of analysis 
namely, norms and rules, governance arrangements, relationships between other 
organisations or institutions, organisational structures, and outputs and performance. 
However, it must be noted that the organisational structure of the SABC overlaps with 
all the other layers and is thus, difficult to establish. Consequently, Hollingsworth’s 
organisational structures will not be engaged with in this study.  
 
A policy analysis is also conducted. However, it must be noted that the policy analysis 
and the institutional analysis in this study are interconnected, as the institutional 
analysis proposed by Hollingsworth consists of policy aspects. Consequently, much of 
the policy analysis is situated within the institutional analysis. The SABC’s internal 
policy documents that are examined are the Editorial Code of Conduct, Code of 
Ethics, and Corporate goals. The external policy documents that govern the SABC that 
are examined are the IBA Act, the Broadcasting Act and the ICASA Act.  
 
This study also examines other documents pertaining to the SABC, which are the 
SABC’s annual report for the 2006/2007 financial year and the Sisulu Marcus 
Commission of Enquiry Report. Finally, this chapter engages with the major issues 
regarding the SABC that appeared in the print media across South Africa. The 
document analysis conducted in this study consists of the examination of newspaper 
articles and the examination of the Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry Report. 
From the examination of the newspaper articles collected for this study, twelve major 
issues regarding the SABC arose in the print media during 2007. The majority of the 
stories that appeared in the print media portrayed the SABC in a negative light. The 
twelve issues, in no apparent order, can be summarised as: 
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1. the blacklisting saga 
2. the PSL issue 
3. the SABC’s political independence 
4. SABC Board nomination and appointment process 
5. the establishment of SABC international  
6. independent producer issues 
7. the circumcision mini-series 
8. the Thabo Mbeki documentary 
9. the leaked SABC internal audit report 
10. Dali Mpofu’s governance/leadership of the SABC 
11. SABC staff mass exodus 
12. SABC’s resignation from SANEF 
 
The twelve issues presented above refer to stories that have received relatively 
extensive attention in the print media. These twelve issues were isolated from a 
collection of newspaper reports spanning from January 2007 to November 2007. 
 
Before engaging in an examination of the SABC, it is important to discuss briefly the 
institution’s portfolio. SABC television consists of a four-fold portfolio, SABC 1; 
SABC 2; SABC 3; and a pay-TV channel, called SABC Africa. SABC 1 and 2 are 
public service channels, while SABC 3 is a public commercial channel. SABC 1 
broadcasts in English and the Nguni languages. The channel’s target audience is 
predominantly the youth of South Africa, with a programming emphasis on 
entertainment, information and education.8 SABC 2 broadcasts in English, Afrikaans 
and the Sotho languages. The channel’s programming has a firm family orientation 
(SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007). SABC 3 broadcasts in English, with a target 
audience of urban, up-market South Africans. The channel specifically targets LSM’s 
7-10 (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007).9 SABC Africa is concerned with news, 
information and entertainment situated specifically within an African context. The 
channel’s programming is provided in English.10 However, SABC Africa will not be 
examined or discussed, as the channel is predominantly accessible to those who have 
access to DSTV (Digital Satellite Television). 
 
 
                                                 
8 Channel Statement: SABC 1. Retrieved from the World Wide Web on 18 September 2007 from: 
http://www.sabc.co.za. 
9 LSM stands for living standards measure. 
10 Commercial Broadcasting. Retrieved from the World Wide Web on 18 September 2007 from: 
http://www.sabc.co.za. 
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4.2. The SABC’s Independence 
 
The SABC’s independence is encapsulated in the governance arrangements of the 
institution. These governance arrangements consist of the composition of the SABC 
Board and the Board appointment process. Instances of the SABC’s lack of 
independence are illustrated through the print media’s reports of the SABC Board 
nomination process, the SABC’s political independence, the Thabo Mbeki 
documentary, Dali Mpofu’s governance of the SABC, the blacklisting saga, the 
SABC’s leaked internal audit report, and the SABC’s withdrawal from SANEF (South 
African National Editors Forum).   
 
4.2.1. The SABC Board  
 
It is important in this study to identify who sits on the SABC Board, in order to 
examine whether the Board is representative of a broad cross-section of the 
population. In addition, it is importance to examine whether the Board members have 
any conflicts of interests with the SABC’s raison d’etre. The SABC Board for the 
year in question consists of eleven members. 11 
 
These eleven members are: Sonwabo Eddie Funde (Chairperson, electrical 
engineering and telecommunications background), Christine Qunta (Deputy 
Chairperson, law background), Prof. Alison Gillwald (telecommunications and 
communications background), Fadila Lagadien (disabled business person), Andrew 
Maralack (business background), Prof. Thami Mazwai (journalist), Andile Mbeki 
(business/broadcasting background and involved in youth affairs), Kanyisiwe Mkonza 
(media background), Cecil Msomi (journalist), Prof. Derrick Swartz (academic), and 
Ashwin Trikamjee (law background)12.  
 
The Group Chief Executive Officer (GCEO) is Advocate Dali Mpofu, who has a 
predominantly law background. The only media or communications experience Mpofu 
has is in the information and communications technology (ICT) field (SABC Annual 
Report, 2006/2007). The CEO has been widely reported in the media, such coverage 
has been predominantly negative. With regard to the controversies that the SABC has 
                                                 
11 For the structure of the SABC, refer to Appendix B. 
12 This information is found in the SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007. 
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generated, it is not surprising that the print media seriously questioned the future of 
Mpofu’s tenure as CEO of the SABC. Firstly, Mpofu’s business interests were 
scrutinised. One of the businesses that Mpofu has an interest in, Elephant Consortium 
owns shares in Telkom (Basson and Gedye, 2007). Secondly, Mpofu’s leadership of 
the SABC has been severely criticised, with reference to the controversies that the 
SABC have generated and the way in which Mpofu dealt with the various issues 
(Naidu, 2007a). The general stance in the print media was that Mpofu would be unable 
to ensure the SABC’s future as a genuine public service broadcaster. 
 
It must be noted, that a new SABC Board was nominated in 2007 and will come into 
office in January 2008. The new Board will consist of six of the previous Board 
members and six new Board members. The Board members for 2008 are as follows: 
Christine Qunta, Prof. Alison Gillwald, Fadila Lagadien, Andile Mbeki, Kanyisiwe 
Mkonza, Ashwin Trikamjee, Gloria Serobe, Advocate Pansy Tlakula, Desmond 
Golding, Nadia Bulbulia, Peter Vundla, and Kheki Khumalo (Haffajee, 2007; Malala, 
2007).  
 
4.2.2. SABC Board appointments 
 
The SABC Board structure consists of 12 non-executive directors, who are 
independent, and 3 executive directors. The public nominates the non-executive 
directors, and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Communications provides the 
President with recommendations on appointments. However, the President makes the 
final decision, and thus appoints the non-executive directors. The non-executive 
directors serve a maximum term of five years. However, the same non-executive 
directors can be appointed to serve another term. The Board, assisted by 
recommendations from the shareholder, appoints the executive directors. It must be 
noted, that the shareholder takes the form of the Minister of Communications who 
represents the state. The executive directors serve a maximum term of four years, but 
may also be re-appointed for another term (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007). The 
SABC provides training for new directors on the “SABC’s legislative framework, its 
governance processes, the nature and operations of the business of the SABC and the 
policies in terms of which the day-to-day activities of the company are managed and 
governed. Additional training is provided when the need arises” (SABC Annual 
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Report, 2006/2007: 30). The Board meets a minimum of six times a year (SABC 
Annual Report, 2006/2007). 
 
In the print media, the nomination and appointment of the new Board caused uproar in 
the print media, where an entirely new Board was favoured (Duncan, 2007; 
Mthombothi 2007; Chanza, 2007; Malala, 2007; Business Day Reporter, 2007). 
Deputy Chairperson Christine Qunta was heavily criticised in the print media, firstly, 
for being the “Queen of Racist Politics”; secondly, for being an Mbeki apologist; and 
thirdly, for her stance on Hiv/Aids (Kadali, 2007b: 11; Sapa, 2007b; Carter and Diver, 
2007; Molele, 2007; Ensor, 2007b; Van Onselen, 2007a; Citizen Reporter, 2007a; 
Dawes, 2007a). In terms of Qunta’s HIV/Aids stance, she is a Director of a company, 
which has been selling alternative medication as a cure for HIV/Aids. However, the 
Medical Research Council (MRC) has not yet tested the medication’s toxicity or its 
human use (Carter and Diver, 2007; Sapa, 2007b). Qunta’s association with the 
company has resulted in the Democratic Alliance (DA) laying a charge against Qunta, 
as well as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) threatening to do so (Kahn, 2007; 
Sapa, 2007b; Sapa, 2007c). 
 
Other Board nominees that have been criticised are Pansy Tlakula, Cecil Msomi, 
Bheki Khumalo and Gloria Serobe. Tlakula is the Chief Electoral Officer and has a 
duty to monitor the SABC during elections, thus her nomination presents a conflict of 
interest (Kadali, 2007b; Dawes, 2007a). Msomi was the KwaZulu Natal spokesperson 
and thus has ANC (African National Congress) ties (Van Onselen, 2007b; Green, 
2007; Ngalwa, 2007; Harper, 2007a; Mkhwanazi, 2007e). Khumalo is a former 
presidential spokesperson and thus has ANC ties (Mkhwanazi, 2007b; Dawes, 2007a). 
Serobe has made a similar uproar to Qunta, as she has a shareholding in Telkom 
(Mkhwanazi, 2007c; Citizen Reporter, 2007a). In addition, Serobe misinformed the 
communications Committee of having knowledge of her nominator. It was found that 
Serobe’s nominator came from within the ANC (Ensor, 2007a; Ensor, 2007c). 
 
Moreover, the print media reported that the nomination and appointment processes 
were flawed (Singh, 2007; Fisher, 2007; Naidu, 2007c). Firstly, the FXI criticised the 
nomination process, where the “advertisements calling for nominations were so small, 
they did not give sufficient publicity to the issue” (Sapa, 2007:3). In addition, 
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interviews for short-listed candidates were scheduled the day after the short-list was 
formed. According to the report, such a process was “unworkable, and may well lead 
to suspicions that candidates have been earmarked” (McLachlan, 2007d: 4). 
Furthermore, the print media reported on a compromised Portfolio Committee 
selection process. The Committee was forced to accept a list of twelve candidates on 
the order of Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota, who was acting on a higher order, 
which the ANC denied giving (Mafela et.al, 2007; Quintal, 2007; Brown, 2007). The 
print media also reported on the fresh opportunity for independence and transparency 
that could come with a completely new Board, but due to the compromised nature of 
the nomination process, the opportunity was squandered. Hence several organisations: 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), FXI, the Media Workers’ 
Association of South Africa (MWASA), the National Council of Trade Unions 
(NACTU), MISA-SA, the South African NGO Coalition (Sangoco), and the TAC 
(Treatment Action Campaign) sent President Thabo Mbeki a letter requesting the 
reconsideration of the Board nomination list (Citizen reporter, 2007b). 
 
Strongly linked to the issue of the Board nomination process, was the numerous 
reports in the print media of the SABC’s political bias towards the ANC (Mkhwanazi, 
2007d; Perlman, 2007; McLachlan, 2007c). Firstly, there were reports of the SABC 
Board and senior management’s ties to the ANC (Green, 2007). Thami Mazwai was 
linked to the ANC for displaying indifference to media independence and bias towards 
the ANC (Van Onselen, 2007a). Dali Mpofu, worked at the ANC as deputy head of 
the Social Welfare Department. Eddie Funde managed “the placement, education and 
training of the hundreds of young ANC exiles during the 1970s [and served] on the 
ANC’s NEC as recently as 2002” (Van Onselen, 2007b: 15)13. In addition, there were 
a number of claims in the print media that the SABC is still its master’s (the ANC) 
voice. Secondly, there was an incident where the SABC’s videotape showing the 
Sunday Times front page story, which exposed the Health Minister as a drunk and a 
thief, mysteriously disappeared. In addition, Dr. Snuki Zikalala (Executive of SABC 
News and Current Affairs) was reported to have ordered the head of SABC television 
news to be the sole controller of all visual material relating to the Minister 
(Mkhwanazi, 2007; McLachlan, 2007a). Zikalala’s political affiliations were widely 
                                                 
13 NEC stands for National Executive Committee.  
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reported on by the print media (Mkhwanazi, 2007; McLachlan, 2007a; Singh, 2007; 
Mthombothi, 2007). 
 
A further controversy in the print media regarding the SABC’s political independence 
can be seen with reports on the SABC’s reluctance to screen the Thabo Mbeki 
documentary. The Thabo Mbeki documentary controversy has been an extensive issue 
in the print media, proceeding since 2006. The Mbeki documentary, Unauthorised: 
Thabo Mbeki, depicts the President’s rise to power. The SABC refused to broadcast 
the documentary in 2006, as the SABC saw it as defamatory against Mbeki and 
instructed the producers to make changes to the documentary (Hlongwane, 2007a; 
McLachlan, 2007a; Mudzuli, 2007; Tsumele, 2007; Smith, 2007). Even after the 
proposed changes were made, the documentary was still not shown. Although, the 
SABC placed the documentary on its programme schedule, it failed to broadcast the 
documentary for a second time (de Waal, 2007; Hlongwane, 2007a; Sosibo, 2007b; 
McLachlan, 2007f; Hlongwane, 2007b; Sapa, 2007c).  
 
After months of the documentary not being broadcast and after the contract between 
the SABC and the documentary’s production house expired, the producers of the 
documentary decided to screen unedited versions of the documentary (Hlongwane, 
2007a). The documentary received its first screenings at the Durban International Film 
Festival and at the Grahamstown Festival (de Waal, 2007; Sosibo, 2007b). Despite the 
lapse in the SABC’s contract with the production house, the SABC threatened to get a 
court interdict to stop the screenings (de Waal, 2007; Mudzuli, 2007). Regardless of 
the SABC’s threats, the documentary was screened at the scheduled festivals (de 
Waal, 2007).  
 
The Mail and Guardian then entered the controversy and decided to screen the 
documentary at its Critical Thinking Forum (de Waal, 2007). The SABC tried to get a 
court interdict against the Mail and Guardian, but was unsuccessful. After the three 
screenings of the documentary, the reports in the print media informed its readers that 
the documentary carried little information about Mbeki that was not already in the 
public domain (de Waal, 2007; Tsumele, 2007). Consequently, questions arose in the 
print media of the SABC’s reason for not broadcasting the documentary (Sosibo, 
2007b). Such questions were met with more questions about the SABC’s political 
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independence from the ANC. After the attempts to attain court interdicts to prevent the 
external screenings of the documentary, the SABC itself broadcast the documentary on 
3 October 2007 (Smith, 2007; Sapa, 2007c). 
 
4.2.3. The SABC’s governance crisis 
 
Strongly linked to the SABC’s crisis in independence are the controversies of: 
blacklisting, which includes the Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry Report; the 
SABC’s leaked internal audit report; the SABC’s resignation from SANEF; and the 
SABC staff mass exodus. These controversies highlight the SABC’s governance crisis.  
 
4.2.3.1. SABC Commission of Enquiry into Blacklisting and Related Matters 
 
The SABC’s CEO, Dali Mpofu, appointed the Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry 
on 29 June 2006. Zwelakhe Sisulu and Gilbert Marcus headed the Commission of 
Enquiry. The examination of the Commission’s report is important to this study, as it 
addresses some critical questions regarding the SABC, questions that refer to the 
accountability and independence of the SABC.  
 
The Enquiry was commissioned to enquire into three issues. Firstly, the Commission 
investigated the existence and operationality of guidelines in the News and Current 
Affairs Division of the SABC, concerning “the utilisation of independent political 
analysts/commentators/experts” (Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry Report, 2006: 
1). In addition, the Commission investigated whether the content of the guidelines 
amounted to “undue ‘blacklisting’ or ‘banning’ of such analysts” (Sisulu Marcus 
Commission of Enquiry Report, 2006: 1). Moreover, the commission investigated 
whether the ‘remarks’ or ‘assertions’ made on SAFM on 21 June 2006, regarding the 
official SABC statement made on 20 June 2006, were factual or “if not, the nature and 
extent of any deviation and the probable causes thereof” (Sisulu Marcus Commission 
of Enquiry Report, 2006: 1). Secondly, the Commission investigated whether there 
was low morale and employee dissatisfaction with the News and Current Affairs 
Division, and if so, the causes thereof. Thirdly, “whether the SABC’s current policies 
and practices in respect of the utilisation of independent political 
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analysts/commentators/experts is in conformity with local and international best 
practice” (Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry Report, 2006: 2).  
 
With regard to the first issue under investigation, the Commission found that 
guidelines concerning the utilisation of independent analysts, commentators and 
experts were in existence. These guidelines were developed on the instruction of Dr. 
Snuki Zikalala. The Commission found that the utilisation of commentator guidelines 
were at odds with the manner in which other SABC policies had been formulated. The 
Report stated that it was “concerned with the manner in which important power have 
been exercised” (Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry Report, 2006: 23). However, 
the guidelines were not formally operational and were thus unapproved. 
 
Of the eight commentators that were allegedly banned or reduced to being used for 
“limited purposes only”, the Commission found that all instances were not objectively 
defensible (Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry Report, 2006: 48). It must be 
emphasised that the banning of commentators by Zikalala did occur at the SABC on 
illegitimate grounds. The Commission found that the banning of Sipho Seepe and 
Paula Slier were politically motivated.  
 
With regard to the second issue under investigation by the Commission, the SABC’s 
media statement that was issued on 20 June 2006 regarding the blacklisting issue, 
avoided providing an explanation to the public. The Commission’s report states that 
the discussion by John Perlman regarding the blacklisting issue, on 21 June 2006 on 
SAFM, was indeed factual.  
 
The Commission’s report points to a climate of fear, where the working environment 
in the news and current affairs department is compromised. Such an environment is 
the result of, according to the report “downward micro-management” (Sisulu Marcus 
Commission of Enquiry Report, 2006: 58). Hence, the Commission also found that 
“the phenomenon of self-censorship” that SABC employees referred to were not 
“exaggerated or implausible” (Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry Report, 2006: 
49). The Commission’s report further states that, “The impression is created of 
management by command in which there is little room to contest controversial 
decisions” (Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry Report, 2006: 61). 
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With regard to the third issue under investigation, the Commission found that the 
guidelines on commentators were not created in line with international best practice. 
On the contrary, the guidelines contradicted international best practice. 
 
4.2.3.2. The blacklisting saga 
 
The Commission’s report was leaked to the Mail and Guardian. The SABC attempted 
to get a court interdict to gag the Mail and Guardian, but was unsuccessful. The 
SABC did not make the Commission’s findings available to the public. The person 
who was responsible for the banning, Dr. Snuki Zikalala, was only issued with a 
warning by the SABC. However, John Perleman was also issued with a warning and 
resigned as a result. The SABC was quoted in the print media, claiming that it would 
institute all the recommendations provided by the Commission, and in fact was in the 
process of doing exactly that (Motsepe, 2007). However, exactly what the SABC has 
done about the Commission’s report has never been disclosed to the public (Farber, 
2007; Swart, 2007).  
 
The FXI issued a complaint to ICASA regarding the blacklisting issue, where ICASA 
called for a hearing to be conducted with the SABC (Sapa, 2007d; McLachlan, 2007g; 
Gifford, 2007). The SABC was then reported in the print media as trying to discredit 
the Commission’s report. The SABC argued that since the evidence used by the 
Commission had not been provided under oath, “tested by cross-examination” and 
“properly evaluated” by the Commission, it did not accept some of the evidence 
contained in the report (McLachlan, 2007b: 3). 
 
In the main, the print media’s stance on the blacklisting saga was that the SABC is 
undemocratic and is stifling freedom of expression, and that the SABC is declining as 
a public broadcaster (Mangcu, 2007). The print media emphasised the fact that no 
action, other than a slap on the wrist, was given to Zikalala (Hartley, 2007: Sapa, 
2007e). In addition, the print media emphasised the SABC’s inaction on the 
Commission’s findings (Swart, 2007; Haffajee and Makgetla, 2007). A number of 
biting comments appeared in the print media including such statements as, “Freedom 
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of speech is dead at the SABC” and “The dumbing down of the SABC” (Devenish, 
2007: 22; Maughan, 2007: 4). 
 
4.2.3.3. Leaked internal audit report 
 
A relatively big scandal in the media was a leaked SABC internal audit report 
detailing the extent to which the SABC’s Head of Legal Services, Mafika Sihlali, 
defrauded the SABC of R1.8 million (Naidu, 2007c; Robinson and Gedye, 2007; 
Basson, 2007). The audit report was leaked to the Mail and Guardian, who exposed 
the scandal.  
 
The audit report found that Sihlali failed to disclose twenty-eight of his business 
interests to the SABC, of which CEO Dali Mpofu is a director in nine of the same 
companies (Naidu, 2007d; Robinson and Gedye, 2007). The report also found that 
Sihlali was invoicing the SABC excessive amounts for legal work and was 
outsourcing work to law firms in which he had an interest (Naidu, 2007c; Robinson 
and Gedye, 2007). In addition, Sihlali used an SABC poll vehicle, which he was 
prohibited from using, which amounted to R 129 000 (Naidu, 2007d; Robinson and 
Gedye, 2007; Basson, 2007). Moreover, due to the SABC not putting Sihlali on 
special leave when the audit was being conducted, Sihlali threatened some of the 
audit’s witnesses and thus, compromised the investigation (Forrest, 2007; Naidu, 
2007d; Robinson and Gedye, 2007; Gedye and Basson, 2007; Ndaba, 2007; Basson, 
2007). Furthermore, Elsje Oosthuizen’s, the Head of Internal Audit, house was burnt 
down in the midst of the investigation (Robinson and Gedye, 2007).  
 
The SABC got a court interdict to stop the Mail and Guardian from publishing the 
report. Consequently, the Mail and Guardian was not able to publish the entire report 
(Kirk, 2007; Wolmarans, 2007; Basson, 2007; Van den Berg, 2007; De Lange, 2007). 
Although the SABC did not suspend Sihlali after the audit report was completed, 
Sihlali eventually resigned (Hlongwane, 2007c; Ndaba, 2007). 
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4.2.3.4. SABC-SANEF issue 
 
Following a report in the Sunday Times, that Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang is an alcoholic and a thief, and the attainment of the Minister’s health 
records without her permission, the SABC resigned from SANEF (Ncube and 
Hlongwane, 2007; Naidu, 2007a; Rademeyer, 2007). However, it must be noted, the 
court ruled that the Sunday Times’s attainment of the Minister’s health records was in 
the public interest and was thus, legal in the eyes of the law. The SABC accused 
SANEF of being culpable to an “epidemic deterioration of journalistic ethics … and 
disrespect for our people” (Naidu, 2007a: 1). The SABC’s resignation from SANEF 
was highly criticised in the print media and the letter Mpofu sent to SANEF was torn 
apart by the print media (Sapa and Naki, 2007; Matya, 2007; Leshilo, 2007). The print 
media once again questioned the SABC’s editorial integrity and political 
independence. 
 
4.2.3.5. SABC staff mass exodus 
 
There have been numerous reports throughout the year within the print media, of a 
“mass exodus” at the SABC. Reports of a “mass exodus” arose due to an excessive 
amount of resignations from the SABC (Farber, 2007). According to the print media, 
the “mass exodus” issue has been caused by low morale and a deteriorating editorial 
standard at the SABC. A news report as a case in point is “SABC head shrugs off loss 
of 76 journalists” (Naidu, 2007b:2). 
 
4.3. Accountability 
 
The SABC’s accountability is encompassed within the internal policies and the 
external polices governing the institution. With regard to the SABC’s internal policies, 
the institution has a number of documents that guide its operations, as they embody 
the norms and rules of the SABC. These documents are, the Memorandum and 
Articles of Association, a Code of Ethics, a Board Charter, terms of reference for the 
Board Committees, and a Delegation of Authority Framework. These documents are 
accessible from the SABC, to all SABC staff members, at all times (SABC Annual 
Report, 2006/2007). In addition to these documents, the SABC has instituted internal 
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controls. Such controls consist of “written policies and procedures, clearly defined 
lines of accountability, and delegation of authority based on predetermined levels of 
risk”, and “comprehensive reporting and analysis against approved standards and 
budgets” (Annual Report, 2006/2007: 34). The effectiveness of the internal control 
system is monitored via: 
 
• “Regular management reviews; 
• Comprehensive review and testing by internal auditors; and 
• Internal auditors’ review” (Annual Report, 2006/2007: 34). 
 
With regard to the external policies that govern the SABC, the SABC’s license 
conditions, the IBA Act, the Broadcasting Act, and the ICASA Act will be discussed. 
Also pertaining to the SABC’s accountability, are the institution’s Board committees 
and the fulfilment of its objectives for the 2006/2007 financial year.  
 
Ntombela-Nzimande (2007), the Group Executive of Public, International and 
Regulatory Affairs, informs that there are regulatory and legislative measures in place 
that ensure compliance with the SABC’s mandate. In terms of the regulatory 
measures, the Editorial Policy provides an operational framework for the SABC. The 
SABC’s license conditions are more in depth, articulating programming quotas for the 
SABC. Moreover, a complaints mechanism exists, where the public can lodge 
complaints about the SABC through the Broadcasting and Complaints Commission of 
South Africa (BCCSA) (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). Furthermore, the SABC belongs 
to NABSA, which holds the SABC accountable in the fulfilment of its license 
conditions. Where the SABC violates its license conditions, the institution is liable to 
be fined by NABSA (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). The SABC is also held 
accountable to ICASA, who has a monitoring unit to monitor the SABC’s compliance 
with its license conditions.  
 
In terms of legislative measures, the SABC has a corporate governance framework, 
which is developed by the SABC Board. The SABC develops its strategies around the 
corporate governance framework (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). In addition, the SABC 
has to account to the Board on the achievement of the Broadcasting Charter. 
Moreover, the SABC accounts to Parliament on its strategies, twice a year. 
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Furthermore, the SABC accounts annually to Parliament on its results and 
achievements for the financial year (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007).  
 
In terms of the Broadcasting Act, every two years, the SABC has to obtain public 
feedback on its service as a public broadcaster. This public feedback acquirement 
takes the form of engagements with the public in public halls and meetings. The last 
public feedback programme, took the form of the SABC opening up its platforms and 
encouraging the public to fax, email and phone the SABC with their comments or 
complaints (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). According to Ntombela-Nzimande (2007), 
the SABC formulates a strategy annually, in relation to the Editorial Policy and the 
Broadcasting Charter, entailing what the organisation plans to do in the upcoming 
years as well as for that respective year.  
 
4.3.1. Editorial values of the SABC 
 
The editorial values outlined in the Editorial Code of Conduct of the SABC are used to 
guide the institution to fulfil its public service mandate.14 The editorial values of the 
SABC are in adherence with the constitution, where the SABC has a responsibility:  
 
• To heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights;  
• To lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is 
based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by the law;  
• To improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and  
• To build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a 
sovereign state in the family of nations (SABC Editorial Code of Conduct). 
 
Furthermore, the SABC’s role as a public broadcaster, according to the Editorial Code, 
is “to promote respect for democratic values and human rights; to supply information 
that allows citizens to exercise their rights, and to reflect the rich diversity of a united 
South Africa” (SABC Editorial Code of Conduct). The values that underpin the 
Constitution are also the values that underpin the SABC as an institution, namely 
“national development, unity, diversity, non-racism, non-sexism, democracy and 
human dignity”, as well as, bridging “political, class, racial and gender divides” 
(SABC Editorial Code of Conduct). Notably though, the SABC has adopted the values 
                                                 
14 For the full Editorial Code refer to appendix C. 
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of equality, editorial independence, nation building, diversity, human dignity, 
accountability, and transparency as its core values.  
 
Equality entails universal access to the SABC. In addition, equality refers to a 
diversity of programming that caters for the needs of all South Africans on an equal 
level, and in all eleven official languages (SABC Editorial Code of Conduct). Editorial 
independence comprises freedom of expression, “journalistic, creative and 
programming independence” (SABC Editorial Code of Conduct).  Nation building 
involves the promotion of national identity and culture, and the promotion of 
participatory democracy (SABC Editorial Code of Conduct). Diversity consists of the 
representation of all languages, cultures, provinces, and people within SABC 
programming (SABC Editorial Code of Conduct). Human dignity is concerned with 
the protection of South Africans in terms of language and images from stereotypical 
and prejudicial representation in programming in terms of race, culture, and gender 
(SABC Editorial Code of Conduct). Accountability involves the accountability of staff 
to the SABC Board. The SABC Board is responsible for implementing the SABC’s 
Charter (SABC Editorial Code of Conduct). Transparency entails being open and 
honest “to every aspect of its relationships with shareholder, stakeholders, suppliers 
and the public” (SABC Editorial Code of Conduct). The code also applies to the 
“commissioning, acquisition and production of the programmes” (SABC Editorial 
Code of Conduct).  
 
Within the Code, the SABC has specified a commitment to a “high standard of 
accuracy, fairness and impartiality”, “to disclose all the essential facts and by not 
suppressing relevant, available facts, or distorting by wrong or improper emphasis” 
(SABC Editorial Code of Conduct). The Code asserts a commitment to the 
information role of the media, diversity and quality. Moreover, the Code pledges that 
editorial decisions will be devoid of commercial, political, and personal influences. 
Furthermore, the Code expresses a commitment to “evaluate, analyse and critically 
appraise government policies and programmes” (SABC Editorial Code of Conduct).  
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4.3.2. SABC Code of Ethics 
 
The SABC’s Code of Ethics entails that the SABC conduct itself and deals with 
societal matters in a fair and just manner. In addition, under the Code of Ethics,  
employees are to conduct their daily duties with honesty and integrity. Moreover, the 
SABC pledges to conduct its relationships with contractual partners with “honesty, 
integrity, transparency, fairness and professionalism” (SABC Annual Report, 
2006/2007: 34). Furthermore, and most importantly, the SABC pledges to avoid any 
situation where its employees’ interests conflict with those of the institution (SABC 
Annual Report, 2006/2007: 34). 
 
4.3.3. Current SABC Corporate Goals  
 
The SABC’s Corporate Goals are quite extensive. The SABC aims to: 
 
• Empower South Africans by providing information, entertainment and education in all 
eleven official languages, which in turn promotes democracy and non-racialism; 
• Ensuring that the institution has a solid and sustainable financial foundation “within a 
specified timeframe that enables it to fulfil its mandate”; 
• Ensure that the SABC is an institution that garners “support and respect” from 
shareholders, viewers, listeners and all other stakeholders; and 
• “Ensuring compelling, professional and authoritative news and current affairs 
programming that tells the South African story accurately, fairly and in a balanced 
way, while reflecting the world, in particular Africa, to all South Africans in line with 
the SABC Editorial Policies” (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007: 7). 
 
In addition, the SABC also aims to align its objectives with the Broadcasting Act, 
Broadcasting Charter and its internal Editorial Policies. The SABC intends to 
“Revitalize the Corporation” by improving the institution’s working environment and 
by obtaining the country’s finest talent (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007: 7). The 
SABC endeavours to ensure that all statutory and regulatory rules and guidelines are 
complied with throughout the institution and to evaluate and monitor the SABC’s 
compliance with the Broadcasting Act and Editorial Policies. Moreover, the SABC 
aims to put in place Employment Equity and Black Economic Empowerment Policies 
and support the African Renaissance and NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development). The institution also seeks to establish an “innovative technology 
platform and infrastructure” to allow the SABC to fulfil its mandate (SABC Annual 
Report, 2006/2007: 7). Furthermore, the SABC intends to establish policies, which 
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will ensure apt governance of the institution as is required by the legislation that 
governs the SABC.  
 
4.3.4. Total citizenship empowerment 
 
The SABC has a new strategy, which is public service broadcasting for Total Citizen 
Empowerment, which aims to be constantly focused on citizens. According to 
Ntombela-Nzimande, the total in Total Citizenship Empowerment means, the SABC is 
“supposed to reach everybody, we’re supposed to reach all age groups, all rich and 
poor, urban and rural” (2007: personal interview). All the SABC’s offerings must 
reach the “total citizen, in its diverse cultures” (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007: personal 
interview). Hence, the SABC’s promise is not to serve niche groups, but to serve the 
South African citizenry in its entirety. According to Ntombela-Nzimande, citizen 
means “we are approaching you as though you have a right to access that [SABC 
programming], irrespective of whether you have money to pay for it or not” (2007: 
personal interview). Empowerment in the SABC’s context means that,  
 
… whatever we do must give you growth, must develop you, must give you 
information that you can make use of in real life. Whether your real life is just being 
informed or your real life is about making choices about your role to play in 
democracy. Whether your empowerment is about accessing those economic 
opportunities (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007: personal interview).  
 
Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) argues that the SABC’s new slogan gives all the SABC’s 
employees a common framework to function around. In addition, the new slogan 
provides the public with a criterion on which to assess the SABC. The new slogan 
helps the SABC to be “transparent and open about our intention and about our 
approach, it also helps us to be made accountable for what we have put across” 
(Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007: personal interview). This new approach according to the 
SABC, also entails “changes to internal operations, programme content briefs, 
commissioning and content acquisition strategies, news, service delivery, content 
angles, human resource deployments and resource allocations”.15 In addition to these 
changes, the SABC stated that it would review its funding model. To achieve total 
citizen empowerment, the SABC’s strategies are as follows: 
 
                                                 
15 Harber, A. 2006. Mistake to dismiss new set of ‘directions’ at SABC. Retrieved from the World 
Wide Web on 18 September 2007 from: http://www.businessday.co.za. 
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• ensure “distinctive, relevant and quality content”; 
• “implement effective and relevant technologies in order to support the delivery of the 
public service remit”; 
• “embrace and pursue a multi-platform approach to deliver on the public service 
remit”; 
• “nation building and universal access and the promotion of democracy”;  
• improve the SABC’s internal environment, by for instance, empowering staff, 
improving staff morale, and rewarding performance. In 2005 six women were 
appointed top management positions; and 
• restructuring of the Group Executive (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007).  
 
In order to achieve and sustain its mandate and objectives, the SABC has fashioned 
the following strategies to aid the institution: 
 
• To take advantage of the opportunities media convergence brings; 
• “Creating adequate platforms and appropriate infrastructure for enhanced delivery of 
the Fifa Soccer World Cup in 2010”; 
• Improving service delivery of those marginalised in society by specifically targeting 
and increasing service to these people; 
• “Creating and implementing an economic and human development approach for 
content creation industries that will enable the development of South African themes 
issues and stories”; 
• Creating a “sustainable and adequate funding model”; 
• “Expanding and improving” BEE and SMMEs participation in the institution; and  
• Addressing issues of “lack of credibility and depth” in the newsroom (SABC annual 
report, 2005/2006).  
 
4.3.5. Relationship between the SABC and other organisations and institutions 
 
The SABC’s relationships to ICASA and the state are explored in this study. The 
SABC’s relationship to ICASA is located within the license conditions that ICASA 
has generated for the SABC. The license conditions form the basis of ICASA’s 
expectations of the SABC and the extent to which the institution is accountable to 
ICASA. 
 
 The SABC is evaluated on an annual basis by ICASA. With regard to the SABC’s 
license conditions, the SABC is required to submit a quarterly report to ICASA on 
their compliance with the license conditions. Even though the SABC has to submit 
quarterly reports to ICASA, they have a period of a year to fulfil the license 
conditions annually. ICASA then compiles an annual report on the SABC’s 
performance in terms of its license conditions (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007). The annual 
report examines whether the SABC has fulfilled all its license conditions and what it 
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focused on during prime time (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007). ICASA also receives 
recordings of all the SABC’s programming during the performance period, from 
which the SABC’s fulfilment of its content quotas is evaluated.16 After ICASA has 
evaluated the SABC, a report is written by ICASA to the SABC detailing its ruling, 
which is followed by recommendations (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007). 
 
Similarly, the SABC’s relationship to the state can be found within the government-
generated legislation that governs the SABC namely, the IBA Act and the 
Broadcasting Act. These Acts make the SABC accountable to the government. 
However, the SABC’s relationship with the government also manifests in the 
institution’s political and editorial independence, which has already been discussed. 
Hence, the SABC’s relationship with ICASA and the state is based on its fulfillment 
and adherence to its license conditions, the IBA Act and the Broadcasting Act.  
 
4.3.5.1. SABC license conditions 
 
ICASA issued the SABC with new license conditions in 2006, which came into effect 
on 23 March 2006. The new license conditions replace the license conditions issued in 
2004. The license conditions for SABC 1 and 2 will be discussed together as there are 
many similarities between them. 
 
The license conditions for SABC 1 and 2 states that the revenues generated from the 
channels must not be used to subsidise the SABC’s commercial services. The license 
conditions make the SABC accountable to ICASA in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
SABC must submit a quarterly report to ICASA of the channels’ use of different 
genres, local content and each official language during that specific quarter (SABC 
license conditions for SABC 1 and 2, 2006). Secondly, the SABC must submit a 
quarterly report to ICASA of the channels’ broadcast of advertisements. This report 
includes the amount of minutes broadcast in every hour, as well as the “average 
number of minutes per hour” during that specific quarter (SABC license conditions 
for SABC 1 and 2, 2006: 11). Thirdly, the SABC must provide ICASA with the 
financial statements for both channels on an annual basis, as well as “any other related 
                                                 
16 Performance period refers to “the period between 18h00 and 22h00 daily” (SABC License 
Conditions for SABC 1 and 2: 3). 
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financial information” (SABC license conditions for SABC 1 and 2, 2006: 7). 
Fourthly, SABC 1 and 2 must “regularly broadcast…information about the manner in 
which members of the public may lodge complaints” about SABC 1 and 2 (SABC 
license conditions for SABC 1 and 2, 2006: 11). Finally, the SABC must submit a 
report to ICASA on all the complaints lodged against SABC 1 and 2, including the 
manner in which each complaint was addressed on an annual basis (SABC license 
conditions for SABC 1 and 2, 2006: 9). The license conditions also specify that the 
state will be the only shareholder of the SABC. 
 
The license conditions further state that SABC 1 and 2 must provide programming 
that is:  
 
• wide ranging and “in the official languages”; 
• programming that reflects “both the unity and the diverse cultural and 
multilingual nature of the Republic and all of its cultures and regions to 
audiences” (SABC license conditions for SABC 1 and 2, 2006: 11). 
 
The content genre quotas provided by ICASA are provisioned for six years in the 
license conditions for SABC 1 and 2, where every year the quotas increase. The 
content genre quotas for SABC 1 and 2 differ and will thus be discussed individually. 
However, there are seven genres for both SABC 1 and 2.  
 
SABC 1 is obliged to provide: 
 
• 7 hours of news per week, of which 3.5 hours must be broadcast in prime time and a 
30 minute news programme must be shown daily; 
• 2 hours per week of current affairs, of which 1 hour must be broadcast in prime time; 
• 10 hours of informal knowledge-building per week, of which 2 hours must be 
broadcast in prime time; 
• 3 hours of drama per week, of which 8 hours must be broadcast in prime time and 4 
hours must be local content drama in prime time; 
• 20 hours per week of children’s content; and  
• 10 hours per week of educational content (SABC license conditions for SABC 1 and 
2, 2006). 
 
SABC 2 is obliged to provide: 
 
• 7 hours per week of news, of which 3.5 hours must be broadcast in prime time, and a 
30 minute news programme must be shown daily; 
• 2 hours per week of current affairs, of which 1 hour must be broadcast in prime time; 
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• 18 hours per week of informal knowledge-building, of which 2 hours must be 
broadcast in prime time; 
• 4 hours per week of documentaries, of which 1.5 hours must be broadcast in prime 
time; 
• 24 hours per week of drama, of which 8 hours must be broadcast in prime time and 4 
hours must be local content drama in prime time; 
• 15 hours of children content per week; and 
• 10 hours of educational programming per week (SABC license conditions for SABC 
1 and 2, 2006). 
 
It must be noted, that the content genre quotas provided by ICASA include repeat 
broadcasts for both SABC 1 and 2. 
 
In terms of news and current affairs, SABC 1 and 2 are obligated to exercise full 
editorial control of their programming. SABC 1 and 2 must broadcast programming 
that demonstrates a regard for the highest standards of journalistic professionalism. 
The channels are also obligated to provide programming that is fair; unbiased; 
impartial; balanced; and independent from government, commercial or any other 
interference. The SABC must appropriately enable the public to receive a diversity of 
opinions on issues of public concern (SABC license conditions for SABC 1 and 2, 
2006). 
 
Further requirements for SABC 1 and 2 are to provide programming “for the interests 
of all sectors of South African society”, which includes people living with disabilities, 
health-related issues, gender issues, programming for all age-groups (SABC license 
conditions for SABC 1 and 2, 2006: 14). The channels must also provide sign 
language translation during prime-time news bulletins, as well as other programming 
(SABC license conditions for SABC 1 and 2, 2006). 
 
In terms of advertising, the channels are confined to broadcasting a maximum of 10 
minutes per hour on average. Moreover, advertisements may not exceed 12 minutes 
per hour (SABC license conditions for SABC 1 and 2, 2006).  
 
ICASA has provided a six-year quota for SABC 1 and 2, where the quotas increase 
annually. The language quotas for SABC 1 and 2 differ and will be discussed 
separately. The language requirements for SABC 1 are to provide 13 hours and 45 
minutes per week of official languages other than English, which excludes the 
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broadcast of marginalised languages in prime time. In addition, SABC 1 must provide 
45 minutes per week of marginalised languages in prime time (SABC license 
conditions for SABC 1 and 2, 2006). 
 
The language quotas for SABC 2 are to provide 17 hours and 18 minutes per week of 
official languages other than English, which excludes the broadcast of marginalised 
languages in prime time. In addition, the channel must provide 54 minutes per week 
of marginalised languages in prime time (SABC license conditions for SABC 1 and 2, 
2006). 
 
4.3.5.1.1. SABC 3 
 
Although SABC 3 is a commercial service, its license conditions state that it is a 
“national free-to-air public television broadcasting service” (SABC license conditions 
for SABC 3, 2006: 3). The license conditions also provide the channel with the PBS 
characteristic of being a full-spectrum programme provider. The channel’s license 
conditions forbid any cross-subsidisation from the SABC’s public service division. 
The license conditions further state, that the state will be the sole shareholder in 
SABC 3. 
 
The SABC has to account to ICASA in terms of SABC 3’s programming in a number 
of ways and in the same way, as SABC 1 and 2 have to account. Firstly, the SABC 
must submit a quarterly report to ICASA on SABC 3’s use of different genres, local 
content, and each official language for the respective quarter. Secondly, the SABC 
must submit a quarterly report on SABC3’s broadcast of advertisements expressed as 
minutes per hour and “an average number of minutes per hour” for the respective 
quarter (SABC license conditions for SABC 3, 2006: 7). Thirdly, the SABC must 
provide ICASA with SABC 3’s financial statements and any other financial 
documents on an annual basis. 
 
In terms of SABC 3’s license condition, the channel must broadcast information 
detailing the way in which the public can go about lodging complaints about SABC 3. 
The channel must provide wide-ranging programming in the official languages. 
Furthermore, SABC 3 must provide programming that is reflective of the unity, 
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diverse culture, multilingual nature, cultures, and regions  to the public (SABC license 
conditions for SABC 3, 2006). 
 
The content genre quotas for SABC 3 are as follows: 
 
• 7 hours per week of news, of which 3.5 hours must be in prime time and a 30 minute 
news programme broadcast daily; 
• 5 hours per week of current affairs, of which 2 hours must be broadcast in prime time; 
• 11 hours per week of informal knowledge-building, of which 2 hours must be 
broadcast in prime time;  
• 4 hours per week of documentaries, of which 1 hour must be broadcast in prime time; 
• 24 hours per week of drama, of which 8 hours must be broadcast in prime time and 4 
hours of local content drama must be broadcast in prime time; and 
• 7 hours per week of children’s content (SABC license conditions for SABC 3, 2006). 
 
It must be noted, that ICASA has placed less educational requirements on SABC 3 
and that the above genre quotas are inclusive of repeat broadcasts. 
 
In terms of news and current affairs, SABC 3, must, like is sister channels, exercise 
full editorial control of its programming. SABC 3 must broadcast programming that 
demonstrates a regard for the highest standards of journalistic professionalism. The 
channel is also obligated to provide programming that is fair; unbiased; impartial; 
balanced; and independent from government, commercial or any other interference. 
The SABC must appropriately enable the public to receive a diversity of opinions on 
issues of public concern (SABC license conditions for SABC 3, 2006). 
 
The language quotas issued by ICASA in the license conditions for SABC 3 are that 
the channel must broadcast 5 percent of all content broadcast on the channel, in 
official languages other than English. In addition, SABC 3 must broadcast its 
programming predominantly in English.  
 
Further requirements for SABC 3 are to, again likes its sister channels, provide 
programming that reflects the interests of all sectors of society, which includes people 
living with disabilities, health-related issues, gender issues, and provide programming 
for all age groups. The channel must also provide sign language translation during 
news bulletins in prime time, as well as other programmes. Advertisements must be 
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limited to 10 minutes per hour on average, and may not exceed 12 minutes per hour 
(SABC license conditions for SABC 3, 2006). 
 
4.3.5.2. The IBA Act 
 
The ideal of an autonomous SABC is further reinforced in the IBA Act. The IBA Act 
was instituted in 1995 and amends the IBA Act of 1993. The purpose of the Act is to 
regulate broadcasting activities in the public interest by ensuring that broadcasters, 
among other things, provide entertainment, education and information, which caters 
for all language and cultural groups in South Africa. Broadcasters must also protect 
and nurture national and regional identity, culture and character.  
 
In addition, broadcasters must provide news, public interest actuality, international, 
national, regional and local programming. The Act obligates broadcasters to “protect 
the integrity and viability” of PSB, where PSB’s must provide programming for 
different language, cultural and religious groups; provide for the different regions and 
local communities in South Africa; and provide educational programmes (IBA Act, 
1993: 9). The Act compels broadcasters to provide “equitable treatment of political 
parties…during any election period” (IBA Act, 1993: 9). What is more, broadcasters 
must adhere to a code of conduct that is “acceptable to the Independent Broadcasting 
Authority” (IBA Act, 1993: 9). Furthermore, broadcasters must ensure that the public 
has an appropriate means for lodging complaints (IBA Act, 1993). 
 
However, many of the provisions within the IBA Act have been integrated into the 
Broadcasting Act and the ICASA Act. Furthermore, the provisions for the 
Independent Broadcasting Authority, detailed in Chapter 2 of the Act have been 
subsumed into ICASA. However, the regulatory framework for broadcasting that is 
provided for in the Act is still in force. Nevertheless, as the IBA no longer exists; the 
Act will not be engaged with any further to avoid repetition (Mochaba et.al, 2003). 
 
4.3.5.3. The Broadcasting Act 
 
The Broadcasting Act further binds the SABC. This study uses the Broadcasting Act 
of 1999 and the Broadcasting Amendment Act of 2003. The Broadcasting Act was 
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instituted in order to regulate the broadcasting industry. Hence, the Act aims to among 
other things, facilitate democracy, the development of society, gender equality, nation 
building, provide education, and strengthen “the spiritual and moral fibre of society” 
(Broadcasting Act, 1999: 9). The Act obligates the SABC to provide a plurality of 
news, views, information, and wide ranging entertainment and educational 
programming. Under the Act, the SABC must provide broad-ranging services and 
provide programming for children, women, the youth, and the disabled. The SABC 
must also encourage local content development in terms of programming. The Act 
further obligates the SABC to:  
 
• “Provide a clear allocation of roles and assignment of tasks between policy formation, 
regulation and service provision as well as articulation of long-term and intermediate-
term goals; and 
• Ensure that broadcasting services are effectively controlled by South Africans” 
(Broadcasting Act, 1999: 9). 
 
Section 5 of the Act states that SABC programming must be: 
 
• “varied and comprehensive, providing a balance of information, education and 
entertainment meeting the broadcasting needs of the entire South African population 
in terms of age, race, gender, religion, interests and backgrounds; 
• Provide a reasonable, balanced opportunity for the public to receive a variety of 
points of view on matters of public concern”; 
• Provide significantly for local content “produced by the independent production 
sector”; and 
• “A range of programming in the Republic’s official languages must be extended to all 
South Africans as circumstances permit” (Broadcasting Act, 1999: 10; Broadcasting 
Amendment Act 2002: 8). 
 
Section 6 of the Act details the Charter of the SABC, which governs the institution. 
The Act states, among other things, that ICASA must monitor and enforce adherence 
to the SABC Charter. The SABC must also provide wide-ranging programming in the 
official languages which: 
 
(a) reflects South African attitudes, opinion, ideas, values and artistic creativity; 
(b) displays South African talent in education and entertainment programmes; 
(c) offers a plurality of views and a variety of news, information and analysis from a 
South African point of view; 
(d) advances the national and public interest (Broadcasting Amendment Act, 
2002:10). 
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The Act obligates the SABC to guarantee that the Board ensures public participation 
in the development of its news, editorial, programming, local content, educational, 
universal service and access, language, and religious policies. Public participation 
must be achieved through “inviting and considering public comment on such draft 
policies and by other means” (Broadcasting Amendment Act, 2002: 10). In addition, 
the SABC must provide the public with a means to confer their opinions to the 
institution on its services on a regular basis, where the SABC must take into account 
such public opinion in its activities. The Act obligates the SABC to develop a Code of 
Practice that ensures compliance with among other things: 
 
• “the rights of all South Africans to receive and impart information and ideas; 
• The mandate to provide for a wide range of audience interests, beliefs and 
perspectives; and  
• A high standard of accuracy, fairness and impartiality in news and programmes that 
deal with matters of public interest” (Broadcasting Amendment Act, 2002: 10). 
 
Section 8 of the Act refers to the prescribed objectives of the SABC, which are to 
among other things, provide information, education and entertainment programmes. 
The SABC also needs “to be responsive to audience needs, including the needs of the 
deaf and the blind and account on how to meet those needs” (Broadcasting Act, 1999; 
Broadcasting Amendment Act, 2002: 12). 
 
Section 10 of the Act, is one of the most important regulations pertaining to the 
SABC, as it details what the SABC’s public service provision should entail. Under the 
Act, the SABC is obligated to ensure that its services are available to the public in all 
the official languages. The SABC must be reflective of the unity, diverse culture, 
multilingual nature, and religions of the public. The institution is obligated to provide 
high quality programming in all languages, as well as wide-ranging educational 
programming. The SABC must provide local content from independent producers, as 
well as from the SABC itself; and provide national sports, developmental and 
minority sports programming. The SABC is obligated to provide news and public 
affairs programming that adhere to the highest journalistic standards. SABC 
programming must also be fair, unbiased, impartial, balanced, and must be 
independent from government, commercial or any other influences. Under the Act the 
SABC is also obligated to “enrich the cultural heritage of South Africa by providing 
support for traditional and contemporary artistic expression” (Broadcasting Act, 1999: 
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13). Moreover, the SABC must endeavor to provide broad-ranging services, which 
extend to children, women, the youth, and the disabled (Broadcasting Act, 1999: 13; 
Broadcasting Amendment Act, 2002). The Act further states that the SABC’s 
operations must be funded through a mix of advertising, sponsorships, government 
grants, donations, and license fees. 
 
Section 10 also details that the SABC must submit an annual report accounting for the 
activities of the corporation during the financial year; the financial statements of the 
SABC at the end of the financial year; and the auditors report on the financial 
statements to the Minister of Communications. This report submitting also applies to 
the SABC’s commercial arm as detailed in section 11 of the Act (Broadcasting 
Amendment Act, 2002). 
 
Section 11 is as important as section 10, as it details what the SABC’s commercial 
services, which in this study is SABC 3, should entail. The Act states that the SABC’s 
commercial arm is subject to the same regulations as that of the commercial 
broadcasting sector. In addition, the channel must comply with the values of the 
SABC’s public service arm in terms of programmes and service. Moreover, SABC 3 
must provide a significant amount of local content from independent producers. 
Furthermore, SABC 3 is obligated under the Act to subsidise the SABC’s public 
service arm (Broadcasting Act, 1999). 
 
The regulations pertaining to the commercial broadcasting sector that also pertains to 
the SABC’s commercial arm are detailed in section 30 of the Act. SABC 3 is 
required, are among other things, to provide a wide-range of programming that 
addresses “a wide section of the South African public” (Broadcasting Act, 1999: 19). 
In addition, SABC 3 must provide programming in all official languages, however it 
may also “provide programming in languages other than South African official 
languages, where the Authority is convinced that such services can be commercially 
viable” (Broadcasting Act, 1999: 19). The Act obligates SABC 3 to provide an 
appropriately significant amount of local content. Moreover, news and information 
programmes must be broadcast regularly, which also includes discussions on national 
and regional issues, and local issues where appropriate (Broadcasting Act, 1999). 
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Section 12 of the Act pertains to the composition of the SABC Board and states that 
the Board will consist of 12 non-executive members and 3 executive members (the 
Chief Executive Officer, CEO; Chief Operating Officer, COO; and the Chief 
Financial Officer, CFO). The Act empowers the President, with the advice of the 
National Assembly, to appoint the 12 non-executive members of the Board. However, 
the appointment process must entail: 
 
• Participation by the public in a nomination process; 
• Transparency and openness; and  
• That a shortlist of candidates for appointment is published (Broadcasting Act, 1999: 
14). 
 
Such selection criteria are crucial for safeguarding institutional autonomy to ensure 
the institution’s independence, so that a situation does not arise where people are 
positioned on the Board to serve the agenda’s of the government or commercial 
entities. 
 
The Act also empowers the President to designate the chairperson and deputy 
chairperson of the Board from the non-executive members. According to the Act 
Board members must be: 
 
• Appointed to the Board according to their “qualifications, expertise and experience in 
the fields of broadcasting policy and technology, broadcasting regulation, media law, 
frequency planning, business practice and finance, marketing, journalism, 
entertainment and education, social and labour issues; 
• Committed to fairness, freedom of expression, the right of the public to be informed, 
and openness and accountability on the part of those holding public office; 
• Represent a broad cross-section of the population of the Republic”; and  
• Be committed to the principles of the SABC Charter (Broadcasting Act, 1999: 14). 
 
The Act further empowers the President to determine the period that a Board member 
can hold office for, however this period may not exceed five years. Under the Act, the 
CEO is accountable for the SABC and the executive committee is accountable to the 
Board. The Act states that the Board must “establish a public service subcommittee 
and a commercial service subcommittee”, which are accountable to the Board on the 
achievement of their objectives (Broadcasting Amendment Act, 2002: 18). The Act 
also allows the SABC to establish any other subcommittees. The power to remove a 
Board member from office lies with the President, who is provided with 
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recommendations from the Board, together with inquiry into the matter. A person may 
not be appointed to the Board if he or she is mentally ill or disordered; or is convicted 
of a crime after the commencement of the Act. The Act further states that no one may 
be appointed to the Board without disclosing any conflict of interest (Broadcasting 
Act, 1999). 
 
Under section 22 of the Act, ICASA is empowered to “impose appropriate license 
conditions” in terms of the Act and the IBA Act (Broadcasting Amendment Act, 
2002: 20). Section 22A of the Act states that, the SABC must apply to ICASA for 
additional licenses to broadcast regionally within nine months of the commencement 
of the Broadcasting Amendment Act. These regional services must be funded by 
Parliament as well as by grants, donations and sponsorships (Broadcasting 
Amendment Act, 2002).  
 
Section 34 of the Act states that “the provision of efficient delivery of programming 
using the most effective technologies available at reasonable cost” (Broadcasting 
Amendment Act, 2002: 28). 
 
4.3.5.4. The ICASA Act  
 
The ICASA Act is not related to the SABC’s accountability, but to ICASA’s 
accountability to the state, as the Act is a state-imposed piece of legislation. However, 
an examination of the Act provides insights into whether it facilitates or hinders 
ICASA’s regulation of the SABC. The ICASA Amendment Act was instituted in 2006 
and amends the ICASA Act of 2000. The reason for the Act’s existence is due to the 
perceived convergence of the broadcasting, telecommunications and electronic 
communications fields, where regulation of these fields were greatly required. 
However, as this study deals solely with broadcasting, only those areas of the Act, 
which deal with broadcasting, specifically PSB, will be examined. In terms of 
broadcasting then, the Act has an objective to “regulate broadcasting in the public 
interest and to ensure fairness and a diversity of views broadly representing South 
African society” (ICASA Act, 2000: 3). 
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Section 3 of the Act establishes ICASA as an authority that “acts through the 
Council”, is independent, must comply with the Constitution and the law, must be 
impartial, independent from political and commercial interference, and “must perform 
its functions without fear, favour or prejudice” (ICASA Act, 2000: 4). 
 
Section 4 details the functions of ICASA and the chairperson of ICASA, where 
ICASA, among other things, is allowed to make recommendations to the Minister 
regarding policy issues and amendments to the Act. ICASA is obligated under the Act 
to develop and enforce license conditions, as well as grant, renew, amend, transfer and 
revoke licenses when necessary. In addition, ICASA “may make regulations on any 
matter” provided these regulations are congruent with the objectives of the Act, the 
underlying statutes, and are vital to “the performance of the functions” of ICASA 
(ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 6). Moreover, ICASA must investigate and 
adjudicate complaints in terms of the various legislation that governs broadcasting. 
However, ICASA may only inquire into matters that fall within its jurisdiction 
(ICASA Amendment Act, 2006). Section 4A of the Act states that ICASA must keep a 
register, which “must be open to inspection by the public”, of the licences that are 
granted, amended and transferred (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 8).  
 
Section 4B of the Act deals with the inquiries that ICASA undertakes, where ICASA 
“may conduct an inquiry into any matter”, provided such an inquiry is conducted in 
accordance with the Act, underlying statutes, and respective licence conditions 
(ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 8). Moreover, ICASA is obligated under the Act to 
publish in the government Gazette, a notice “of its intention to conduct an inquiry” 
and the purpose of the inquiry, as well as invite people to make written representations 
concerning the inquiry. Such written representations must be made open to public 
inspection (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 8). Furthermore, oral representations must 
also be made available for public inspection (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006). 
 
Section 4C refers to the process of an inquiry, where ICASA must publish in the 
Government Gazette a summary of the inquiry’s findings 180 days after the inquiry, as 
well as the place and time when the public can access the findings and the reason for 
the findings (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 10). 
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Section 4D refers to the handling of confidential information, where “a determination 
of confidentiality may not be made in respect of a document or information that is in 
the public domain or is required to be disclosed by operation of law or a court order” 
(ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 12). 
 
Section 5 of the Act details the appointment of councillors to the Council, were the 
Act empowers the President to appoint a chairperson and eight councillors to the 
Council, with recommendations by the Minister and the National Assembly. This 
appointment process must be conducted with “participation by the public in the 
nomination process; transparency and openness; and the publication of a shortlist of 
candidates for appointment” (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 12). The National 
Assembly’s participation in the appointment process is to submit a list of suitable 
candidates to the Minister. The Act states that, “The National Assembly may invite 
technical experts to assist in the selection, evaluation and appointment process of 
councillors” (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 12). From the National Assembly’s list, 
the Minister chooses prospective candidates to serve on the Council. However, the Act 
empowers the National Assembly to request that the Minister review his 
recommendation. The Chairperson of the Council selects an Acting Chairperson 
(ICASA Amendment Act, 2006). According to the Act, people who are appointed to 
the Council must be “committed to fairness, freedom of expression, openness and 
accountability” and must represent “a broad cross section of the population” of South 
Africa. Furthermore, councillors must “uphold and protect the Constitution and the 
laws” of South Africa (ICASA Act, 2000: 5). 
 
Section 6A of the Act is an important aspect of the Act, as it details a performance 
management system for ICASA. The Minister must establish the performance 
management system in order to monitor and evaluate the Council. This performance 
management system must consist of key performance indicators, measurable 
performance targets, and a procedure to measure and review performance at least once 
a year” (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 16). The Minister, with consultation from the 
National Assembly, performs evaluations of performance. After which, a report must 
be submitted to the National Assembly.  
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Section 16 of the Act holds ICASA accountable to the Minister where ICASA must 
submit any information and particulars related to ICASA’s activities. ICASA must 
also submit to the Minister on an annual basis, ICASA’s annual report, financial 
statements, and Auditor-General’s report (ICASA Act, 2000). 
 
Section 17 of the Act is one of the most important sections of the Act, as it details the 
functions and procedures of hearings that are conducted. Section 17A of the Act 
stipulates that ICASA must establish a Complaints and Compliance Committee, 
consisting of a maximum of seven members, “one of whom must be a councillor” 
(ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 24). The functions of the Committee are stipulated in 
section 17B, where the Committee must investigate, hear if necessary, and make 
findings on: 
 
• “all matters referred to it by the Authority; 
• Complaints received by it, and 
• Allegations of non-compliance with this Act or the underlying statutes” (ICASA 
Amendment Act, 2006: 26). 
 
In addition, the Act empowers the committee to make recommendations to ICASA on 
the Authority’s performance of its functions, as well as the achievement of the Act’s 
objectives in terms of the Act and underlying statutes (ICASA Amendment Act, 
2006).  
 
The procedure that the Committee has to follow when it receives a compliant is 
detailed in section 17C, which states that complaints must be lodged within sixty days 
of the alleged non-compliance. Complaints must also be directed to the Committee for 
consideration. Before a hearing the Committee must provide the alleged offender with 
a copy of the complaint, as well as a notice detailing “the nature of the alleged non-
compliance” (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 26). The respective licensee must be 
given sufficient time to respond to “the allegations in writing” (ICASA Amendment 
Act, 2006: 26). The Committee is obligated to allow the complainant sufficient time to 
respond to the alleged offender’s response. The Committee must hear oral 
representations, and pre-hearing conferences may be held. ICASA “may prescribe 
procedures for the handling of urgent complaints and non-compliance matters” 
(ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 26). Records of complaints must be open to public 
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inspection. Furthermore, “a copy of or extract from such record” may be requested 
from ICASA for a fee (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 26). 
Section 17D of the Act states that the Committee must “make a finding within 90 days 
from the conclusion of the hearing” (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 28). In addition, 
the Committee is obligated to make recommendations on the action ICASA should 
take against the offender. Furthermore, the Committee must submit a report to ICASA 
on the findings and recommendations of the hearing (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 
28). 
 
The actions that can be taken against an offender are detailed in section 17E as 
follows: 
 
• A warning to “desist from further contravention”; 
• A fine; 
• Provide “remedial or other steps” to avoid conflict with the Act and underlying 
statutes; 
• Suspend the licensed service for no more than 30 days; 
• “amend or revoke” the respective license; and  
• “direct the licensee to comply with any settlement” (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 
28). 
 
Finally, section 17F of the Act details the duties of license inspectors, where an 
inspector must monitor compliance of licensees with their license terms and 
conditions, as well as the Act and underlying statutes (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006). 
In addition, inspectors are obligated to investigate and evaluate: 
 
(i) non-compliance by a licensee with its license terms and conditions and provisions 
of this Act or the underlying statutes;  
(ii) breach by a license of an agreement between such licensee and its subscribers; and 
(iii) failure to provide a communications service that the licensee is required to 
provide under the terms of its license or in terms of this Act or the underlying statutes 
(ICASA Amendment Act, 2006: 30)   
 
Furthermore, the Act obligates inspectors to refer any instances of non-compliance to 
the Committee (ICASA Amendment Act, 2006). 
 
4.3.6. Board Committees 
 
The corporate governance structures of the SABC are divided into Board Committees, 
in order to engage with the various aspects that comprise the institution in a more 
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comprehensive manner. Specialist external advisers are appointed to assist the Board 
Committees when the need arises. Board Committees guide the Board in governing 
the SABC (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007). The SABC has eleven Board 
Committees namely the Audit Committee, the Finance Committee, the Human 
Resources Committee, the Remuneration Committee, the Technology Committee, the 
News Committee, the Public Broadcasting Services Committee, the Public 
commercial Services committee, the Procurement Committee, the Risk Committee, 
and the Executive Committee (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007). It is important to 
note that the Executive Committee “applies policy and determines strategies and 
guidelines for achieving corporate objectives”.17 Board committees meet five times a 
year on average or when circumstances require a meeting to be held, to discuss 
“specific issues within their terms of reference” (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007: 
31). The Board Committees are accountable to the Board, where each committee has 
to report on the achievement of their objectives. 
 
4.3.7. Fulfilment of SABC objectives for the 2006/2007 financial year 
 
The SABC set itself a number of objectives for the 2006/2007 financial year, some of 
these objectives were achieved and some were not. The SABC’s fulfilment of its 
objectives allows one to examine the SABC’s efforts to fulfill its public mandate. For 
the purposes of this study, not all the objectives that the SABC has set for itself will 
be discussed. This study will only discuss the SABC objectives that are central to the 
study. 
 
In terms of its operations, the SABC has established a content hub, which deals with 
the commissioning of local content, “reversioning and repurposing”; and creating new 
procurement policies and procedures (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007: 77). The 
institution is in the process of annual information sharing with the independent 
production sector, as well as applying for a pay television license. The SABC will 
launch a 24-hour News Channel, which will commence in 2008. Furthermore, the 
SABC has established an industry development strategy, where an “industry 
                                                 
17 Development of Broadcasting in SA. Retrieved from the World Wide Web on 18 September 2007 
from: http://www.sabc.co.za. 
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development manager was appointed and “key industry development projects 
launched” (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007: 37). 
 
In terms of the SABC’s funding and financial health, the SABC exceeded its objective 
of a 10% revenue growth in television and achieved an 11.1% revenue growth. 
However, the SABC’s expense growth is higher than the objective of 2% below 
revenue growth. The reason for this objective not being achieved was due to the 
“increased local content requirements” imposed by ICASA and due to the “improved 
quality of content” (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007: 38). 
 
It must be noted, that the SABC invested R500 million in technologies, with the 
strategic aim that this technology will assist the SABC in fulfilling its role and 
mandate as a PSB and “increase revenue generation for the organization” (SABC 
Annual Results Presentation, 2007). 
 
In terms of governance, objectives regarding ICASA’s quotas were exceeded. 
However, annual information sharing with the Department of Communications (DoC) 
and ICASA were not achieved. 
 
4.4. Outputs and performance: the SABC funding model 
 
The SABC’s performance can be determined by the revenue it generates during the 
financial year, as it depicts the institution’s financial health. The SABC’s performance 
is also examined by considering the institution’s achievement of its objectives for the 
year in question. Another way in which the SABC’s performance is examined is by 
looking at media reports on the SABC to determine whether there were any 
complaints on the broadcaster’s performance, which are engaged with throughout the 
chapter. 
 
The funding model of the SABC is a mix of advertising, sponsorships, license fees, 
donations and government grants.18 The SABC’s revenue in-take for the period 2005-
2007 is as follows: 
 
                                                 
18 Refer to appendix B. 
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Revenue Analysis   
(R million) 
2007 2006 2005 
Forms of revenue R % R % R % 
Commercial 3 297 77.25 3 054 77.45 2 670 78.92 
License fees* 760 17.81 739 18.74 568 16.79 
Other revenue 127 2.97 100 2.54 96 2.84 
Government 84 1.97 50 1.27 49 1.45 
Total revenue 4 268 3 943 3 383 
(Annual Report, 2006-2007: 25) 
*It must be noted, that there was no rate increase of license fees for the 2006/2007 
financial year. 
 
4.4.1. Summary Consolidated Income Statement 
 
The SABC’s revenue income and expenditure is compared below: 
 
 Actuals Actuals Actuals 
 2007 2006 2005 
 R’m R’m R’m 
Operating Income 4 314 3 970 3 420 
Operating Expenditure 4 103 3 455 3 147 
EBIT 211 515 273 
(SABC annual results presentation, 2007).  
 
With reference to the above table, the SABC receives 77% of its revenue from 
commercial sources; 18% from license fees: 2% from the government; and 3% from 
other sources of funding. General revenue trends at the SABC from 2005-2007 
indicate a slight decrease in the SABC’s intake of commercial revenue; an instability 
in license fee generation, which has decreased since 2006; a slight increase in other 
revenue sources; as well as a slight increase in government funding. The SABC in 
general generated a surplus of R183 million. However, the SABC made a R382.9 
million profit during the 2005/2006 financial year (Annual Report, 2006/2007; 
Annual Report, 2005/2006). Furthermore, the SABC has generated more revenue in 
2007 than in the two previous years. At the same time, the SABC’s operating 
expenditure has increased year on year since 2005. It must be noted, that the SABC 
initiated a PSB Colloquium to debate the issue of a better funding model for the 
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SABC, and has been engaged in discussions with Parliament and the SABC’s 
shareholder on the same issue (SABC Annual Results, 2006/2007). 
 
4.5. Distinctiveness 
 
Although the SABC’s distinctiveness is encapsulated within the various policies and 
legislation that govern the institution, reports by the print media on several issues also 
indicates the SABC’s level of distinctiveness. The print media reports relate to the 
PSL (Premier Soccer League) rights issue, SABC international, independent producer 
issues and the circumcision documentary that the SABC broadcast.  
 
4.5.1. The Premier Soccer League issue 
 
 The PSL issue refers to the SABC’s inability to acquire the rights to broadcast PSL 
soccer matches. This issue created uproar in the print media, as PSL soccer is a sport 
of national interest. The PSL awarded the rights to M-Net’s SuperSport, after the 
SABC missed the deadline to hand in a tender for the rights (Mthemba and Sapa, 
2007; Ntloko and McLachlan, 2007; Khanyile, 2007). The SABC successfully got a 
court interdict to prevent the PSL from negotiating a deal with third parties, before the 
PSL renegotiating a deal with the SABC (Mthembu and Sapa, 2007; Ntloko and 
Mclachlan, 2007; Khanyile, 2007; Alfred, 2007; Lieberum, 2007). However, when the 
SABC’s old contract expired, the PSL awarded the rights to SuperSport, while the 
issue had been sent to court for arbitration. Nevertheless, the SABC lost the rights, but 
managed to enter an agreement with SuperSport and the PSL to broadcast 143 matches 
a season, with a cost of R120 million for five years (Mseleku, 2007; Mark, 2007). 
However, the SABC failed to establish a new contract with the PSL and thus lost its 
right to broadcast matches on radio (Ntloko, 2007; Mantambo, 2007a; Maseleku, 
2007b; Mokoena and Kortjaas, 2007).  
 
The media’s coverage of the issue emphasised the decreasing nature of national sport 
on the SABC and the SABC’s disregard for its soccer viewers and listeners (Maeleku, 
2007; Pheko, 2007; Makgalemele, 2007; Haleu, 2007; Mkhwanazi and Sapa, 2007). In 
addition the cost of the whole debacle was also emphasised, where the battle between 
the SABC and the PSL cost the SABC “R3.3 million in legal fees” and a further R120 
million for the rights to the matches it did secure (Mseleku, 2007: 13; Mark, 2007). 
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4.5.2. SABC international 
 
The SABC aims to launch a twenty-four hour news and current affairs channel in 
2008. The channel will be broadcast via satellite from Sentech’s Vivid satellite service 
(Mochiko, 2007). However, Vivid’s satellite service covers predominantly rural areas. 
In order to facilitate the channel, the SABC will establish its own agency, where it will 
be able to sell its content; or it will amalgamate SABC Africa with the international 
channel (Mochiko, 2007). The SABC will spend R21 million on the establishment of 
the channel (Hlengani, 2007). In order to fund the channel the SABC wants to change 
its funding structure, which includes a possible increase in licence fees (Web, 2007). 
The rationale behind the channel is to compete with CNN (Cable News Network) and 
the BBC’s international news channels, as well as to provide improved coverage on 
Africa (Harrison, 2007). Nevertheless, the print media has criticised the SABC’s 
establishment of the channel due to the SABC’s compromised editorial integrity, 
declining credibility and lack of funding (Mochiko, 2007). 
 
4.5.3. Independent producer issues 
 
Local independent producers that have been commissioned by the SABC protested 
that the SABC is having a detrimental effect on their development. Independent 
producers complained about the SABC’s low production budgets; “slow contract 
turnaround”; “inexperienced commissioning editors”; “development and scripting that 
are becoming increasingly prescriptive, over-invasive and patronising”; and “training 
decisions for commissioning editors that do not solicit producers’ input” (Sosibo, 
2007: 6; Dawes, 2007b; Ensor, 2007d). A further problem experienced by independent 
producers, was the SABC’s retention of one hundred percent of the intellectual 
property rights created from independent productions (Mgibisa, 2007; Dawes, 2007b; 
Ensor, 2007d). The SABC’s retention of these rights means that the SABC is able to 
sell the content internationally and retain all the profits produced. However, the 
SABC’s argument is that the institution covers a great deal of their technological costs 
(Ensor, 2007d). 
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4.5.4. Circumcision mini-series 
 
The SABC broadcast a coming-of-age mini-series Umthunzi Wentaba, which depicted 
the sacred Zulu ritual of circumcision (Feni, 2007a). However, only the first 
programme was broadcast from the mini-series. The National Heritage Council 
(NHC), the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), and the 
National House of Traditional Leaders strongly protested the broadcast of the mini-
series (Feni, 2007a). These organisations argued that the ritual was misrepresented, 
and was of a sensitive cultural nature and thus should not be broadcast (Feni, 2007a; 
Best, 2007; Toyise, 2007; Ngqiyaza, 2007). Other reports in the print media focused 
on the need for discussions and debate on circumcision. Nevertheless, the SABC 
withdrew the mini-series and apologised for “overstepping the mark” (Feni, 2007b: 4; 
Sangotsha, 2007). 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter was themed according to issues of independence, accountability, 
distinctiveness, and finance. Within these themes, an institutional analysis was 
conducted, where firstly, the SABC’s norms and values were articulated. Within this 
discussion the SABC’s Editorial Values, Code of Ethics, Corporate Goals, and 
strategy of citizenship empowerment were discussed. Secondly, the SABC’s 
governance arrangements were examined, where the SABC’s organisational structure, 
functions and appointment process were discussed. Thirdly, the SABC’s relationships 
between other organisations and institutions were examined, which looked at the 
SABC’s relationship to ICASA and the state. The SABC’s relationship to ICASA and 
the state where examined in terms of the SABC’s license conditions, the IBA Act, and 
the Broadcasting Act. Fourthly, the SABC’s outputs and performance were examined 
with regard to the SABC’s funding model, as well as the fulfilment of its objectives. A 
policy analysis was also conducted which examined the ICASA Act. The other 
policies relevant to policy analysis were examined in the institutional analysis. Hence, 
the policy and institutional analyses overlapped extensively.   
 
Lastly, the chapter conducted a document analysis, which examined the print media’s 
coverage of the SABC and the Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry Report. In terms 
of the print media’s coverage of the SABC, twelve major issues arose. The media’s 
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coverage of the twelve issues were predominantly negative and brought the SABC’s 
independence, transparency and accountability to the public, as well as the SABC’s 
service provision as a PSB into question. The proceeding chapter in this study will 
attempt to analysis the information that has been presented in this chapter of the study. 
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Chapter 5 – Analysis of findings 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to analyse the findings outlined in the previous chapter. To this 
end, the literature and theoretical arguments presented in Chapter Two will be linked 
to arguments made in this chapter. In doing so, the effects of the SABC’s activities in 
fulfilling its ideal institutional roles will be explored. Moreover, the SABC’s 
developmental approach to broadcasting; the SABC’s effect on the public sphere, the 
public interest and citizenship will also be explored. In addition, the SABC’s 
independence, accountability and distinctiveness, which form a core component of 
this study, will be examined. Moreover, the identified challenges that are facing South 
African PSB, and thus the SABC, will be engaged with. Furthermore, the SABC as a 
public institution will be critically analysed in terms of its norms and values, 
governance arrangements, relationship to other institutions and organisations, and 
funding mix. The arguments that are presented in this chapter are critically informed 
by interviews that have been conducted with people within the broadcasting industry 
and related constituencies. 
 
5.2. The SABC’s faltering independence 
 
This section analyses the SABC’s independence. In doing so, the SABC’s governance 
arrangements; which consists of the SABC Board nomination process, the bias within 
the Board appointments, and the Board’s credentials; will be explored. In addition, the 
SABC’s political and economic independence is examined.  
 
5.2.1. Governance arrangements 
 
The governance arrangements that are discussed in this section focus on three areas. 
Firstly, the importance of the credentials of the SABC Board members are 
highlighted, which brings to the fore the defective nature of the Board. Secondly, 
some of the Board members’ ties to the ANC are accentuated. Thirdly, the flawed 
nature of the Board nomination process is exposed.  
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5.2.1.1. SABC Board nomination process 
 
Mkaize and Ndlovu (2007), the Senior Manager of Policy Development and the 
Broadcasting Manager of ICASA respectively, assert that in terms of the legislation 
that governs the SABC, the SABC is independent. The policies are clear; hence, it is 
the implementation of the policies and legislation that govern the SABC that are 
problematic (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007). If the policies and legislation are not aptly 
implemented, political interference will occur, but if the policies and legislation were 
appropriately implemented, no such interference would occur. Consequently, many of 
the controversies that the SABC have generated, have emerged due to the way in 
which the SABC’s editorial policies are implemented (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007). 
However, in light of Mkaize and Ndlovu’s argument, despite the importance of 
adequate implementation, a severe flaw exists within the Broadcasting Act, which 
compromises the SABC’s independence.  
 
A key problem with governance at the SABC is the Board nomination process. With 
reference to the Broadcasting Act, the SABC Board appointment process can be seen 
to be severely flawed. The Broadcasting Act confers excessive power to the President 
in the SABC Board appointment process, as it is the President who ultimately decides 
who serves on the Board. Such an appointment process hinders the independence of 
the SABC, as the President has the potential to appoint members to the Board that 
would be loyal to him. Moreover, the Broadcasting Act also empowers the President 
to remove Board members from office, which has similar repercussions. In fact, the 
controversy around the appointment of the new SABC Board, which was reported on 
by the print media, is indicative of precisely such bias. Green (2007), the SABC’s 
former Head of Radio News and Current Affairs, contends that politicians 
predominantly have short-term agendas at heart, and are thus ill equipped to 
determine the board members of the SABC.   
 
Duncan (2007), the Executive Director of the FXI, asserts that the FXI was 
dissatisfied with the final Board nomination list. Firstly, there were only 143 initial 
nominees. One of the reasons for such a diminutive amount of nominees was that 
SANEF did not want to process nominees, which means there were few strong 
journalistic nominees. Many journalists declined to run for Board candidacy. They did 
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not want to speak out and address the SABC’s problems for fear of alienating 
themselves from the SABC. Secondly, there were no journalists in the final list, which 
for a PSB is atypical. Thirdly, the final list consisted of six of the eleven previous 
Board members. According to Duncan, such an occurrence is unacceptable, as “the 
old Board members have presided over possibly the highest level of poor governance 
since the 1993 transformation of the SABC Board” (2007: personal interview). In 
light of Duncan’s argument, the reluctance of journalists to run for Board candidacy is 
indicative of the severity of the PSB crisis in South Africa and the governance crisis 
at the SABC. Instead of acknowledging the problems and flaws of the institution and 
making considerable efforts to address the problems within the institution, the SABC 
would rather alienate those who speak out against the institution. Such an occurrence 
brings one to allude to the blacklisting issue and the Sisulu Marcus Enquiry report, 
which found that a climate of fear exists within the SABC. Consequently, the 
Commission’s findings provide credence to Duncan’s argument. 
 
5.2.1.2. ANC-aligned Board appointments 
 
Yet another disconcerting aspect of the SABC Board is its ties to the ANC. As 
revealed by the print media, four of the eleven current Board members have ties to the 
ANC (Van Onselen, 2007; Van Onselen, 2007b; Mkhwanazi, 2007b). These ties to 
the ANC severely compromise the independence of the SABC, as decisions that are 
made have the potential to be biased in favour of the ANC. Consequently, the public 
may be misinformed or uninformed on important issues or happenings. If PSBs are 
unrepresentative in their appointments, this unrepresentativeness will extend into their 
public service responsibilities (Tomaselli, 1994). In the SABC’s instance, the control 
of the SABC is placed within the Board’s hands, thus Board members with ANC ties 
have the potential to influence the SABC’s programming and other public service 
functions. In fact, any of the SABC staff who hold prominent positions within the 
SABC and are politically bias, can have a detrimental effect on the institution’s 
political independence. 
 
The wielding of such influence can particularly be seen with the Mbeki documentary. 
The SABC’s reason for not broadcasting the Mbeki documentary was that the 
documentary was “incurably defamatory” (Duncan, 2007: personal interview). 
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However, the SABC’s argument is erroneous as, “it is extremely difficult to argue 
defamation by inference” (Duncan, 2007: personal interview). However, Ntombela-
Nzimande’s (2007) explanation, as the Group Executive of public, international and 
regulatory affairs, is that the SABC did not want to broadcast the Mbeki documentary, 
as it was a “shoddy” documentary. Matthews (2007), the SABC’s former Head of 
Television News and Current Affairs, shares this view. The producers that were 
commissioned were informed by the SABC to develop a documentary that was in 
accordance with the SABC’s high standards and to be hard-hitting. However, 
although the documentary was hard-hitting, it did not adhere to the SABC’s high 
standards, as hard-hitting still needs to be factual (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). 
However, Matthews (2007) contends that the SABC created the controversy regarding 
the Mbeki documentary, controversy that could have been avoided if the SABC was 
not afraid that the documentary would offend President Thabo Mbeki.  
 
What can be seen from both sides of the argument and the print media’s reports on the 
issue, is that the SABC only broadcast the documentary after it had been screened 
elsewhere by the producers and the Mail and Guardian. Such an occurrence indicates 
that the SABC only broadcast the documentary due to external pressures, which if the 
documentary was as “shoddy” as the SABC claims, contradicts its mandate to provide 
quality programming. The SABC’s decision to broadcast the documentary suggests 
that the institution does not have the strength of its convictions. However, the fact that 
the SABC went as far as to apply for a court interdict to stop the screenings of the 
documentary, indicates that the SABC’s motives for not broadcasting the 
documentary extend further than the documentary’s poor quality. The SABC’s efforts 
to obtain a court interdict against the screenings of the documentary provide some 
degree of candour to Matthews’s argument. Hence, it seems that the SABC’s 
reasoning that the documentary was of poor quality may have been a smokescreen for 
the institution’s allegiances to President Thabo Mbeki.   
 
As it is the President who ultimately appoints the SABC Board, the present crisis in 
political independence at the institution may be attributed to the ANC’s culture of 
deploying cadres (state appointments). Post-apartheid, the ANC government made 
one of its policy objectives strengthening “its grip on the levers of power”; such levers 
included the SABC (Giliomee et al, 2001: 169). Such a policy objective resulted in 
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the ANC deploying cadres to key institutions in society, thus undermining the 
legitimacy of those institutions (Giliomee et.al, 2001). Due to the composition of the 
SABC Board, it seems that people with ANC backgrounds have been deployed to 
strategic and influential positions within the SABC. In fact, at the ANC’s 52nd 
National Conference in Polokwane, CEO Dali Mpofu attended the conference as a 
“deployed cadre” of the ANC, where Mpofu’s nametag identified him as such 
(Harper, 2007: 7). Consequently, the structural conditions at the SABC are distorted 
enough to allow pro-government content to be favoured, as can be seen with the 
Mbeki documentary controversy. Furthermore, the ANC’s culture of deploying cadres 
to key institutions in society, and the present situation that exists within the SABC 
Board, provides a persuasive rationale to amend the current Board nomination 
process. Such an amendment would need to ensure that the government has less or no 
involvement in the Board nomination process.  
 
5.2.1.3. The aptitude of the SABC Board 
 
Dali Mpofu who has no broadcasting, media, or communications experience heads the 
SABC Board of 2007. In addition, of the eleven members of the Board, there are only 
four members with any communications, journalistic or media experience, and only 
one member has broadcasting experience (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007). 
Bussiek argues that “Members [of the board] should … have the necessary expertise 
to fulfil their duties” (2005: 39). Hence, the SABC Board lacks professionals who 
would be able to implement effective changes within the institution to ensure that the 
SABC functions as a genuine PSB. To place someone who has no broadcasting 
background as CEO of a PSB is aberrant. There is no actual broadcasting knowledge 
informing the CEO’s decisions, which in a public broadcaster is objectionable. Even 
though the CEO has the Board members to help with decision-making, ultimate 
decision-making lies with the CEO, who is inhibited by his lack of broadcasting 
knowledge to make the most constructive decisions for the SABC.  
 
According to March and Olsen (1989), problems of institutional efficiency are partly 
structural and partly behavioural. Behavioural efficiency problems include 
information problems, limited rationality, agency and concentration and are thus 
linked to personal preferences (March and Olsen, 1989). Structural problems are 
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linked to endowments, which entail the way in which rights, resources and authority 
is distributed. Hence, in terms of efficiency, the credentials of the SABC Board 
members and the CEO of the institution are crucial. The CEO’s lack of adequate 
media, communications or broadcasting credentials has the likelihood of generating 
behavioural efficiency problems within the institution. In addition, March and Olsen 
(1989) highlight the importance of competence and integrity when assessing 
institutions. As March and Olsen articulate, the issue of competence concerns whether 
“genuine expertise of relevance to the problem” is used (1989: 127). Competence is 
necessary in order to “clarify issues, exclude false directions, and discover correct 
alternatives’ (March and Olsen, 1989: 128). By virtue of the CEO’s lack of proper 
expertise to lead the SABC, his leadership of the institution can be said to be 
defective.  
 
In fact, defective governance decisions or leadership of the SABC can directly be seen 
by the amount and intensity of the controversies that the SABC has been embroiled in 
throughout 2007. According to Duncan (2007), the current Board is responsible for 
many of the governance failures that have occurred throughout the year. With regard 
to the importance of the Board’s credentials and the consequence of inadequate 
credentials, Duncan’s argument has candour. However, according to Koster (2007), 
the Executive Director of NABSA, the SABC is an independent institution. Koster 
(2007) further contends that it is unfair to judge the SABC on the controversies that 
have appeared in the print media, without being privy to all the aspects that are taken 
into account when making decisions.  
 
However, Duncan (2007) points out that, as the Minister of Communications appoints 
the CEO, it is inappropriate for the CEO to be the editor-in-chief at the SABC, as an 
editor-in-chief has to be independent and objective. In fact, Louw (2007), the Deputy 
Chairperson of MISA-SA, points out that the CEO’s role as editor-in-chief of the 
SABC conflicts with his other duties. These duties are for instance, considering the 
image of the SABC, his financial role in the SABC, and so on. This is a structural 
problem. The roles and functions of the various staff levels and departments of a PSB 
must be clearly defined (Fourie, 2003). Furthermore, according to Bussiek, board 
members have two roles, “internally the board supervises the activities of the 
corporation and externally it protects its editorial independence and lobby for its 
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interests” (2005: 41). In light of Fourie and Bussiek’s arguments and the SABC 
CEO’s title of editor-in-chief, it is clear that there is minimal distinction between the 
roles and functions of the various staff levels and departments at the SABC. Such 
obscurity is a contributing factor to the institution’s diminishing independence.  
 
Nevertheless, the SABC’s establishment of Board Committees, which are accountable 
to the Board on its objectives, is a positive development for the institution. Such a 
development enhances the institution’s accountability and fulfilment of its PSB 
mandate. However, even though the establishment of Board Committees is a step in 
the right direction for the SABC’s level of accountability, the other severe flaws in 
governance at the SABC overshadow this positive development. 
 
5.2.2. Political influence 
 
Of the three requirements for a PSB to be independent from political influence, there 
is unquestionably a violation of the third requirement, that there must be public 
conviction that the PSB is independent. With reference to the print media alone, the 
SABC receives extremely negative coverage, where the SABC’s political 
independence is frequently attacked. Such negative coverage is indicative of the lack 
of public conviction in the SABC’s political independence.  
 
Direct political interference is difficult to gauge at the SABC (Duncan, 2007; Louw, 
2007). Political interference would tend to be discreet within the organisation (Louw, 
2007). However, according to Duncan, the FXI has detected a “growing climate of 
timidity, fear and self-censorship” at the SABC, which is something that the Sisulu 
Marcus Commission of Enquiry has also alluded to (2007: personal interview). 
Hence, in light of Duncan’s argument, if both the Commission and the FXI have 
detected self-censorship at the SABC, it seems highly likely that self-censorship is 
indeed taking place. Duncan (2007) indicates that if self-censorship is taking place at 
the SABC, then external political interference may not actually be necessary, as the 
ends of the government are already being attained. Nevertheless, Louw contends that 
“Bias in favour of the ANC and the government is noticeable though not as rampant 
as in the days of the National Party government” (2007: personal interview). Louw 
further states that “When the board is overwhelmed with ANC appointees and the 
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staff at important levels are ANC stalwarts, there is not much independence”, thus the 
SABC is not an independent institution (2007: personal interview).  
 
Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) contends that since the government ensures there are 
legislation and policies in place that protect PSB, a model that is completely detached 
from the government is unattainable. The government then, is essential in providing 
constitutional oversight. Hence, an independence model that does not involve the 
government is problematic (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). In light of Ntombela-
Nzimande’s argument, an independent model of PSB, where government involvement 
is limited to a legislation and policy level, is acceptable. However, government 
involvement needs to end at legislation and policy level, which is not what is 
happening with the SABC with regard to the Board nomination process. If the 
government’s involvement in the SABC could end at legislation and policy level, the 
SABC’s political independence would increase significantly.  
 
However, Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) maintains that the SABC is politically 
independent. SABC programming only contains government voices or content 
insofar, as such content and voices provide information that is in accordance with the 
fulfilment of the SABC’s mandate. Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) asserts that the 
government generates the most news in the country, which is why the SABC news 
carries many government stories in its news. In addition, because the President retains 
such an important position in the country, people want to know what he is doing and 
saying. The problem lies with the public who do not cross-examine what the SABC 
conveys about the government (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). Although Ntombela-
Nzimande’s argument has some credence, her explanation falls short of explaining 
controversies such as the Mbeki documentary, the video tape exposing the Health 
Minister as a drunk and a thief that mysteriously went missing, and the SABC’s 
resignation from SANEF. In fact, interviewee A (2007) reveals that one of the 
challenges that PSB faces in South Africa, is dealing with both commercial and 
political interference in terms of programming.19 The SABC has a role, which 
includes interpreting government policies and providing the public with information 
on government activities. In light of the SABC’s role, the institution needs a Board 
                                                 
19 Interviewee A refers to an interviewee from the SABC who preferred to remain anonymous in this 
study.  
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that will not retreat in the face of negative government exposure (Matthews, 2007). 
Matthews’s argument corresponds with the watchdog role of the media. Matthews’s 
argument requires special emphasis, as it has already been established in the chapter 
that the SABC falls short of fulfilling its watchdog role.  
 
5.2.3. Economic influence 
 
Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) concedes that economic interference exists at the SABC. 
The extent of the economic interference is such that, if the SABC cannot find 
sponsorship for a particular programme, they are forced to desist from broadcasting 
that programme (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). In light of Ntombela-Nzimande’s 
assertion, the SABC is not independent from economic interference. Hence, it is 
evident that economic interference does exist at the SABC. The dangers of such 
economic interference, is as McChesney (2000) articulates, PSB’s tend to maintain 
the status quo, which may work counter to democracy and their public service 
obligations.  
  
5.3. The SABC’s accountability to the state, ICASA and the public 
 
In exploring the SABC’s accountability, firstly, the norms and rules of the institution 
are discussed, which includes a discussion of the blacklisting debacle. Secondly, the 
SABC’s attainment of its goals is explored. Thirdly, the SABC’s relationship to 
ICASA is examined, which also entails an examination of the ICASA Act, ICASA’s 
role in protecting PSB, and the challenges that ICASA faces. Finally, the SABC’s 
relationship with the state is discussed.  
 
5.3.1. Norms and rules 
 
According to Ntombela-Nzimande (2007), the SABC has a stringent regime of 
accountability. The SABC has a strict legislative framework; and it has to account in 
terms of the PFMA (Public Finance Management Act), as well as to the Auditor 
General and Parliament. The SABC is directly accountable to the public through its 
annual report, which is made public. In addition, the SABC holds feedback meetings 
with the public every two years. Moreover, the SABC’s editorial policies and 
programme policies are also available to the public. The SABC’s direct accountability 
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to the public makes the SABC’s activities, to some extent, transparent. Indirectly, the 
SABC is held accountable by ICASA (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). However, the 
problem with the SABC’s direct accountability to the public is that it only occurs 
every two years. As a public institution, the SABC should be more frequently 
accountable to the public. In this way, the SABC could significantly increase its 
public accountability. Matthews (2007) reveals that the SABC does not always 
consider itself as being in the public’s service. In fact, Matthews (2007) believes that 
the SABC treats the public with disdain, as can be seen with the SABC’s inaction on 
the findings of the Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry.  
 
One way, in which accountability is ensured, is by widely publicising the board 
members of a PSB (Hoynes and Croteau, 2001). In South Africa, the print media 
assists extensively in publicising the SABC Board members and the new SABC 
Board members. Without the print media, certain Board members’ ties to the ANC 
and other controversial ties would not have been exposed. However, it is unfortunate 
that such accountability was not undertaken by the SABC itself, which is an 
indication of the SABC’s lack of independence and accountability to the public.   
 
Another way, in which the SABC is accountable, is through its self-imposed 
performance criteria, namely the SABC’s Memorandum and Articles of Association, 
Code of Ethics, Board Charter, terms of reference for the Board Committees, and 
Delegation of Authority Framework. However, as Coppens and Saeys (2006) point 
out, the SABC’s binding criteria, such as its license conditions, and the Broadcasting 
Act, may be hindering the fulfilment of the SABC’s long term objectives. Instead of 
spending the necessary time to bring its long-term goals into fruition, the SABC has 
to ensure it fulfils its binding criteria. Nevertheless, overall, there are a number of 
ways in which the SABC is made accountable. However, according to Koster (2007), 
the various levels of accountability that the SABC is subject to creates a problem, as 
the institution is obligated to meet varying needs. Subsequently, the SABC sometimes 
works at cross-purposes. 
 
The main piece of legislation governing the activities of the SABC, which presides 
over all SABC employees, is the Editorial Code of Conduct. As it is premised on the 
South African Constitution, it is in accordance with democratic practices and thus 
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displays a strong adherence to such practices. Consequently, the SABC is found to 
exhibit elements of the developmental approach to broadcasting, where the Editorial 
Code speaks of national development, nation building and social cohesion. In 
addition, in keeping with democratic practices, the Editorial Code expresses a 
commitment to the information, analysis, and debate and discussion roles of the 
media. Moreover, the Editorial code expresses a commitment to the PSB 
characteristics of universal access, diversity, accountability, transparency and 
independence from political and commercial influences. Complementing the Editorial 
Code is the Code of Ethics, which expresses a commitment by all SABC employees 
to honesty, integrity, avoidance of conflict of interest, transparency, fairness and 
professionalism. However, in light of the SABC’s compromised political 
independence, the institution has failed to fulfil its Code of Ethics. Particularly, the 
SABC has failed to avoid situations where employees do not disclose their conflicting 
interests. Hence, although the Editorial Code of Conduct and the Code of Ethics 
provide a solid foundation for the SABC to fulfil its public mandate successfully, 
adherence to the policies is inadequate. 
 
Moreover, although the Editorial Code expresses a commitment to the ideal 
institutional roles of the media, it does not express a commitment to the watchdog role 
of the media. Such a discrepancy severely flaws the Editorial Code, as it is the 
watchdog role of the media that works to secure a PSB’s independence. Despite the 
lack of commitment to the Editorial Code, the Code is quite a sound policy document. 
The Code expresses a commitment to both the public and national interests, which has 
been argued, should be complementary (Mak’Ochieng, 2006; Tleane and Duncan, 
2003).  
 
Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) asserts that the SABC does adhere to its editorial policy, 
and that instances of non-compliance relate to minor issues of staff making 
discriminatory remarks on-air, and predominantly around religious issues. However, 
the SABC has been taken to the BCCSA (Broadcasting Complaints Commission of 
South Africa) on such occasions, where the SABC has won many of the cases. Given 
the size of the SABC’s operations, the instances of non-compliance have been minor 
(Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). The SABC’s editorial policies assist, to some extent, to 
broaden the SABC’s mandate (Duncan, 2007). Matthews (2007) asserts that the 
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SABC’s Editorial Policy is remarkable as it is a document, which expresses a 
commitment to the highest principles of journalism. As, the editorial policy is a public 
document, the public is provided with a means by which they can hold the SABC 
accountable. 
 
Galombik (2007), the SABC’s former Head of Education, contends that a complex 
view of editorial independence exists with regard to the SABC. News and current 
affairs at the SABC is very rule governed. However, in other areas of programming 
such stringent rules do not exist. Hence, editorial decision-making is less governed in 
general programming at the SABC (Galombik, 2007). However, despite Galombik’s 
argument, it is ironic that one of the severest instances of editorial independence being 
violated at the SABC occurred within its news and current affairs department. This 
violation can be seen with the blacklisting saga and the findings of the Sisulu Marcus 
Commission. Such a violation indicates that the rules that the SABC creates to guide 
the institution, are not being adhered to or are being selectively adhered to, which 
again is indicative of a governance crisis at the SABC.  
 
In fact, Louw (2007) concurs that the SABC is selective in its adherence to the 
Editorial Code. Louw asserts that “The recent remarks by the CEO Dali Mpofu (and 
news Chief Snuki Zikalala) at seminars in Johannesburg indicate that they do not 
adhere to an independent news person’s assessment of the charter” (2007: personal 
interview). However, Matthews (2007) argues more contentiously that the SABC does 
not always adhere to the Editorial Code, as can be seen with the various controversies 
that the SABC has stimulated. The blacklisting issue is a notable instance of the 
SABC’s lack of adherence to its Editorial Policy.  
 
5.3.2. The blacklisting debacle 
 
The SABC’s response to FXI’s complaint to ICASA, regarding the SABC’s inaction 
on the Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry, has been shocking to FXI. Although, 
the SABC has never disputed the findings of the Commission, the SABC in its 
response claims never to have adopted the Commission’s findings (Duncan, 2007). 
Consequently, a double standard seems to emerge on the part of the SABC. In light of 
Duncan’s argument, it is contradictory that although Dali Mpofu himself 
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commissioned the enquiry and appointed its head, the institution did not adopt the 
Commission’s findings.  
 
Ntombela-Nzimande contends that with regard to the blacklisting debacle, all media 
houses have a right to, “decide what it publishes, who it sources from, and to say no to 
anything that they don’t think should be there” (2007: personal interview). 
Commentator guidelines were developed in order to enrich and diversify the SABC’s 
news (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). The guidelines were proposed by a Group 
Executive and not by the News and Current Affairs Department (Ntombela-
Nzimande, 2007).  
 
However, Ntombela-Nzimande’s explanation contradicts the findings of the Sisulu 
Marcus Commission of Enquiry, which implicated Head of News, Snuki Zikalala, as 
having instigated the blacklisting. Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) asserts that the reason 
for developing the guidelines was due to a lack of female commentators in news and 
current affairs. Hence, “the names of people were not mentioned in order to blacklist 
them, as it were. It was to drill a point as to when and how and who we should choose 
and why” (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007: personal interview). However, Ntombela-
Nzimande’s argument is flawed since there were also women who where found to be 
blacklisted in the Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry.  
 
Interviewee A (2007) contends that the SABC’s efforts to address the blacklisting 
were bold. However, interviewee A’s argument is erroneous, as can be seen with the 
lack of action taken by the SABC on the Commission’s Report. Hence, it can be seen 
that Louw and Matthews’s arguments display some candour, since the arguments 
emerging from the SABC are severely flawed. It can be seen that, the Editorial Code 
of Conduct as a document is a positive development for the SABC in terms of 
accountability and aiding the institution in fulfilling its public service mandate. 
However, the execution and adherence to the Code is inadequate, as the blacklisting 
issue illustrates, resulting in a governance crisis at the institution. Green (2007) asserts 
that stringent external monitoring of the SABC’s compliance with its editorial policies 
is non-existent, which facilitates the institution’s growing governance crisis.  
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5.3.3. Unachieved goals 
 
Another document aiding the SABC to fulfil its mandate is the SABC’s Corporate 
Goals. Seemingly, the SABC’s Corporate Goals attempt to address some of the 
challenges that the SABC as a PSB in South Africa faces. However, on closer 
inspection, it can be seen that the SABC has not been meeting many of the goals it has 
fashioned. Firstly, the SABC’s goal to ensure that the institution has a “sustainable 
financial foundation” has not been realised yet and progress towards that end has been 
minimal (SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007: 7). Secondly, the SABC’s goal to 
improve the institution’s working environment and garner top talent stands in 
contention with the print media’s reports of a mass exodus from the SABC. In fact, 
the Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry Report alludes to a climate of fear and 
intimidation at the SABC, thus an improved working environment at the SABC has 
not been realised yet. Thirdly, the SABC’s goal to garner support and respect is an 
area where the SABC dismally falls short. Such a failure can be seen with the 
negative coverage of the SABC in the print media, where the SABC has been 
stumbling from controversy to controversy. The twelve controversies that have been 
identified in this study have a contradictory effect to the SABC’s goal of garnering 
support and respect. Fourthly, the Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry Report 
demonstrates that the SABC does not always provide fair and balanced news and 
current affairs programming. Nevertheless, the SABC has displayed a significant 
commitment to its goal of improving technology and infrastructure at the institution, 
as their R500 million investment in technology indicates.   
 
A further guiding force for the SABC to fulfil its mandate is its new slogan of “Total 
Citizenship Empowerment”. Although the SABC’s new slogan falls directly within 
the SABC’s mandate, there are a number of problems with the institution’s new 
slogan. In the interviews that were conducted for this study, Louw (2007) reveals that 
he had no knowledge that such a slogan existed at the SABC. Consequently, if Louw 
who works within the media industry, is not aware that the SABC’s new slogan exists, 
the question must be raised about how many ordinary citizens have knowledge of the 
SABC’s new slogan. If citizenship empowerment is a means to which citizens can 
assess the SABC, their lack of knowledge that the slogan even exists is unbeneficial 
to them. Similarly, Matthews (2007) reveals that although he has heard the CEO 
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explain the essence of citizenship empowerment, the CEO’s explanation does not 
sufficiently clarify what the SABC means by “Total Citizenship Empowerment”. 
Again, in light of Matthews’s argument, the question is raised about how many of the 
citizens that the SABC aims to empower, actually understand what such 
empowerment is about and how it is meant to positively affect them.  
 
Alberts (2007), the former General Manager of SABC2, believes that the SABC’s 
new slogan is a smoke screen for all the inadequacies of the institution. In fact, 
Duncan asserts that, “all these things [SABC controversies] have cast a pall on the 
SABC’s claim that it is aiming for total citizenship empowerment. In fact, I think that 
a strong indication is that it has moved towards total citizen disempowerment” (2007: 
personal interview). Although Duncan’s statement may be somewhat harsh, the 
controversies that have been identified in this study, as well as the Sisulu Marcus 
Enquiry’s report do indeed contradict the SABC’s slogan of “Total Citizenship 
Empowerment”. Duncan’s statement is also indicative of the lack of support that the 
SABC has come to garner from the media industry and public in general. 
Consequently, although the SABC’s new slogan engages with its public service 
mandate, the SABC does not seem to be living up to its new slogan, which provides 
plausibility to Alberts’s comment of the SABC hiding behind a smoke screen.  
 
In light of the controversies that the SABC has been generating, the SABC “seems to 
be a highly unstable organisation and it seems to be losing credibility” (Duncan, 2007: 
personal interview). Duncan’s argument has candour when looking at the negative 
reports on the SABC by the print media. However, interviewee A (2007) contends 
that all PSBs are surrounded by controversy, as they are so important in society. 
Ntombela-Nzimande further states that some of the issues that the print media have 
reported on “get taken out of proportion precisely because we are a highly contested 
organisation” (2007: personal interview). Although interviewee A and Ntombela-
Nzimande’s arguments may be true, the problem that exits with the SABC is that the 
institution is surrounded by too much controversy. Such an occurrence is unhealthy 
for a PSB, as, in accordance with Duncan, the PSB will lose credibility in the eyes of 
the public.  
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Moreover, according to Ntombela-Nzimande (2007), only some of the controversies 
that have been in the media are real, others are not. Interviewee A (2007) further 
argues that the print media have not been objective in their reporting of the SABC, as 
the print media belong to the commercial media and thus, are looking to discredit the 
competition, which is the SABC. According to interviewee A (2007), most of the 
print media’s reports were not well researched and were not always factual. However, 
despite the arguments of interviewee A and Ntombela-Nzimande, the findings of the 
Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry alone are quite disturbing. Hence, whether or 
not all the print media reports were factual, become inconsequential in comparison to 
the Commission’s findings, the SABC’s lack of independence and its lack of 
accountability to the public. 
 
In terms of the SABC’s objectives for the 2006/2007 financial year, the SABC is 
already struggling to finance its existing operations and still needs to find funding to 
establish SABC 4 and 5. Hence, the possibility of the SABC establishing a 24-hour 
news channel seems grim, as financing such an endeavour would require huge 
amounts of capital that the SABC does not have at its disposal. The fact that the 
SABC’s expense growth rate is higher than its objective is testament to the fact, that 
the SABC does not have the financial resources to establish a 24-hour news channel. 
The mere fact, that the SABC wants to establish a 24-hour news channel, indicates 
that the SABC’s focus, in terms of fulfilling its public responsibilities, is somewhat 
distorted.  
 
However, the SABC had a few positive achievements within the 2006/2007 financial 
year, such as the content hub that was established and the creation of new 
procurement policies and procedures, as well as its R500 million investment in 
technology. However, although the institution achieved its governance objectives, 
such an achievement is negligible in relation to its governance crisis. In fact, in light 
of the SABC’s numerous unachieved goals, the positive accomplishments of the 
institution are obscured and provide little compensation for its many inadequacies. 
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5.3.4. Relationship between the SABC and ICASA 
 
In order to understand the SABC’s relationship with ICASA and the manner in which 
ICASA regulates the SABC, a discussion of the ICASA Act needs to be undertaken, 
as the Act clarifies ICASA’s jurisdiction and procedures. Furthermore, ICASA’s role 
in protecting the SABC is also engaged with.  
 
5.3.4.1. The ICASA Act 
 
With regard to the SABC, ICASA’s jurisdiction over the institution is limited, where 
it is predominantly confined to the SABC’s fulfilment of its license conditions and the 
underlying statutes. Hence, many of the controversies that the SABC incited fell 
outside of ICASA’s jurisdiction. ICASA’s jurisdiction needs to be extended to the 
SABC’s self-imposed policies, such as its Editorial Code of Conduct. In this way, the 
SABC will be made more accountable to the public it claims to serve. 
 
The Act makes ICASA highly accountable to the public, where ICASA’s activities 
must be made transparent to the public. The Act also makes ICASA accountable to 
the government through the Minister of Communications. What is noticeable about 
ICASA’s accountability, is that none of the documents and pieces of legislation that 
govern the SABC compel the institution to make every aspect of its activities 
transparent and open to public scrutiny, as the ICASA Act compels ICASA. 
Consequently, it seems that ICASA is more accountable and transparent to the public 
than the SABC is, which is clearly a flaw in the legislation governing the SABC.  
 
The complaint procedure detailed in section 17C is a very clear and democratic 
process that allows both parties involved in the complaint equal representation. The 
fact that all complaints are required to be open to public inspection, legitimises the 
complaint procedure and again makes ICASA accountable to the public.  
 
The appointment process of the ICASA councillors is similar to that of the 
appointment process of the SABC Board. Consequently, the process raises many of 
the same arguments as that of the SABC’s appointment process. Naturally, ICASA’s 
appointment process is also severely flawed. 
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5.3.4.2. ICASA’s role in protecting PSB 
 
ICASA is required to ensure the viability of PSB in South Africa, as required by the 
ICASA Act. ICASA does this by conducting an inquiry to assess the threats that exist 
for PSB. According to Mkaize and Ndlovu (2007), one of the greatest threats facing 
the SABC currently, is competition due to the subscription broadcasting services that 
ICASA will shortly license. By identifying these threats to the SABC as a PSB, 
ICASA can then make sure that the unique role that the SABC has to play is 
protected. In fact, Mkaize and Ndlovu (2007) assert that there are stringent rules that 
exist that protect the SABC from political influence. However, when formulating 
policy, it is difficult for ICASA to balance social goals with economic goals, as they 
are not always complementary. Furthermore, with technological convergence, it is 
difficult to protect PSB separately (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007). 
 
ICASA does not always propose solutions to the challenges they find themselves. 
Instead, ICASA engages with the broadcasting industry and interested parties 
regularly, to find solutions. Such engagements take the form of for instance, public 
hearings or meetings (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007). In addition, ICASA conducts 
research where other jurisdictions are observed, to examine how these jurisdictions 
handled similar problems to what the SABC is facing. The solutions obtained from 
other jurisdictions are then adapted to the South African context (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 
2007).  
 
In terms of the SABC’s programming, ICASA’s amendment of the SABC’s license 
conditions reveals that ICASA is trying to help the SABC to improve its program 
provision to the public. The license conditions that ICASA has generated for the 
SABC make accountability an essential component, where the SABC is made 
accountable to ICASA and to the public. The license conditions also facilitate the 
provision of programme diversity. ICASA’s six-year provision of content genre and 
language quotas for the SABC enables the SABC to plan ahead to meet ICASA’s 
regulations, thus providing no room for the SABC to fail in fulfilling those quotas. 
The increased language quotas means that the predominance of English on the SABC 
is decreased, which in turn means that the language needs of South Africans will be 
catered for to a greater extent than before.  The specificity of the stringent license 
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conditions makes it increasingly difficult for the SABC to discontinue certain 
programmes merely because they are unprofitable, as the SABC needs to fulfil its 
genre and language quotas. However, this situation may aggravate the SABC’s 
funding crisis. A key problem with the license conditions is that no limit is placed on 
the amount of repeat broadcasts the SABC is allowed to broadcast. Consequently, the 
opportunity for the SABC to excessively broadcast repeats is created, which has 
negative consequences for the institution’s distinctiveness. Nevertheless, the SABC’s 
license conditions conform to the key characteristics of PSB, in terms of editorial 
independence, distinctiveness and diversity.  
 
Furthermore, according to Mkaize and Ndlovu (2007), the SABC is accountable in 
terms of the various pieces of legislation that exist, which govern the institution. An 
example of the SABC’s accountability can be seen with the SABC’s appearance 
before the Complaints and Compliance Commission, regarding the SABC’s 
contravention of the Broadcasting Act and its Editorial Code of Conduct due to the 
Sisulu Marcus Commission’s findings. 
 
With reference to the controversies that have been identified in this study, most of the 
controversies did not fall within ICASA’s jurisdiction. However, with regard to the 
PSL issue, Mkaize and Ndlovu (2007) argue that ICASA does have regulations in 
place that ensure that sports of national interest are not acquired exclusively. Hence, 
from the commencement of the controversy, the SABC would have had the right to 
broadcast PSL matches that were played on a national level. None of ICASA’s 
policies on the matter were contravened, thus ICASA could not intervene in the 
negotiations (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007). With regard to the blacklisting controversy, 
the SABC did not violate its license conditions. Consequently, ICASA could not 
intervene, as ICASA’s jurisdiction over the SABC is predominantly limited to the 
license conditions.  
 
However, ICASA is not the only industry body striving to protect PSB in South 
Africa. According to Koster (2007), NABSA is assisting the broadcasting 
environment in South Africa, by striving to ensure that the environment is stable, 
predictable, and encourages growth and development. One way in which NABSA 
tries to achieve its objective, is to ensure that the policies and regulations governing 
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the broadcasting industry are enforceable and predictable. In this way, stability is 
created within the broadcasting industry (Koster, 2007). Koster (2007) further asserts 
that NABSA plays a significant role in assisting in determining the rules that govern 
the industry and that everyone in the industry understands what their role is.  
 
5.3.4.3. Challenges facing ICASA 
 
Duncan (2007) contends that it has been difficult for ICASA to effectively regulate 
and monitor the SABC, as ICASA is extremely under-funded. Consequently, ICASA 
is inhibited in its ability to monitor the performance and compliance of the SABC 
with its mandate and the various legislation that govern the SABC. However, ICASA 
displayed independence when developing the SABC’s new license conditions, where 
although the SABC objected to some of the regulations in the license conditions, 
ICASA still developed stringent license conditions for the SABC (Duncan, 2007). 
Koster (2007) asserts that the license conditions that ICASA has generated are 
comprehensive and clear, thus sufficiently facilitating the SABC to fulfil its mandate. 
Moreover, regulatory, legislative and other mechanisms are in place to ensure the 
continued existence of PSB in South Africa. However, the SABC needs to decide how 
to approach strategically, the challenges that it faces (Koster, 2007). Albeit, according 
to Louw (2007), although ICASA is trying, it does not sufficiently know how to 
ensure that the SABC achieves its mandate. Louw contends that the increased content 
quotas that ICASA has placed on the SABC, where the SABC now has to provide 
current affairs and news programmes on Sundays, “is not a satisfactory solution 
because listeners and viewers at those hours are limited” (2007: personal interview).  
 
Another challenge facing ICASA is the diversity of the South African nation. 
Similarly, to the SABC, it is difficult for ICASA to regulate PSB so that every 
member of the public is satisfied. Koster (2007) concurs with Ntombela-Nzimande’s 
argument.  
 
Moreover, regulating such a converged broadcasting industry is not easy (Ntombela-
Nzimande, 2007). There are some issues that ICASA has overlooked, such as 
providing adequate regulations for sports of national interest (Ntombela-Nzimande, 
2007). A case in point is the PSL issue, where Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) argues that 
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if ICASA had adequate regulations in place, the PSL would not have been able to 
award its broadcasting rights to SuperSport. However, in light of Ntombela-
Nzimande’s argument, it must be noted, that ICASA not only regulates PSB, but also 
the other broadcasters in the industry, as well as telecommunications. Consequently, 
there is a lot of competition in the industry and ICASA has to make the industry 
viable for all players. Ensuring the viability of all parties is a difficult task for ICASA 
in such a competitive industry. However, ICASA does have in place regulation, where 
even though the SABC may not have secured the rights to broadcast all PSL matches, 
some of the rights must be awarded to the SABC by virtue of it being a public 
broadcaster. Hence, the PSL matches were never completely lost to the SABC 
(Koster, 2007; Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007). Hence, interviewee A (2007) asserts that 
ICASA is performing its role and duties adequately.   
 
In light of the arguments from the interviewees, it can be seen that ICASA is trying to 
adequately regulate the SABC to aid the institution to fulfil its mandate, as can be 
seen with the stringent license conditions generated for the SABC. Although there are 
problems with ICASA’s efforts, there seems to be an understanding within the 
industry, where the challenges that ICASA faces are acknowledged.  
 
5.3.5. Relationship between the SABC and the State 
 
The IBA Act conforms with the entertainment and cultural roles of the media, as well 
as the PSB characteristics of universality of appeal and distinctiveness. In addition, 
the Broadcasting Act is a clear document that conforms to the highest principles of 
democracy, as well as the various PSB principles and ideal institutional roles of the 
media. The Broadcasting Act makes the SABC accountable to the public by 
obligating the SABC to promote public opinion on its services. The Act also makes 
the SABC accountable to the state, as the SABC is obligated to submit an annual 
report on its activities to the Minister of Communications. Moreover, the Act makes 
the SABC accountable to ICASA, where ICASA issues, monitors and enforces the 
SABC’s license conditions. Hence, the Broadcasting Act clearly states to whom the 
SABC should be accountable.  
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However, Duncan contends that the Broadcasting Act is “conceptually flawed”, and 
as a result “was not able to effectively set the SABC up for self-efficiency” (2007: 
personal interview). In particular, Duncan notes that the Broadcasting Act’s statutory 
Charter is problematic, as it hinders the charter from being reviewed on a regular 
basis. Such a problem means that the Charter runs the risk of not always being 
relevant. As it stands, only when the Broadcasting Act is reviewed can the charter be 
renewed (Duncan, 2007). Another problem with the Charter that is detailed in the 
Broadcasting Act is that “ten of the sixteen clauses were taken directly from the BBC 
Charter” (Duncan, 2007: personal interview). Consequently, the public consultation 
process that was needed to develop the Charter was lacking. The lack of public 
consultation and copying of the BBC Charter means that the Charter did not go 
through the proper processes in its development. Moreover, since the Charter relates 
to a public institution, its development can be seen to be undemocratic (Duncan, 
2007). Nevertheless, Duncan (2007) believes that the Broadcasting Amendment Act 
assists, to some extent, in elaborating journalistic standards.  
 
5.4. The SABC as a distinctive broadcaster 
 
Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) contends that the SABC is very distinct from other 
broadcasters in South Africa. Commercial broadcasters are given the freedom to 
“cherry-pick” its target audience, while community broadcasters can choose which 
community they want to provide a service to (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007: personal 
interview). However, the SABC cannot choose its audience. The SABC has to service 
the South African citizenry in its entirety and that is what makes it distinct from other 
broadcasters (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). Furthermore, one of the central aspects of 
the SABC that makes it distinct from other broadcasters is the local content and the 
amount of different languages that it broadcasts (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007).   
 
According to interviewee A (2007), the SABC ensures the public interest in terms of 
programming by firstly, adhering to its programming content quotas; and secondly, by 
acquiring research information. With regard to acquiring research information, firstly, 
the SABC acquires audience research information, which is obtained from, for 
instance, SAARF (South African Advertising Research Foundation). Secondly, the 
SABC may commission research to inquire into problems that certain stations or 
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channels may experience. Moreover, the SABC has its own internal research unit. The 
research that is generated internally is used to identify problems that the SABC can 
fix immediately and for “strategic purposes, such as fighting competition” 
(Interviewee A, 2007: personal interview). 
 
In contention with Ntombela-Nzimande’s earlier argument, Duncan (2007) contends 
that PSB in South Africa is not distinct from the other forms of broadcasting, as all 
three forms have fallen prey to commercialism due to funding constraints. 
Consequently, the distinction between the three tiers of broadcasting in South Africa 
has begun to blur, where PSB and community broadcasting have increasingly begun 
to exhibit the characteristics of commercial broadcasting (Duncan, 2007; Louw, 
2007). Hence, pure public service broadcasting does not exist in South Africa 
(Duncan, 2007). Although Ntombela-Nzimande’s argument has credence 
theoretically, Duncan’s argument is substantiated by the degree to which the SABC 
has become reliant on commercial revenue to fund its activities. Hence, it seems that 
the SABC is losing its distinctiveness as its reliance on commercial sources of 
revenue increases.  
 
In fact, Mkaize and Ndlovu (2007) inform that the license for community 
broadcasters and the SABC are very similar; the only difference is that community 
broadcasters operate on a local level and the SABC operates on a national level. 
Furthermore, the only difference between the SABC and commercial broadcasters is 
the amount of advertising that they are allowed to acquire. There are stringent 
restrictions on the SABC regarding the amount of advertising and sponsorships it can 
attain (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007). The central problem with the SABC losing its 
distinctiveness in relation to other broadcasters in South Africa is the effect that this 
has on the quality of its programming.  
 
In terms of programming, Louw asserts that the SABC provides “news and current 
affairs programmes of variable quality” (2007: personal interview). However, “the 
wider public interest in programmes on other subjects … is dealt with on a very 
limited basis” (Louw, 2007: personal interview). With regard to Louw’s argument, the 
high-quality content that is needed for a PSB to achieve distinctiveness is lacking at 
the SABC. In fact, high-quality content is lacking so much so, that Matthews (2007) 
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contends that the majority of people who watch the news in English have shifted to e-
tv. Furthermore, as high-quality content provision correlates to the media’s 
information role, the SABC is thus, also failing to achieve its information role. Green 
(2007) contends that the SABC’s news and current affairs provision is excessively 
events orientated. However, with the resources that the SABC has, the institution has 
the capacity to pursue issues rather than events. The SABC should be providing 
information to all corners of the country, thus, filling the gap that the print media 
creates and being distinctive in that way. Unfortunately, the SABC is not performing 
at its true potential (Green, 2007). Alberts (2007) contends that the SABC’s 
programming strategy is in disarray, a case in point is the SABC’s excessive repeat 
broadcasts of some of its programmes.   
 
One occurrence that could have increased the SABC’s distinctiveness was the 
establishment of SABC 4 and 5, where the SABC would have been able to address the 
needs of Southern and Northern region native speaking citizens on a more significant 
level (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). SABC 4 would have exclusively addressed the 
programming needs of the Nguni speaking population, while SABC 5 would have 
exclusively addressed the programming needs of the Sotho speaking population 
(Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). Hence, the SABC would have been the only broadcaster 
in South Africa to address the language needs of the public on such an extensive level, 
thus increasing its distinctiveness.  
 
However, the license for SABC 4 and 5 were granted but not issued by ICASA. 
According to Ntombela-Nzimande (2007), the establishment of SABC 4 and 5 was 
halted, as the SABC had imminent plans to digitalise their broadcasting operations. 
Hence, instead of establishing two extra channels while the institution was still using 
analogue technology, the SABC decided to wait until the institution digitalised its 
operations to develop extra channels, as this would be less costly and thus more viable 
(Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). The SABC’s digital migration is scheduled to occur in 
November 2008 (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007).  
 
However, another reason for the halting of SABC 4 and 5 is provided by Duncan 
(2007), who contends that SABC 4 and 5 were brought to a standstill, as there was a 
lack of clarity on how to fund the two channels. The SABC was granted a license for 
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the two channels in order to force Trevor Mannuel (the Finance Minister of South 
Africa) to fund the two channels. However, Mannuel did not want to provide funding 
for the channels (Duncan, 2007).  
 
The fact that the SABC is losing its distinctiveness is a severe impediment to PSB in 
South Africa, as a PSB’s programming forms the core of its public service provision. 
The controversies that the SABC has generated regarding its content, such as the PSL 
issue, the negative coverage by the print media on the SABC’s establishment of a 24-
hour news channel, the controversy with the independent producers, and the 
circumcision mini-series, are all examples of the difficulty the SABC is having with 
establishing its distinctiveness within the broadcasting industry. Furthermore, the 
dumbing-down of the SABC’s content provision means that the PSB characteristics of 
universality of appeal, promotion of national identity and community, and catering for 
minority interests are not being adequately achieved by the SABC. Instead, these PSB 
characteristics are being waived to increasingly fulfil the commercial motive of profit 
maximisation, which presents a severe disservice to South African citizens. The 
SABC’s increasing commercial inclination, is discussed in more detail in the next 
section. The SABC’s deteriorating programming quality also affects the country’s 
democracy, as citizens are not being provided with the high-quality information that 
they need to make informed decisions. 
 
5.5. The SABC’s funding mix 
 
It seems that the only positive development with regard to the SABC’s funding model 
is the rise in its revenue generation year on year for the past three years (SABC 
Annual Report, 2006/2007). However, the SABC’s profit for the 2006/2007 financial 
year has severely diminished from the previous financial year. Nevertheless, such a 
decline could be attributed to the SABC’s R500 million investment in technology, as 
the SABC’s revenue expenditure has increased year on year for the past three years 
(SABC annual results presentation, 2007). Although the SABC’s commercial revenue 
generation has also decreased year on year for the past three years, commercial 
revenues amount to 77% of the SABC’s entire revenue generation (SABC Annual 
Report, 2006/2007: 25). For the SABC as a PSB to have the majority of its revenue 
emerge from commercial sources, is quiet disturbing.  
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The SABC’s reliance on advertising revenue has the potential to allow advertisers to 
influence SABC content (World Radio and Television Council, 2000). In fact, the 
SABC’s commercial bias can already be seen by for instance, the news at 10pm on 
SABC 3, which used to “provide engaging current affairs and international affairs”; 
however, it has shifted to business news, which attracts advertising (Duncan, 2007: 
personal interview). Hence, as the SABC clamours to please advertisers, 
programming is increasingly moving towards business and economic information. 
Consequently, the SABC is moving towards a situation where dominant interests are 
supplanting quality information. That is to say, the SABC is indeed moving towards 
commercialism. Subsequently, the idea of the SABC as a PSB redressing market 
failure in South Africa is severely compromised. Interviewee A (2007) argues that it 
has and still is detrimental to the SABC for Parliament and ICASA to impose 
restrictions and requirements on the institution without providing a sufficient means 
of funding for the SABC. Nevertheless, the SABC is exploring the viability of 
allowing SARS (the South African Revenue Service) to collect license fees in the 
future, which would potentially increase revenue generation from public sources 
(Interviewee A, 2007).  
 
Duncan (2007) provides one reason for the SABC’s funding crisis, when she contends 
that immense confusion develops in the broadcasting industry when amalgamation 
between the role of a PSB and commercial broadcasting occurs. Ntombela-Nzimande 
(2007) concurs with Duncan’s argument. In the SABC’s circumstance, this 
amalgamation has caused the role, purpose and function of the SABC to become 
unclear (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). The structure of the SABC, which is part public 
service and part commercial, is detrimental to the SABC, as the SABC cannot afford 
to compete with commercial broadcasters (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007).  
 
Moreover, the SABC’s cross-subsidisation, where its commercial arm subsidises its 
public service arm, is hindered by the fact that the commercial arm cannot compete as 
a purely commercial broadcaster, as it is still bound by the SABC’s public service 
mandate (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). Consequently, the SABC’s cross-subsidisation 
approach is not an approach that works very well and it is contradictory. Funding the 
public mandate is expensive. Since the SABC is not receiving adequate public 
funding to fulfil such a mandate, it is forced to increase its commercial revenue in-
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take to fund its public services (Duncan, 2007). Hence, Duncan (2007) suggests that 
the SABC’s mandate needs to be clarified; and one way of doing this is to separate 
public and commercial broadcasting and make the SABC a purely public broadcaster 
(Duncan, 2007: Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007; Interviewee A, 2007). In this way, the 
distinction between public and commercial broadcasting becomes clear. 
 
However, the funding of a purely public broadcaster would possibly emanate from 
either a purely publicly funded SABC or purely government funded SABC, the latter 
of which poses acute dangers to the independence of PSB in South Africa. If the 
SABC is funded purely by the government or the public, then the SABC Board who 
oversees the SABC’s funding, needs to display more independence then in the past. If 
the SABC is to be funded completely by the public, then it must be more accountable 
to the public in terms of ensuring that the SABC is independent and fulfils its mandate 
(Matthews, 2007). 
 
5.6. Effects on the ideal institutional roles of the media 
 
The SABC fails to be a watchdog in protecting the public interest. Firstly, the 
influence that advertisers and sponsors have on the SABC’s programming, due to the 
SABC’s reliance on commercial sources of funding, works counter to the public 
interest. Secondly, the political bias that has been identified in this study, with regard 
to the SABC Board and some of its programming, also illustrates the SABC’s failure 
to be a watchdog and expose faults in the government. 
 
In addition, due to the SABC’s political bias, citizens are not empowered by the 
SABC to make informed political decisions. Here, the SABC fails to fulfil its 
information role. If the public are not informed on the activities of individuals within 
the government, they may form skewed perceptions of the government of the day. 
Consequently, an inaccurately informed citizenry has devastating consequences on 
democracy in South Africa.  
 
Moreover, the blacklisting controversy is indicative of a violation of freedom of 
expression at the SABC, which in turn inhibits its debate and discussion role. As 
Lichtenberg (2002) points out, if not all voices are heard, people may come to the 
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wrong conclusions on important issues and this may result in inequality, 
marginalisation and domination. Hence, the SABC’s violation of some of the ideal 
institutional roles of the media indicates that it is not adequately fulfilling its public 
service mandate. Louw (2007) concurs with this argument.  
 
5.7. The effects of the SABC’s developmental approach to broadcasting 
 
Interviewee A (2007) asserts that the SABC’s developmental approach is about 
transformation, nation building and empowerment. Such an approach informs the 
SABC’s approach to news provision. According to Duncan (2007), the SABC’s 
developmental approach is something that the institution prides itself on. However, 
Duncan (2007) contends that the SABC does not, in reality, practice developmental 
journalism. Instead, the SABC “ignores the voices of the poor and when the voices of 
the poor come through, it’s often in a highly distorted fashion and it’s in a fashion that 
shields the government from criticism” (Duncan, 2007: personal interview).  
 
With reference to Faringer’s (1991) argument that the problem with the 
developmental approach is that the media becomes partisan to the government, 
Duncan’s argument implies that the SABC has in fact moved towards that exact 
situation. Duncan’s argument is substantiated when looking at the Mbeki 
documentary, the mysterious disappearance of the videotape exposing the Health 
Minister as a drunk and a thief, and the SABC’s withdrawal form SANEF. These 
three controversies are indicative of the SABC’s bias towards the government. 
Furthermore, Louw (2007) contends that the SABC broadcasts when a development 
occurs, but tends not to broadcast on issues that find the government’s development 
initiatives lacking. If Louw’s argument is indeed true, the SABC can actually be 
found to be contradicting the purpose of development journalism. One of the 
functions of development journalism is to critically examine the government’s 
implementation of its development initiatives (Watson and Hill, 2000). Such a 
contradiction raises the question of whether the SABC is actually serious about its 
commitment to development journalism, or whether the practice of development 
journalism is just a smoke screen to conceal its pro-government stance. 
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Duncan asserts that the SABC is developing “strong elements once again of state 
broadcasting”, where a climate of self-censorship is intensifying in the SABC’s 
provision of news and programming (2007: personal interview). Matthews (2007) 
also asserts this view and contends that the SABC falls short of its public interest role 
and obligations. The views of Duncan and Matthews are given credence by the 
findings of the Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry, which found that a climate of 
self-censorship did exist at the SABC. There have been a number of controversial 
programmes, which the SABC itself has commissioned, that it has refused to 
broadcast (Matthews, 2007). With regard to Matthews’s assertion, a case in point is 
the Mbeki documentary. According to Duncan, “the SABC is too close to the Minister 
of Communications” (2007: personal interview).   
 
What can be seen from all of this is that, the SABC’s developmental approach to 
broadcasting is infringing on the institution’s political independence. The SABC has 
displayed tendencies to be bias in its programming in favour of the government of the 
day. Consequently, such bias poses a disservice to citizens, where citizens are not 
being adequately informed by the SABC. Such an occurrence violates the very nature 
of the public interest that the SABC is supposed to protect.  
 
5.8. The SABC’s effect on the public sphere 
 
The SABC as a public broadcaster is crucial in upholding and facilitating the public 
sphere. However, the SABC is working counter to the principle of the public sphere. 
The public sphere is supposed to be a place where critical-rational discussion can take 
place, which is free from business or state influence (Habermas, 1964; McChesney, 
2000). Due to the SABC’s ANC-aligned nature and its increasing shift towards 
commercialism, the SABC does not assist in creating a public sphere for citizens 
where critical rational discussion can take place. Hence, the SABC provides candour 
to Habermas’s (1964) theorisation of the refeudalisation of the public sphere. A 
decline of the public sphere is occurring in South Africa, where the private sphere is 
encroaching on the public sphere, due to the SABC’s increasing shift towards 
commercialisation. The consequence of the declining public sphere is that the 
platform, which the SABC together with the public sphere is suppose to provide, for 
public interest groups to raise awareness on important issues, is being eroded. Hence, 
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the erosion of such an important platform in society means that the public is not being 
adequately facilitated to promote progressive changes in society, as they are unable to 
adequately put pressure on the government and any other powerful groups in society. 
Consequently, not only is the SABC infringing on the public sphere, it is not fulfilling 
its debate and discussion role, which is detrimental to the country’s democracy. The 
SABC’s eroding of the public sphere inhibits a system of participatory democracy in 
South Africa, where citizens are not adequately informed to make important 
decisions. 
 
5.9. The SABC’s effect on the public interest and citizenship 
 
The public interest, like the public sphere, is supposed to be free form vested interests 
(Kupe, 2005a). In terms of political interest, the public is supposed to receive 
unbiased information and be able to voice their concerns (Teer-Tomaselli, 2004). 
However, as the SABC is not free form vested interests, it cannot be seen to be 
adequately servicing the public interest. Consequently, the SABC infringes on the 
political component of citizenship, which is “the right to participate in the exercise of 
political power” (Marshall, 1963: 72). Without accurate information on political 
issues, the public will not be able to make informed decisions. The SABC’s ANC-
aligned nature creates a barrier to accurate information and imagery, which according 
to Golding (1997), not only excludes citizens from democratic life, but also from 
social and cultural processes. Consequently, the SABC is hindering the equal 
participation of citizens in the social order.  
 
Although citizenship can be implemented through the public sphere, the fact that the 
SABC is eroding the public sphere in South Africa further hinders citizenship in the 
country. Subsequently, the SABC is again inhibiting democratic processes in the 
country. The SABC as a PSB, which is supposed to be so crucial in facilitating 
democratic processes, which actually works to hinder democracy, the public sphere 
and the public interest, indicates that the SABC is not a genuine PSB.  
 
5.10. Challenges facing the SABC 
 
The challenges that are discussed in this section are those that have been identified by 
the study’s interviewees, as they work or have worked closely with the SABC and the 
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broadcasting industry in general. For this reason, the interviewees are best placed to 
identify challenges facing the SABC. There are various problems facing the SABC. 
With regard to the crisis that the SABC is experiencing, Duncan blames the initial 
policy process and resultant policies for the crisis. Duncan asserts that the policy 
process and resultant policies were not adventurous enough in detailing the future of 
PSB. In particular, the cross-subsidisation of the SABC, of its commercial arm to its 
public service arm, was “a disastrous policy choice”, that does not work (Duncan, 
2007: personal interview). Duncan (2007) further contends that without serious 
investment in public funds to fund the SABC, PSB in South Africa will not grow. 
According to Duncan,  
 
all of this is policy chaos when it comes to the SABC, that there hasn’t, since 
the transformation of the SABC Board in 1993, been a clear line of march that 
can take us towards the establishment of a proper public broadcaster. So, I 
think that policy and legislation is characterised by incoherence at best and 
chaos at worst (2007: personal interview). 
 
However, there has been progress in clarifying the SABC’s mandate. Hence, in light 
of Duncan’s argument, a major problem hindering the SABC from fulfilling its public 
service mandate is a crisis in the policy governing the SABC. 
 
Another problem is the high level of staff departures from the SABC, which has seen 
the institution lose numerous senior staff members. The SABC has not been able to 
prevent this loss, which is indicative of a human resource management failure, which 
in turn is indicative of a governance failure at the SABC (Duncan, 2007).  
 
In addition, there has been a display of SABC Board members engaging in micro-
management of the SABC. Such micro managing entails interfering in the day-to-day 
operations of the SABC and thus, making decisions where SABC management should 
not be making decisions. Hence, this interference by the SABC Board members 
indicates that the SABC Board has misconstrued its role at the SABC, which in itself 
is a governance failure (Duncan, 2007).   
 
Louw contends that PSB in South Africa faces a problem of “Telling it like it is” 
(2007: personal interview). The SABC does not adequately representing the reality of 
South Africa on for instance, issues of crime, HIV/AIDS, lack of service delivery, 
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nepotism, corruption, lack of jobs, and so on. There is no in-depth examination on 
important issues (Louw, 2007). The SABC’s provision of news needs to be 
broadened. However, although these important issues are difficult to account on, the 
SABC does not want to deal with these issues as, “I sense they are not being tackled 
because the broadcaster does not want to upset the government” (Louw, 2007: 
personal interview). Louw (2007) further contends that although the SABC has the 
biggest newsroom in South Africa, the output of its news content does not reflect 
optimum use of such a newsroom. Consequently, this limited use of its newsroom 
capacity, indicates that, “news gathering lacks thrust and appears to be tainted with 
political correctness” (Louw, 2007: personal interview). 
 
Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) asserts that there are three main challenges facing the 
SABC. Firstly, competition within the broadcasting arena has increased, which means 
that the SABC is losing some of its audience share. Secondly, the SABC is operating 
within serious funding constraints, which inhibits the SABC from fulfilling its public 
mandate. Thirdly, as South African society is so diverse, the SABC cannot meet the 
needs of each citizen (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). This problem is also attributed to 
the SABC’s lack of funding. Galombik (2007) contends that due to the SABC’s lack 
of funding, the continued financing of local content will become problematic in the 
future. The financing of local content is an especially important challenge that the 
SABC will have to contend with, as its local content provision is a central aspect of 
what makes the SABC distinct from other broadcasters (Galombik, 2007).  
 
Further challenges for the SABC, are firstly, winning public trust, where the public 
has complete trust in the SABC. Winning public trust is difficult to do, as South 
African society is so diverse. Secondly, the challenge for the SABC is to remain 
relevant to the public. Thirdly, the SABC must stay abreast of technological 
developments (Ntombela-Nzimande, 2007). Interviewee A (2007) contends that even 
though new technologies provide the advantages of facilitating the development of a 
multitude of television channels, the new technologies are expensive to obtain for the 
SABC, as it has to be imported. The high costs of new technologies are incompatible 
with the SABC’s revenue generation. In addition, technological advancements are 
resulting in more players entering the broadcasting industry, which threatens the 
SABC’s viability. Hence, in order to survive, the SABC must remain relevant, 
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continue to add value, be sustainable and adapt, and keep abreast with the various 
technological advancements (Interviewee A, 2007). Furthermore, media 
developments, such as U-tube, facebook, itunes and so on, are shifting public 
expectations towards increased interaction. “They [the public] want to have some 
editorial control and they want to have access to the kind of content that they want, 
when they want it, and they even want to give or contribute their own types of 
content” (Koster, 2007: personal interview). Consequently, according to Koster 
(2007), broadcasting will have to become more interactive to accommodate the 
public’s needs.  
 
Matthews (2007) contends that the SABC has lost its credibility as a PSB; thus, the 
main challenge for the SABC is to restore its credibility. Green (2007) asserts that 
with the SABC’s crisis of credibility comes a crisis of professionalism. Here, less 
experienced people have replaced the more experienced staff at the SABC, due to the 
exodus in staff that the SABC has experienced. The inability to retain its professionals 
or acquire new professionals, points to an inadequate management strategy at the 
SABC (Green, 2007).   
 
Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) reveals that the SABC’s communication to the public 
about its activities and future plans is defective. Hence, some of the public’s critique 
of the SABC is due to inefficient communication by the SABC. Consequently, the 
SABC needs to utilise its many platforms to communicate more effectively with the 
public. In addition, Ntombela-Nzimande (2007) asserts that with all the power that the 
SABC possesses, it does not use this power efficiently to facilitate the achievement of 
its mandate. Ntombela-Nzimande’s assertion is indicative of the SABC’s governance 
crisis.  
 
Galombik (2007) highlights that the SABC is an institution that constantly suffers 
from a crisis of expectation, as it is such an important institution in society. 
Furthermore, as the SABC is a public institution, it is very sensitive to the debates and 
contestations that lie beneath society. These debates and contestations manifest itself 
through the SABC. Hence, some of the controversies that the SABC has generated are 
examples of such manifestations (Galombik, 2007). 
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Mkaize and Ndlovu (2007) stress that it is important to keep in mind that the SABC is 
implementing its new license conditions for the very first time. One must also be 
mindful of the fact that the SABC is operating under strained circumstances. Firstly, 
the SABC has the kind of responsibilities that no other broadcaster. Secondly, the 
SABC faces fierce competition despite its responsibilities. Thirdly, the SABC 
operates on limited funding (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007). 
 
According to Duncan, the SABC has become the embarrassment of the region, where 
at a meeting, “of civil society organisations and donor organisations in the SADC … 
someone who is very high up in the media in Swaziland, who’s also the Chairperson 
of a funding agency, just said, South Africa has become an embarrassment to the 
region” (2007: personal interview). Duncan’s statement comes in light of the many 
controversies that have besieged the institution, as well as the SABC’s lack of 
independence and accountability. The SABC is supposed to be a PSB to aspire to, 
since it is one of the few supposedly independent PSBs in the region. The SABC, and 
as a result South Africa, is especially an embarrassment to the region with regard to 
the aspiration on the continent to shift state broadcasters to public broadcasters.  
 
Given the challenges facing the SABC that have been identified in this study, it can be 
seen that Sparks’s (2000) argument that global aspects are eroding the local public 
sphere, is occurring in South Africa in terms of PSB. Technological advancement, a 
multi-channel environment, competition and commercialisation, which are all linked 
to globalisation, are hindering the ability of the SABC to adequately fulfil its public 
service responsibilities, and thus be a genuine broadcaster. However, the challenges 
facing the SABC are not just external, but internal as well. Hence, the SABC seems to 
be dealing with a double-edged sword. However, although the SABC may not be able 
to control the external challenges that it faces, it can control and possibly solve the 
internal problems it faces, if it can find the resolve to do so.  
 
5.11. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, a number of aspects of the SABC were examined. In the analysis of 
the SABC’s norms and rules, it was found that even though the various documents 
that guide the SABC to fulfill its mandate are sound documents, the SABC does not 
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necessarily comply with these documents. The various controversies that have been 
identified in this study, as well as the Sisuslu Marcus Commission of Enquiry are 
testimony to the SABC’s non-compliance with its internal policies. In fact, the SABC 
tries to cover up such inadequacies with a positive catchphrase that is does not 
however, live up to.  
 
The governance arrangements within the SABC are severely flawed. The SABC 
Board is tainted by members with ANC ties, which is clearly a flaw of the SABC 
Board appointment process. What is more, a CEO that is unqualified for the job of 
running the SABC is placed at the helm of the institution. Such shortcomings have 
culminated in exceptionally bad governance of the SABC that has spawned twelve 
major controversies within the space of a year.  
 
ICASA is limited in its activities of evaluating and monitoring the SABC, as its 
jurisdiction is limited, thus there are many inadequacies that are neglected at the 
SABC. The inadequacies that are neglected are resulting in a deteriorating PSB. In 
addition, ICASA lacks funding to be able to fulfil its function adequately, to evaluate 
and monitor the SABC. However, the dilemmas that ICASA faces are no fault of its 
own, the fault lies with legislation and the government. Hence, the relationship 
between the SABC and ICASA is a strained one.  
 
The SABC’s relationship to the state is comprised predominantly by the Broadcasting 
Act. However, although the Broadcasting Act ensures the SABC’s accountability to 
the state, ICASA and the public, the Act is conceptually flawed. Such a flaw strains 
the relationship between the SABC and the state slightly, as the states legislation is 
not appropriately assisting the SABC to be the best PSB it can be and to fulfill its 
public mandate to the best of its ability.  
 
The SABC’s funding model is disconcerting, as the SABC’s predominant source of 
revenue generation is from commercial sources. The SABC’s reliance on advertising 
and sponsorships means that those advertisers and sponsors influence the SABC’s 
programming to a large degree. Consequently, the SABC is moving increasingly 
towards commercialism. Such a dilemma severely violates the values of PSB and the 
public interest.  
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A crucial component of this chapter has been to examine the SABC’s independence, 
accountability and distinctiveness. The SABC’s independence is severely 
compromised as can be seen with the Board’s ANC ties, the Board appointment 
process, and the influence of advertisers and sponsors on SABC programming. 
Although the SABC is made accountable in various ways to the state and ICASA, its 
accountability to the public is inadequate. This inadequacy is a result of defective 
legislation, but also the result of the SABC’s non-compliance with its own internal 
polices, as can be seen with the lack of consequence of the Sisulu Marcus 
Commission of Enquiry.  
 
With all this, it can be seen that, the SABC as a PSB is lacking in many aspects. The 
SABC’s positive efforts to improve its service to the public are engulfed by the 
institution’s inadequacies, thus making positive developments inconsequential. 
Hence, the SABC cannot be said to be a genuine PSB. Instead, the SABC is an 
institution that is engulfed in crisis.    
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and recommendations 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to conclude this study by reiterating the central findings and 
arguments of the study. In doing so, the initial aims of the study will be engaged with. 
These aims were to determine whether the SABC is a genuine PSB, which entailed 
determining whether the SABC is adequately fulfilling its mandate or contradicting its 
mandate by moving towards commercialism. In addition, the causes for any shifts 
toward commercialism were to be determined. This chapter will also engage with the 
study’s initial research questions, where firstly, the study was to determine the extent 
to which the SABC is a PSB. Secondly, to ascertain whether the policy and regulation 
governing the SABC facilitates or constrains the SABC in its PSB responsibilities. 
This chapter also attempts to provide recommendations to some of the problems 
facing the SABC that have been identified in this study.  
 
6.2. The SABC’s fulfilment of the central tenets of PSB 
 
This study was themed according to the PSB characteristics of independence, 
accountability, distinctiveness, and finance. These four characteristics were used to 
determine whether the SABC is adequately fulfilling its PSB responsibilities, and thus 
whether it is a genuine PSB. The characteristics of independence, distinctiveness and 
finance are closely related, and will thus be discussed together.  
 
6.2.1. Independence 
 
One of the main causes of the SABC’s lack of political independence is the 
governance arrangements that exist within the SABC. The Board nomination process 
seems to be a key flaw in the governance of the SABC. The President ultimately 
appoints the SABC Board, which is extremely problematic, as can be seen with the 
several ANC-aligned people serving on the SABC Board. The crisis in the 
governance arrangements at the SABC has consequently, culminated in instances of 
pro-ANC bias on the part of the institution. Such occurrences have eroded the 
SABC’s political independence. In addition, the SABC Board’s lack of appropriate 
credentials to steer the institution in a progressive direction, enhances the institution’s 
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governance crisis, where behavioural inefficiency is created. The SABC also suffers 
from structural inefficiency, where the roles and functions of different levels and 
departments within the institution are blurred. Moreover, the SABC’s developmental 
approach to broadcasting facilitates the institution’s pro-ANC stance. The use of 
development journalism is a platform from which the SABC can justify its pro-
government stance. Hence, the SABC’s developmental approach to broadcasting 
hinders the institution from fulfilling its PSB responsibilities, as it assists in 
compromising the institution’s political independence.  
 
Another factor that has eroded the SABC’s independence is its reliance on 
commercial sources of funding. The SABC has become reliant on commercial sources 
of funding due to the minimal revenue it receives from other sources. The main 
problem with the SABC’s funding mix then, is that the SABC’s content is 
increasingly becoming commercialised, as advertisers and sponsors dictate their 
desires to the institution. Consequently, the SABC’s economic independence has also 
been eroded. Related to the SABC’s financial dilemma is the issue of distinctiveness. 
The SABC’s increasing shift towards commercialisation is eroding its distinctiveness, 
where the SABC’s high-quality content provision is being compromised. Such an 
occurrence is resulting in the dumbing-down of the SABC.  
 
6.2.2. Accountability 
 
The SABC as a PSB is supposed to be accountable to three main bodies, the state, 
ICASA and the public. The SABC does account to the state and ICASA in terms of 
submitting annual reports, quarterly reports and so forth. The SABC is accountable in 
the same way to the PFMA and the Auditor General. In terms of public 
accountability, the SABC holds feedback meetings with the public every two years. In 
addition, the SABC’s annual reports, editorial and programme policies are made 
available to the public. Although the SABC is accountable to the state and ICASA, 
the SABC is inadequately accountable to the public. The SABC’s meetings with 
members of the public occur too infrequently to make the institution adequately 
accountable to the public. What is more, the SABC does not always comply with its 
editorial policies. When the SABC fails to comply with its editorial policies, it does 
not account to the state, ICASA or the public regarding its non-compliance. The 
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SABC’s rejection of the findings of the Sisulu Marcus Commission of Enquiry is a 
case in point. The SABC’s non-compliance with its own internal policies is again 
indicative of the institution’s governance crisis.  
 
6.2.2.1. ICASA’s regulation of the SABC 
 
It seems that ICASA, despite the challenges it faces, is trying significantly to facilitate 
the SABC to fulfil its public mandate, as can be seen with the stringent license 
conditions created for the SABC. However, ICASA is restricted in its ability to 
regulate the SABC adequately due to a flaw in the ICASA Act. Such a discrepancy is 
a legislative flaw.  
 
6.2.2.2. Legislation governing the SABC 
 
The Broadcasting Act and the ICASA Act generate key flaws in legislation. The 
Broadcasting Act empowers the President to appoint the SABC Board. The 
consequences of such a flaw in policy have already been explored in the discussion on 
independence. In addition, the Broadcasting Act does not allow the statutory Charter 
to be renewed on a regular basis. Consequently, the Charter is unable to keep abreast 
with the changing broadcasting environment, which may result in it being unsuitable 
to address particular issues or problems that the SABC may have. What is more, the 
Charter may be unsuitable for the South African context, as much of the Charter 
originates from the BBC Charter. These flaws in the Broadcasting Act can be seen to 
be exacerbating the SABC’s governance crisis. Furthermore, the ICASA Act restricts 
ICASA’s jurisdiction over the SABC to primarily the institution’s license conditions. 
Hence, any transgressions of the SABC’s internal policies go unaccounted. 
Consequently, the ICASA Act also exacerbates the SABC’s governance crisis. Such 
detrimental flaws in legislation thus hinder the SABC from fulfilling its public service 
responsibilities.   
 
6.3. Consequences of the SABC’s violation of the central tenets of PSB 
 
Firstly, the SABC’s inability to fulfil the central tenets of PSB means that it violates 
its ideal institutional roles of being a watchdog, providing information, and providing 
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a forum for debate and discussion. Since the ideal institutional roles of the media are 
so intrinsic to the promotion of democratic processes, the SABC is actually hindering 
democratic processes in the country when it should in fact be facilitating it. Secondly, 
the SABC’s inability to fulfil the central tenets of PSB is eroding the country’s public 
sphere. The public’s ability to engage in critical rational discussion is being hindered 
due the SABC’s ANC-allegiances and through its increasing shift towards 
commercialisation. Thirdly, the SABC is violating the public interest and hindering 
citizenship in the country. The SABC is not providing a public service that is free 
from vested interests, and thus, cannot be said to have the public’s interests at heart. 
In addition, the erosion of the SABC’s political independence is preventing the public 
from receiving accurate information and imagery, which in turn is eroding citizenship 
in the country. What can be seen from all of this is that the SABC seems to be losing 
its identity as a PSB. The institution is not complying with the central tenets of PSB. 
Hence, the SABC is providing a disservice to the public it is supposed to serve and a 
disservice to democracy. Consequently, the SABC is not a genuine PSB.  
 
6.4. Recommendations 
 
Primarily, the SABC is in dire need of addressing its internal problems. In terms of 
the governance crisis that the SABC is facing, Green (2007) asserts that, good 
governance within a PSB is crucial, as without good governance, the essence of a PSB 
becomes compromised. Hence, in order to protect PSB in South Africa, there needs to 
be a system that will ensure good governance and oversight of the SABC, which 
allows the institution to fulfil its mandate adequately (Green, 2007).  
 
One way in which to achieve good governance within the institution is through 
augmented political consensus. Green (2007) further contends that there needs to be 
more political consensus and political will, not only on a government level, but also 
from other political parties and from society. Without political will, there can be no 
guarantee of a public broadcaster (Green, 2007). Green’s argument comes in light of 
the fact that it is the government’s responsibility to develop the legislation that 
governs PSB. Without political will, the government will not be stimulated to amend 
the flaws that exist in the current legislation. In addition, interviewee A (2007) 
contends that the policy governing the SABC must be revised in order to clarify an 
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appropriate way in which to structure the institution and how to ensure the 
institution’s sustainability. In addition, Louw contends that “Public values need 
broader expression and thus can be restructured” (2007: personal interview).  
 
However, Matthews (2007) contends that consensus within the SABC is also needed. 
Matthews (2007) reveals that the SABC holds regular breakaway seminars and 
workshops, where journalism issues are discussed. These breakaway seminars are 
valuable as they allow consensus to be formed on important issues (Matthews, 2007). 
Hence, the SABC should have more breakaway seminars within the entire institution, 
where the seminars can be held for all divisions of the SABC.  
 
Another way in which the governance crisis at the SABC can be addressed is by 
revising the Board nomination process. Louw (2007) contends that instead of the 
government appointing the members of the Board, civil society should instead be 
conferred with the task. In this way, the role of the SABC Board members will be 
unambiguous. Hence, the SABC will see its function as providing a service to the 
public, instead of seeing its function as “following a politically correct line” (Louw, 
2007: personal interview). Subsequent to revising the Board appointment process, the 
“politically appointed heads” in key sectors of the SABC, for instance, the head of the 
news and current affairs department, must be removed (Louw, 2007: personal 
interview). The politically appointed SABC staff-members must be removed, as it is a 
conflict of interest for card-carrying members of the ANC to hold such key positions 
within the SABC (Louw, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, the SABC needs to abandon its developmental approach to broadcasting 
and instead concentrate on trying to fulfil the tenets of PSB. In this way, the SABC’s 
focus will be on fulfilling its PSB responsibilities, instead of gratifying its political 
allegiances. The SABC needs to focus on what is important, which is fulfilling its 
PSB responsibilities. Although, it must be noted, that there is nothing wrong with 
utilising the developmental approach. However, the problem lies in the way in which 
people in power utilise the development approach, as in the case of the SABC. 
Consequently, a redefinition of the developmental approach is needed, where abuse of 
the approach by people in power can be curtailed. In this way, the political 
independence of PSB’s who use the developmental approach can still be ensured.  
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In terms of increasing the SABC’s accountability, Duncan (2007) contends that there 
needs to be a far greater engagement of the SABC with the public. There needs to be 
much more public participation in clarifying the SABC’s mandate and in the 
development of the SABC Act. The SABC Board should engage in regular public 
consultations and should “accede to public meetings if a significant amount of 
signatures are given to it, calling for meetings” (Duncan, 2007: personal interview). 
The Board should have,  
 
… quarterly report-back meetings, its minutes should be made publicly 
available, its voting records should be made publicly available, and also its 
services should set up things like listener committees, which can act as 
advisory bodies for programme monitoring services (Duncan, 2007: personal 
interview).  
 
Louw (2007) also favours meetings between the Board, senior management and the 
public, similar meetings that were proposed post-apartheid by the Campaign for Open 
Media during the transformation phase. In this way, the SABC will be more 
accountable to the public. 
 
Another way in which the SABC’s accountability can be increased is through greater 
adherence to its Editorial Code of Conduct. If the SABC strictly adheres to its 
editorial policies, the SABC’s political independence can be salvaged (Matthews, 
2007). However, augmented adherence to the SABC’s editorial policies can only 
operate in tandem with a revision of legislation governing the SABC. Only legislation 
has the power to obligate the SABC to adhere to its internal policies.  
 
In terms of diversity, the SABC gravely needs to halt the deterioration of its 
programming quality in the midst of commercial revenue dependency. Louw contends 
that the SABC should increase the diversity in its programming, by providing content 
other than drama and public interest programmes, “which focus on specialist areas” 
(2007: personal interview). In addition, the SABC needs to provide candid 
information, analysis, and debate and discussion to its public. In order to do this, the 
SABC needs to “tell it like it is”, which entails not always supporting the dominant 
view, as this view may not always be the correct view (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007: 
personal interview). To Mkaize and Ndlovu, “realising the independence and 
importance of telling it like it is, is what is meant by total citizenship empowerment” 
 
 138
(2007: personal interview). Furthermore, if research, which gauges the public’s wants, 
needs and interests can be carried out as frequently as possible, this would assist the 
SABC in fulfilling its mandate (Mkaize and Ndlovu, 2007).  
 
6.5. Conclusion 
 
The SABC, which lacks independence both politically and economically, is not 
adequately accountable to the public that it claims to serve, is not adequately distinct, 
and has a funding structure that is moving the institution increasingly towards 
commercialism; cannot be said to be a genuine broadcaster. The Sisulu Marcus 
Commission of Enquiry report is particularly disturbing, as the document alludes to 
some gross violations of the key principles of PSB. The report indicates that there is a 
crisis of independence and governance at the SABC. Direct censorship (in terms of 
the blacklisting of commentators) is occurring, together with self-censorship, due to 
the climate of fear that exists within the SABC. The fact that such censorship is 
occurring at the SABC is more indicative of a state broadcaster than that of a public 
broadcaster. The report provides credence to the print media’s reports concerning the 
SABC.  
 
The fact that the SABC generated twelve major controversies in a period of a year is 
inexcusable behaviour for a PSB. Such controversies immediately point to a 
governance failure at the SABC. A governance failure, which is created by a CEO 
who does not have the credentials to make decisions that, can allow the SABC to 
progress; in tandem with a Board that is ANC-aligned, making the institution partisan 
to the government. Here, once again, the SABC exhibits symptoms of a state 
broadcaster rather than that of a public broadcaster. A further governance failure can 
be seen with the way in which the SABC renounces any responsibility for the 
misdemeanours it performs. Such renouncement of responsibility can particularly be 
seen with the SABC’s failure to accept the findings of the Sisulu Marcus Commission 
of Enquiry. What is more, the SABC’s inability to acknowledge its defects inhibits 
the SABC from adequately accounting to the public. However, inadequacies in 
legislation also contribute to the SABC inadequately accounting to the public. Hence, 
a revision of the Broadcasting and ICASA Acts can help the SABC gain its 
independence and accountability to the public.  
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Adjunct to these problems is the SABC’s funding model. The SABC’s funding model 
does not allow the SABC to fulfil its public service obligations adequately. The 
SABC receives nominal funding from government and other revenue sources, and the 
funding the institution receives from license fees is insufficient. Hence, the SABC’s 
main source of funding is via commercial sources. Consequently, the SABC depends 
on commercial sources for its revenue, which has severely compromised the 
institution’s independence from the private sector. As a repercussion of the SABC’s 
reliance on commercial sources of funding, the quality of the SABC’s programming 
seems to have declined in favour of content that would please advertisers and 
sponsors. The reality of the SABC’s deteriorating programme quality has been met 
with wide concurrence among many of this study’s interviewees.  
 
Consequently, it appears that the SABC has lost its sense of direction as a PSB. 
Despite the SABC’s fulfilment of its license conditions, the internal problems that the 
SABC is fraught with are inhibiting the PSB from progressing. Hence, if the SABC 
does not acknowledge its problems and does not become truly counteractive, the 
institution will never develop into a genuine public service broadcaster. However, the 
SABC’s efforts must be met with increased political will. Accordingly, the future and 
fate of the SABC lies firstly, with the institution itself and secondly, with the 
government who needs to change legislation to increase the SABC’s political 
independence and public accountability.   
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Appendix A: Interview guides 
 
The interview guides that have been presented below serve as a framework for the 
interviews and are an indication of the issue areas that will be discussed. 
 
Interview guide for the SABC: 
1. How is adherence to the editorial charter evaluated by the SABC? 
2. What is the SABC doing in terms of programming to ensure that it serves the 
public interest? 
3. From which source does the SABC primarily receive revenue? 
4. What approach to programming and news provision does the SABC follow?  
5. In what ways can you say that this approach is assisting the SABC in fulfilling 
its public service mandate? 
6. What would you regard as the current challenges facing public service 
broadcasting in South Africa? 
7. Can and should a new coalescence between public and market values be 
conceptualised and implemented? 
8. What can be done to secure the future of public service broadcasting in South 
Africa? 
9. How distinct, if at all, is the SABC from private (commercial) and community 
broadcasters in South Africa? 
10. How do you see the changing public service broadcasting environment? 
11. How does this changing environment affect the SABC? 
12. How independent is the SABC's editorial and programme policies from 
political and economic interference? 
 
Interview guide for ICASA: 
1. How often do you evaluate the SABC? 
2. What informs this evaluation? 
3. What is ICASA doing about the recent controversies that the SABC has been 
stirring-up? 
4. After an evaluation, if it happens to be that the SABC is not adequately 
fulfilling its role and responsibility as a PSB, what does ICASA do then? 
5. What is the evaluation process? (take me through the evaluation process) 
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6. What would you regard as the current challenges or threats facing PSB in SA? 
7. What is ICASA doing to facilitate solutions to these problems? 
8. What would you regard as the current challenges facing broadcasting policy in 
SA? (Is broadcasting policy and regulation in SA adequate?) 
9. Can and should a new coalescence between public and market values be 
conceptualised and implemented? 
10. What can be done to secure the future of public service broadcasting in South 
Africa? 
11. In your opinion, what are the best ways of funding the SABC in order to allow 
it to become a public service broadcaster in the true sense of the word? 
12. In your opinion, how independent is the SABC's editorial and programme 
policies from political and economic interference? 
13. How distinct, if at all, is the SABC from private (commercial) and community 
broadcasters in South Africa? 
 
Interview guide for FXI/MISA/NABSA: 
1. What would you regard as the current challenges facing PSB in SA? 
2. In your opinion do you think broadcasting policy adequately facilitates the 
SABC to fulfil its PSB mandate/roles? (If not, why?) 
3. What is your stance on the recent controversies that the SABC has been 
stirring up? 
4. What can be done to improve the situation of PSB in SA? 
5. Do you think that the SABC’s development approach to PSB is beneficial to 
South African’s (Why?) 
6. Is ICASA doing an adequate job in ensuring that the SABC fulfils its public 
service roles? 
7. Can and should a new deal be struck between public and market values? 
8. What can be done to secure the future of public service broadcasting in South 
Africa? 
9. In your opinion, what are the best ways of funding the SABC in order to allow 
it to become a public service broadcaster in the true sense of the word? 
10. In your opinion, how independent is the SABC's editorial and programme 
policies from political and economic interference? 
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11. How distinct, if at all, is the SABC from private (commercial) and community 
broadcasters in South Africa? 
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Appendix B – SABC organisational structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(SABC Annual Report, 2006/2007: 19) 
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Appendix C: SABC Editorial Code of Conduct 
 
1. PREAMBLE: THE CORE EDITORIAL VALUES OF THE SABC 
 
Public broadcasters world wide share many features relating to independence, 
accountability and diversity.  However, the SABC's context has unique facets that 
also determine its positioning.  These relate to South Africa's challenges as a young 
democracy and a society in transition.  The challenges are captured neatly in the 
preamble to the Constitution, which sets out the objectives of the South African 
constitution as these: 
 
• To heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights 
• To lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government 
is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by the 
law 
• To improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person 
• To build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as 
a sovereign state in the family of nations 
 
Those national objectives therefore underpin the values and principles that define the 
SABC's role as a public broadcaster: to play a part in healing divisions of the past; to 
promote respect for democratic values and human rights; to supply information that 
allows citizens to exercise their rights, and to reflect the rich diversity of a united 
South Africa. 
 
The values articulated in the Constitution — including national development, unity, 
diversity, non-racism, non-sexism, democracy and human dignity — represent those 
things that are commonly held by South Africans to be important.  They bridge 
political, class, racial and gender divides, and although we are still at the start of our 
project of national development, those are what anchor us as a nation.  For the public 
broadcaster, then, they must form the foundations of our editorial policies. 
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Among the core editorial values for the SABC are these20: 
 
Equality 
The SABC provides programmes for everyone, in all the official languages, and 
promotes universal access to its services. 
 
Editorial Independence 
The SABC is governed by the Charter of the Corporation, which enshrines the 
journalistic, creative and programming independence of the staff of the corporation, 
and the constitutionally protected freedom of expression. 
 
Nation Building 
The SABC celebrates South Africa's national identity and culture, and provides its 
citizens with the information they need to participate in building our democracy. 
 
Diversity 
The SABC reflects South Africa's diverse languages, cultures, provinces and people 
in its programmes. 
 
Human Dignity 
The SABC respects the inherent dignity of all the South Africans, reflects them in all 
their diversity, and does not use language or images that convey stereotypical or 
prejudiced notions of South Africa's races, cultures and sexes. 
 
Accountability 
In discharging their editorial responsibilities, SABC management and staff are 
accountable to the SABC Board, which is charged with ensuring that the corporation 
complies with the Charter. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 These values are reflected in various of the SABC’s editorial policies, including the policies on 
programming, news, language, local content and universal service and access. 
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Transparency 
The SABC ensures that the principles of honesty, openness and transparency are core 
to every aspect of its relationships with shareholder, stakeholders, suppliers and the 
public. 
 
2. EDITORIAL CODE OF THE SABC – THE CODE OF PRACTICE 
 
The values give rise to an Editorial Code that underpins all the programming.  This 
Code was developed by the SABC Board in 1993, and has now been revised to 
incorporate recent developments and changes in the law.  The Code affirms 
commitment to the principle of editorial independence as it relates to SABC 
programmes.  
 
o We are committed to a high standard of accuracy, fairness and impartiality and 
we therefore report, contextualise, and present news and current affairs 
honestly by striving to disclose all the essential facts and by not suppressing 
relevant, available facts, or distorting by wrong or improper emphasis. 
 
o We are committed to fulfilling the rights of all South Africans to receive and 
impart information and ideas and we further understand that if South Africans 
are to meet the challenges of building a nation and a strong democracy, they 
must have access to relevant, reliable, and timely information of the best 
quality.  In covering newsworthy events, we aim to give them what they need 
in order to make informed decisions about their lives. 
 
o We commission, produce and broadcast programmes in a variety of genres and 
formats, and strive to ensure that the SABC's core values are upheld in 
commissioning, acquisition and production of the programmes. 
 
o We are aware of the danger of discrimination being furthered by the media, 
and therefore, in accordance with the Constitutional principle of equality and 
our commitment to the equitable treatment of all segments of the South 
African population, we avoid promoting discrimination through the SABC's 
programmes on the grounds of gender, race, language, culture, political 
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persuasion, class, sexual orientation, religious belief, marital status, or 
disability. 
 
o We do not allow advertising, commercial, political or personal considerations 
to influence our editorial decisions.  The SABC is expected to provide 
information, and as part of this duty should evaluate, analyse and critically 
appraise government policies and programmes.  The SABC is not the 
mouthpiece of the government of the day, nor should it broadcast its opinion 
of government policies, unless they relate directly to broadcasting matters. 
 
o We respect individuals' legitimate right to privacy, and should not do anything 
that entails intrusion into private grief and distress, unless it is justified by 
overriding considerations of public interest. 
 
o We are circumspect and sensitive in presenting any form of brutality, violence, 
atrocities or personal grief. 
 
o We seek balance by presenting relevant views on matters of importance, as far 
as possible.  This may not always be achieved in a single programme or news 
bulletin, but should be done within a reasonable time.  
 
o We are guided by news merit and judgement in reaching editorial decisions.  
Fairness does not require editorial staff to be unquestioning, nor the SABC to 
give every side of an issue the same amount of time. 
 
o In serving the public's right to know, we are enterprising in perceiving, 
pursuing and presenting issues that affect society and individuals. 
 
o We are free from obligation to any interest group, and committed to the 
public's right to know. 
 
o We do not accept gifts, favours, free travel, special treatment, or privileges 
that could compromise our integrity, and any such offer is to be disclosed. 
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o We identify ourselves and our employer before obtaining any information for 
broadcasting.  As a general rule, journalism should be conducted openly.  
Covert methods may be used only with due regard to their legality, to 
considerations such as fairness and invasion of privacy, and to whether the 
information being sought is so significant that it warrants public disclosure but 
cannot be obtained by other means. 
 
o We resolutely uphold the principle of journalistic freedom and see the 
protection of a journalist's sources as an important part of this principle.  If the 
protection of a source were to become a legal matter, the SABC would not 
advise its employees to refuse to obey a court order, but would make its legal 
counsel available for advice and to present legal argument in court to protect 
the source. 
 
o We do our utmost to make a timely correction of any information that was 
broadcast and is found to be inaccurate. 
 
o We foster open dialogue with our viewers and listeners, as we are accountable 
to the public for our reports. 
 
o We aim to tell stories from a South African point of view and deal with issues 
that are important to South Africans.  This includes local, African and global 
issues.  We endeavour to contextualise for South Africans their life as global 
citizens, and to recount the story of South Africa in all its variety and 
complexity.  Given our history, and that South Africa is part of Africa, we see 
it as our responsibility to endeavour to represent Africa and African stories 
fairly and diversely. 
 
o We support South African culture and develop programmes that are 
identifiably South African and contribute to a sense of national identity; to a 
sense of shared experience and the goal of nation building.  
 
o We are committed to being a truly national broadcaster, providing a showcase 
of all South Africa’s provinces and peoples. 
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o We have a mandate to provide for a wide range of audience interests, beliefs 
and perspectives. We therefore provide a programme mix that suits a variety 
of tastes and reflects the diverse make-up of South Africa.  This extends to 
languages, cultures and geographical regions.  
 
o We are committed to being the voice and to telling the story of every South 
African.  Accordingly, we strive to: 
• provide a range of distinctive, creative and top quality programmes in all 
11 official languages across our radio and television portfolio, and strive to 
reflect the needs of each language community in our programming 
• maintain distinct and separate radio services in each of the 11 official 
languages 
• treat all the official languages equitably on our television services 
• integrate South Africa Sign Language into broadcasting as a means of 
making programming accessible to people with hearing disabilities 
• strive to include other non-official languages spoken in South Africa, with 
particular emphasis on the Khoi, Nama and San languages.  
 
(retrieved from www.sabc.co.za) 
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Appendix D - SABC Funding Model 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public 
funding
 
TV license fees 
(S21 Co 
taxation) 
 
Public private 
partnerships 
 
Government 
dept. funding 
 
Direct funding for 
projects 
- Technology 
infrastructure (DTT) 
Commercial 
funding 
Content sales 
- Channels 
- Pay to view channels    
(DtH & DTT) 
- Advertiser funded  
- programmes 
- News bureau 
- Joint venture  
- Music 
- Film  
- New media 
- IPTV 
- Content on demand 
- Trade exchange 
 
Consumer products 
- Retail  
- Publishing  
- Facilities 
- Mobile WASP 
- Portal services 
- Access services 
- Trade exchange 
 
 
Airtime Sales 
- Radio 
- Television 
- Website 
- Interactive 
- Programme sponsorships 
- Sport sponsorships 
 
 
(SABC Annual Report and Financial Statements, 2007: 24) 
 
 
 
